Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). · Go Syfert
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Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2016–2024 · …as a preliminary matter the trial court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …as a preliminary matter the trial court is only required to make a finding of the agreements existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity. ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · 2 courts · …does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms at p. 219 ✓
127 citation events (127 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co. (calctapp, 2026-05-27) · Strongest negative: City of Hope v. Bryan Cave (calctapp, 2002-11-13)
Treatment trajectory · 2002 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2002 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 30 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" City of Hope v. Bryan Cave
Cal. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: but see · confidence high
(See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, § 496, pp. 925-926; but see Condee v. Longwood, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 215 .) Inclusion of the arbitration provision is necessary because, in addition to determining whether an arbitration agreement exists, the court needs to determine who has standing to demand arbitration.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee).) “This conclusion is bolstered by California Rules of Court, rule [3.1330].”2 (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 ).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 states: “A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kostandian v. American Honda Motor Co. CA2/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee).) “This conclusion is bolstered by California Rules of Court, rule [3.1330].”2 (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 ).) California Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 states: “A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Manriquez-Gonzales v. Impact Logistics CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
(See Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062 (Espejo) [concluding that a declaration, detailing how an electronic signature “could have only been placed on the signature pages” by someone using the employee’s “unique user name and password,” was sufficient to authenticate the arbitration agreement]; Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 322 (Jazayeri); Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 (Condee).) First, Impact’s reliance on Condee and Espejo is misplaced.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Inostroza v. Amazon.com CA1/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 (Condee); Code Civ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James v. Knolls West Post Acute CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
(See Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1154 [“Once the moving party has established the existence of the arbitration agreement, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual basis for any defense to enforcement”]; see also Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804 , 815 [“Under the Gamboa framework, the moving party is entitled to a presumption, in the first instance, that the agreement to arbitrate is authentic”]; Condee v. Long…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chai v. National Enterprise Systems CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [as a preliminary matter the moving party need only allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation by providing a recitation of its terms].) Both here and in Gamboa, the party opposing 3Because we find NES did not prove the existence of an agreement between Citibank and Chai, we need not determine whether Citibank or its successor, USI, assigned the right to compel arbitration to NES. 5 arbitration met the burden under the second step by filing an opposing declaration.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”].) For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, at p. 218.) If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its bu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdez v. Tesla CA1/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee).) The movant “may meet [its] initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 ; accord, Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062 , 1067 (Fabian) [party “met its initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a copy of the Contract to its petition, which purportedly bears 6 [plaintiff’s] electronic i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tuttle v. Nalco Co. CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219 [where opposing party never challenged signature on arbitration agreement, trial court erred in denying petition to compel arbitration based on movant’s failure to authenticate signature]; see Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 [“Properly understood, Condee holds that a petitioner is not required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature on an arbitration agreement . . . in the event the authenticity of the signature is not challenged”]; Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2015) 99 F.Supp.3d 1072, 1076, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. Overland Terrace Healthcare Centre CA2/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Cf. Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [attaching copy of pertinent agreement sufficient].) Because, as noted above, substantial evidence supports the finding that Overland did not prove the existence of an arbitration agreement that it could enforce, the burden never shifted to plaintiff. 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lopez v. Charter Communications CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
(Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219 .) It also concluded the parties seeking arbitration were not required to follow the normal procedures of document authentication and noted that section 1281.2 “does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence.” ( Condee, supra, at pp. 218, 219 .) Furthermore, the court determined the trial court erred in denying the petitions to compel arbitration for failure to authenticate the arbitration agreement when the authenticity of the signature on the document was never challenged.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sprunk v. Prisma LLC
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee) [holding that rule 371, the predecessor to rule 3.1330, “does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms”].) The Grundel declarations met this requirement by providing the two different versions of the arbitration provision and stating that all class members signed at least one of those versions.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 (Condee); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 ["A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joyce v. Volt Management Corp. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(See Apex LLC v. Sharing World, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009 [review of a trial court's "selection of the applicable law . . . is reviewed de novo"].) Appellants note that a writing may be authenticated by any qualified witness and that a handwriting comparison done by the court is a valid form of authentication.7 Appellants contend that the trial court "failed to apply" these standards pertaining to the 7 Citing Condee v. Longwood (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee), appellants also assert that a party petitioning to compel arbitration "need only prove an agreement's existence, a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Petitioner’s Burden Defendants rely primarily on Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 217-219 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ] (Condee) in support of their contention that they were not required to establish the authenticity of Espejo’s signature on the DRP as part of their initial petition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Code; a writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence and by its contents]; Newton v. American Debt Services, Inc. (ND.Cal. 2012) 854 F.Supp.2d 712, 731-732 [electronic signature on arbitration agreement proved to be the plaintiff’s signature because it was made using DocuSign, a company used to electronically sign documents in compliance with the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ( 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.), and the process DocuSign used to verify the plaintiff’s electronic signature was explained].) Relying on Condee v. Longwood Management Corp.