presumed error in California

2024(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 , disapproved on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72–73, fn. 4.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable the verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent this presumed error.

2023(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 , disapproved on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72–73, fn. 4.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable the verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent this presumed error.

2024(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 , disapproved on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72–73, fn. 4.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable the verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent this presumed error.

2023(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403 , disapproved on other grounds in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72–73, fn. 4.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable the verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent this presumed error.

2022(See Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 279 .) Therefore, prejudice is not present under the standard articulated in Chapman, and this claim fails.

2021(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 .) In other words, this presumed error was unimportant in relation to everything the jury considered on the issue of appellant’s guilt.

2025(People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197 , 226‒227 [“we have held the application of ordinary rules of evidence … does not implicate the federal Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the ‘reasonable probability’ standard of Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836”].) At the time Rusche testified, A.S. had already testified regarding the multiple incidents of sexual abuse—including both charged and uncharged conduct.

2025Under the Chapman standard, “[w]e must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) “[I]n order to conclude that an instructional error ‘ “did not contribute to the verdict” ’ within the meaning of Chapman [citation] we must ‘ “find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record” ’ [citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 70 .) Knives are not inherently deadly weapons.

2025Under the Chapman standard, “[w]e must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831 .) “[I]n order to conclude that an instructional error ‘ “did not contribute to the verdict” ’ within the meaning of Chapman [citation] we must ‘ “find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record” ’ [citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 70 .) Knives are not inherently deadly weapons.

2025(People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 70 .) Here we cannot conclude a presumed error of admitting the gang expert’s opinion about the lack of false confessions of murder amongst gang members rendered Martinez’s trial fundamentally unfair.

2025As stated above, “a true Brady violation occurs when three conditions are met: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 274 .) Here, Conerly has failed to establish the evidence was suppressed as a result of a presumed violation.

2024(Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052 .) We accordingly review the presumed error under the state law harmlessness standard.

2023(Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 .) In the present matter, this presumed error was not a defect in how the trial proceeded.

2022“To establish a person has willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer in the performance of the officer’s duties, the People must prove: (1) the person willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer; (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties; and (3) the person knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 956 ; § 148, subd. (a)(1).) The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Rodriguez saw uniformed office

2021(See People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646 .) “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) Apart from the failure to instruct on the element of force or threat with respect to count two, we have found either no error or the presumed error was harmless under the appropriate standard of review.

2021(See People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 646 .) “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) Apart from the failure to instruct on the element of force or threat with respect to count two, we have found either no error or the presumed error was harmless under the appropriate standard of review.

2014(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390 .) The court further found that this presumed error required a remand for resentencing because: “Although the trial courts in these cases understood that they had some discretion in sentencing, the records do not clearly indicate that they would have imposed the same sentence had they been aware of the full scope of their discretion.

2013Because on appeal a judgment is presumed correct, an appellant "must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error." (People v. Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 881 .) The standard of prejudice set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836 for state law error applies to the presumed error in excluding the Funtall phone call evidence, and therefore Covey must show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable verdict absent the trial court's error.

2013(People v. Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 66-71; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Defendant argues the trial court’s presumed error was prejudicial because defendant was forced to ask about the district attorney’s campaign mailer during jury selection, and also because the deputy district attorney who actually tried the case was “likely” precluded from negotiating any plea to a lesser charge.

1996Instead, the reviewing court assumed “arguendo the trial court abused its discretion in not granting defendants’ motion for discretionary dismissal” ( 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 ) and then concluded the presumed error did not compel reversal; “When an appeal is taken from a judgment and the appellant alleges the trial court made an erroneous pretrial ruling, it is not enough to show that the ruling was indeed erroneous.

1973See also People v. Laster (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 381 , 393 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 108 ]; People v. Nichols (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 217, 223 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; and Cannis v. Di Salvo Trucking Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.2d 893, 898 .) In People v. Nichols, supra, the court stated, “To determine whether error has been committed this court must consider jury instructions as a whole. [Citations.]” ( 255 Cal.App.2d at p. 222 .) Appellant asserts that the fact that the jury requested three readings of the instructions demonstrates that they were confusing.

1973(Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 491, p. 497.)” (People v. Smith (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 775, 779-780 , fn. omitted [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 557 ].) In People v. Ramirez (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 665 ], which both sides recognize as expressing the principle applicable to this case, the court stated: “. . . since the presumed error was in the instructions to the jury, the test to be applied is that of article VI, section 13 of our Constitution, that is, whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an exam

1973(Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 491, p. 497.)” (People v. Smith (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 775, 779-780 , fn. omitted [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 557 ].) In People v. Ramirez (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 665 ], which both sides recognize as expressing the principle applicable to this case, the court stated: “. . . since the presumed error was in the instructions to the jury, the test to be applied is that of article VI, section 13 of our Constitution, that is, whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an exam

1973(Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 491, p. 497.)” (People v. Smith (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 775, 779-780 , fn. omitted [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 557 ].) In People v. Ramirez (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 665 ], which both sides recognize as expressing the principle applicable to this case, the court stated: “. . . since the presumed error was in the instructions to the jury, the test to be applied is that of article VI, section 13 of our Constitution, that is, whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an exam

1973(Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 491, p. 497.)” (People v. Smith (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 775, 779-780 , fn. omitted [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 557 ].) In People v. Ramirez (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 345 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 665 ], which both sides recognize as expressing the principle applicable to this case, the court stated: “. . . since the presumed error was in the instructions to the jury, the test to be applied is that of article VI, section 13 of our Constitution, that is, whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. ‘[A] “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an exam