private attorney general doctrine in Hawaii

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2014The court’s determination as to the private attorney general doctrine is reviewed “under the abuse of discretion standard,” however, “we review de novo whether the trial court disregarded rules or principles of law that arise in deciding whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private attorney general doctrine.” Id. at 313 , 310 P.3d at 308 .

2014As to the third criterion, “the number of people standing to benefit from the decision,” Sierra Club, 120 Hawai#i at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263 (citations omitted), the court determined that “proper enforcement of the procurement code via enforcement through HRS § 103D-304 is of benefit to all citizens of the state.” The Board contends, on the other hand, that “even if invalidation of the [r]ule could benefit someone in some theoretical case, there is no showing that even a handful of people, let alone many people, would benefit.” 58 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

2014The private attorney general doctrine “is an equitable rule that allows courts in their discretion to award [attorneys’] fees to plaintiffs who have vindicated important public rights.” Id. (quoting Maui Tomorrow v. State, 110 Hawai'i 234, 244 , 131 P.3d 517, 527 (2006)).

2014The private attorney general doctrine “is an equitable rule that allows courts in their discretion to award [attorneys’] fees to plaintiffs who have vindicated important public rights.” Id. (quoting Maui Tomorrow v. State, 110 Hawai'i 234, 244 , 131 P.3d 517, 527 (2006)).

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2025Unlike the ICA, we do not reach the latter question, and note that the ICA’s discussion of that issue is dicta. 21 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI᷾I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** Hawaiʻi at 221, 225-29, 307 P.3d at 1266, 1270-74) (“‘Application of the private attorney general doctrine is . . . subject to the defenses which a defendant may have’ . . . [including] the State’s defense of sovereign immunity.”).

2013The private attorney general doctrine was first discussed by this court in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Hawai'i 27 , 25 P.3d 802 (2001) (Waiahole II). “[N]ormally, pursuant to the ‘American Rule,’ each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses.” Sierra Club II, 120 Hawai'i at 218 , 202 P.3d at 1263 (quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g and Erection, Inc., 87 Hawai'i 37, 50-51 , 951 P.2d 487, 500-01 (1998) (brackets omitted)).

2013The private attorney general doctrine was first discussed by this court in In re Water Use Permit Applications, 96 Hawai'i 27 , 25 P.3d 802 (2001) (Waiahole II). “[N]ormally, pursuant to the ‘American Rule,’ each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses.” Sierra Club II, 120 Hawai'i at 218 , 202 P.3d at 1263 (quoting Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g and Erection, Inc., 87 Hawai'i 37, 50-51 , 951 P.2d 487, 500-01 (1998) (brackets omitted)).

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2026Although relief was not yet determined, we expressly held that “the private attorney general doctrine does not require that a plaintiff receive a final judgment in [their] favor before fees may be awarded.” Id.

2026The ICA’s determination that the PAG doctrine cannot apply because “it has not yet been determined what relief Ralston can obtain” is contrary to both Kaleikini and Unite Here!, and our holding that “the private attorney general doctrine does not require that a plaintiff receive a final judgment in [their] favor before fees may be awarded.” Kaleikini II, 129 Hawaiʻi at 462, 304 P.3d at 260 .

2021However, "we review de novo whether the trial court disregarded rules of principles of law that arise in deciding whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private attorney general doctrine." Id. 9 Portions of the Settlement Agreement apparently relating to the issues of attorneys' fees were redacted. 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER B.

2021"The private attorney general doctrine sets forth an equitable rule enabling an award of attorneys' fees for vindication of important public rights." Irwin Park II, 130 Hawai#i at 308, 310 P.3d at 303 (citation omitted).

2006We affirmed in part and reversed in part, id. at 189-90 , 9 P.3d at 501-02 , and soon thereafter, some of the parties, referred to as the Windward Parties, filed motions for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine.

2006We affirmed in part and reversed in part, id. at 189-90 , 9 P.3d at 501-02 , and soon thereafter, some of the parties, referred to as the Windward Parties, filed motions for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine.

2013See Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 128 Hawai'i 53, 60 , 283 P.3d 60, 67 (2012) (Kaleikini I).