…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(See Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ].) 6 Gloster argues the Melody defendants’ notice of appeal was defective because it sought review of the denial of their petition to compel arbitration but referred only to the written order, without mentioning the minute order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ].) “ ‘Only the valid and binding agreement of the parties, including all material terms well-defined and clearly expressed, may be ordered specifically performed.’ [Citation].” (Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 .) Because the Employee Acknowledgment Form and Application for Employment are incomplete without the incorporated Fair Treatment Process, we may not enforce them as stand-alone arbitration agreements.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. UBS Financial Services CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 217-219 (Condee), the appellate court held that for purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, the petitioner may make an adequate prima facie showing regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement without submitting evidence sufficient to authenticate the signatures on the agreement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. UBS Financial Services CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
In Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 217-219 (Condee), the appellate court held that for purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, the petitioner may make an adequate prima facie showing regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement without submitting evidence sufficient to authenticate the signatures on the agreement.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
“A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ].) In this case, defendants carried their initial burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. *711 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Co. v. Architectural Facades Unlimited, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1478 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 754 ] [“motion for reconsideration”]; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 217 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ].) The sole suggested justification for disregarding the statute’s language was thus demonstrably unsound.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shea v. HOUSEHOLD BANK (SB)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
(Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ].) For the following reasons and authorities, Shea failed to meet this burden.
discussed Cited "see" Toal v. Tardif (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
(Blanton, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 402, fn. 5 ; see § 1141.10 et seq.) 8 In Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ], the trial court denied a petition to compel arbitration because the arbitration contract “was not properly authenticated” (id. at pp. 217-218), even though “the signature’s authenticity .. . was never challenged” (id. at p. 218).
discussed Cited "see" Brodke v. Alphatec Spine Inc. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
Assn. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1035, 1041-1042 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 , 831 P.2d 821 ] [deciding when statute of limitations on action to compel arbitration begins to run]; see Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 [ 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 ] [a party moving to compel arbitration “must allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the controversy”]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Proceedings Without Trial, § 496, p. 925 [a petition to compel arbitration must allege, among other things, “that there is a written agreement to arbitrate”].) Here, defendants did …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Turner v. Insight Global CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
(See Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569 , 586 [“‘At this step, a movant need not “follow the normal procedures of document authentication” and need only “allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule [3.1330]”’”]; see also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215 , 218–219 [a petitioner seeking to compel arbitration is not required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature on an arbitration agreement to satisfy its initial burden].) As Insight Global attached to the motion to comp…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Menjivar v. Field Fresh Foods CA2/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Gamboa, at p. 165; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”].) At this initial step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 .) If the moving party establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the nonmoving party does not challenge the agreement’s validity or otherwise establish an exception to arbitration, the court …
examined Cited "see, e.g." Baumgarten v. EOTFR CA2/3 (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(Gamboa, at p. 165; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”].) At this step, “it is not necessary 6 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 10 to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218 (Condee).) If the moving party establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and the nonmoving party doesn’t challenge the agreement�…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. 5th · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
(See Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc . (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696 , 701-702, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 [concluding that defendants had "made a sufficient prima facie showing of an agreement to arbitrate, based not only on the allegations of the complaint but also on their moving papers and on their proffer of the [agreement]"]; see also Condee , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597 [concluding that a petitioner is not required to authenticate an opposing party's signature on an arbitration agreement in the event the authenticity of the signature is not cha…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
MARTA FELIX CONDEE Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
LONGWOOD MANAGEMENT CORP., Defendant and Appellant; MARTA FELIX CONDEE Et Al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. IRA DAVID ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant and Appellant
G027263, G027773.
California Court of Appeal.
Apr 2, 2001.
105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 597
2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2701
2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 252
Counsel, Huskinson & Brown, Stephen J. Kelley and David W. T. Brown for Defendants and Appellants., Law Offices of Melissa G. Schwartz, Melissa G. Schwartz and Matthew Schwartz for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Rylaarsdam.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

RYLAARSDAM, J.

Defendants Longwood Management Corp. (case No. G027263) and Ira David Enterprises, Inc. (case No. G027773) appeal from a[*217] denial of their petitions to compel arbitration for failure to authenticate the alleged arbitration agreement; Longwood Management also appeals from the denial of its motion to reconsider. We conclude the court erred in denying the petitions and reverse.

Facts

Joaquin Penilla was a resident of Parkhurst Retirement Residence (Parkhurst), a residential care facility. Upon commencement of Penilla’s residence at Parkhurst, Penilla’s sister, plaintiff Marta Felix Condee, allegedly signed an arbitration agreement in his name. The agreement purported to bind the parties to arbitration for any dispute, “including actions for injury or death arising from facilities negligence,” but excluding “disputes pertaining to collections and evictions.” Penilla slipped and fell in the Parkhurst facility. After considerable time spent in medical facilities, he died.

Condee and Brenda Yates, Penilla’s heirs, sued Longwood Management Corp. (Longwood), the company operating Parkhurst, for wrongful death. The complaint alleged general negligence, negligent supervision, premises liability and medical malpractice. A Doe amendment added Ira David Enterprises, Inc. (Ira David), a company doing business as Parkhurst, as codefendant.

After conducting some discovery, Longwood filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the current action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281.2, 1281.4; unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) The court denied the petition after finding the alleged arbitration agreement was not properly authenticated, and denying Long-wood’s proffer of a declaration from Virginia Hawkins, Parkhurst’s custodian of records, which purported to authenticate the agreement. Longwood thereafter filed a motion to reconsider the petition (§ 1008), contending the Hawkins declaration was a new fact not before the court when it denied the petition. This motion was denied.

Two months later, Ira David also filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings; it moved the court to take judicial notice of documents including the Hawkins declaration. Plaintiffs opposed the petition contending, among other things, Ira David was bound by the denial of Longwood’s petition. The court denied the petition on the basis it was merely a refiling of Longwood’s earlier petition.

Discussion

Defendants contend the court erred in denying their petitions to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings for the following reasons: (1)[*218] the court should have accepted the Hawkins declaration; (2) the arbitration agreement was properly authenticated; (3) Penilla was bound by the agreement through the actions of his agent Condee; (4) plaintiffs are bound under the agreement as Penilla’s heirs; (5) defendants have not waived arbitration by engaging in discovery; (6) the agreement is not unconscionable; and (7) the agreement need not comply with laws regulating arbitration agreements for medical care. Longwood also contends the court erred by denying its motion to reconsider because the Hawkins declaration was a new fact. We conclude the court erred when it denied the petitions to compel for failure to authenticate the arbitration agreement and reverse. We remand to permit the trial court to consider the other issues.

“A proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. [Citation.]” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479 [121 Cal.Rptr. 477, 535 P.2d 341]; see also Spear v. California State Auto. Assn. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1035, 1040 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 831 P.2d 821].) When a party to an arbitration agreement refuses to submit to arbitration, the other party or parties may petition the court to compel arbitration and stay any pending proceedings. (§§ 1281.2, 1281.4.) The petitioner must allege the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the controversy (§ 1281.2); facts necessary for a determination of its enforceability are proven by affidavits or declarations. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061].) Furthermore, “[t]he provisions [of the arbitration agreement] shall be set forth verbatim or a copy shall be attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 371.) The court must then conduct a summary hearing “in the manner . . . provided by law for the . . . hearing of motions. . . .” (§ 1290.2.)

Here, the court concluded the arbitration agreement, included as an exhibit with defendants’ petitions, was not properly authenticated. A document offered into evidence must be properly authenticated regardless of the fact it is not excludable on other grounds. (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a); see generally 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Documentary Evidence, § 3, p. 136.) In this case, although no evidence was ever introduced to verify the signature’s authenticity, it was never challenged.

The parties needlessly spill a fair quantity of ink arguing whether the court properly excluded the Hawkins declaration and whether the declaration would have authenticated the arbitration agreement. For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication. “[T]he court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an[*219] agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. . . .” (§ 1281.2) The statute does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence. A plain reading of the statute indicates that as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.

This conclusion is bolstered by California Rules of Court, rule 371. A petitioner must attach a copy of the agreement to the petition, or its “provisions . . . shall be set forth” in the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 371.) As with section 1281.2, what the rule does not say is significant. (See Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 921 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226, 844 P.2d 545] [applying doctrine of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius].) Rule 371 does not require the petitioner to introduce the agreement into evidence or provide the court with anything more than a copy or recitation of its terms. Petitioner need only allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule 371. Both Longwood and Ira David met this requirement. Once the petitioners had alleged that the agreement exists, the burden shifted to respondents to prove the falsity of the purported agreement.

If the court determines the agreement to arbitrate exists, it should then decide the other objections to its enforceability. Once the court has determined the agreement exists, the court must grant the petition “unless it determines that: [¶] (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.” (§ 1281.2.)

The court erred by denying the petition to arbitrate on the grounds the agreement was not properly authenticated. We remand to permit the court to consider the other objections raised to the enforcement of the agreement.

Disposition

The judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Each party shall pay its own costs.

Sills, P. J., and O’Leary, J., concurred.