2013In that case, we determined that Kaleikini was the prevailing party in Kaleikini v. Yoshioka (Kaleikini I), 128 Hawai#i 53, 283 P.3d 60 (2012),4 and we awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Petitioner Kaleikini pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine. 129 Hawai#i at 462, 304 P.3d at 260 .

2013Id. at 333 n. 14, 132 P.3d at 1244 n. 14 (“[The pjlaintiffs’ arguments that attorneys’ fees should be awarded pursuant to ... the private attorney general doctrine, [was] raised for the first time in their reply memorandum.”).

2013Id. at 333 n. 14, 132 P.3d at 1244 n. 14 (“[The pjlaintiffs’ arguments that attorneys’ fees should be awarded pursuant to ... the private attorney general doctrine, [was] raised for the first time in their reply memorandum.”).

2013Serrano, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d at 1315 ; see also Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 29 , 25 P.3d at 804 (stating that the private attorney general doctrine is one of the “equitable exceptions to the American Rule that ‘each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses’”) (quoting Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees’ Retirement Sys., 92 Hawai'i 432, 439 , 992 P.2d 127, 134 (2000)).

2013Serrano, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d at 1315 ; see also Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 29 , 25 P.3d at 804 (stating that the private attorney general doctrine is one of the “equitable exceptions to the American Rule that ‘each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses’”) (quoting Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees’ Retirement Sys., 92 Hawai'i 432, 439 , 992 P.2d 127, 134 (2000)).

2014As to the third criterion, “the number of people standing to benefit from the decision,” Sierra Club, 120 Hawai'i at 218 , 202 P.3d at 1263 (citations omitted), the court determined that “proper enforcement of the procurement code via enforcement through HRS § 103D-304 is of benefit to all citizens of the state.” The Board contends, on the other hand, that “even if invalidation of the [r]ule could benefit someone in some theoretical case, there is no showing that even a handful of people, let alone many people, would benefit.” This court has found that the third prong of the private attorney g

2014As to the third criterion, “the number of people standing to benefit from the decision,” Sierra Club, 120 Hawai#i at 218, 202 P.3d at 1263 (citations omitted), the court determined that “proper enforcement of the procurement code via enforcement through HRS § 103D-304 is of benefit to all citizens of the state.” The Board contends, on the other hand, that “even if invalidation of the [r]ule could benefit someone in some theoretical case, there is no showing that even a handful of people, let alone many people, would benefit.” 58 ***FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

2026When a party seeks to recover fees under the PAG doctrine, however, “we review de novo whether the [lower] court disregarded rules or principles of law that arise in deciding whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private attorney general doctrine.” Asato v. Procurement Pol’y Bd., 132 Hawaiʻi 333, 357, 322 P.3d 228, 252 (2014) (quoting citation omitted).

2026When a party seeks to recover fees under the PAG doctrine, however, “we review de novo whether the [lower] court disregarded rules or principles of law that arise in deciding whether or not a party satisfies the three factors of the private attorney general doctrine.” Asato v. Procurement Pol’y Bd., 132 Hawaiʻi 333, 357, 322 P.3d 228, 252 (2014) (quoting citation omitted).

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2025The ICA Properly Held That Attorneys’ Fees Are Barred by Sovereign Immunity in Inverse Condemnation Cases The Ohanas request attorneys’ fees through the private attorney general doctrine, arguing that they are entitled to fees because: (1) “[t]he Ohanas vindicated fundamental rights through this litigation,” (2) of “the effort, resources, and time involved (two decades) that illustrates the magnitude of the burden of litigating against the State and the need to promote lawsuits that vindicate important public rights by awarding fees,” and (3) the issues they raised in this litigation are consi

2025Sierra Club I, 154 Hawai#i at 285, 550 P.3d at 251; cf. Ass'n of Owners of Kalele Kai v. Yoshikawa, 149 Hawai#i 417, 420, 493 P.3d 939 , 942 (2021) ("an award of attorneys' fees is inappropriate where the underlying judgment is vacated").

2025Goo, 132 Hawaiʻi at 318, 321 P.3d at 669.

2025Goo, 132 Hawaiʻi at 318, 321 P.3d at 669 .

2024The State argues that the Circuit Court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs because (a) sovereign immunity bars an award of attorney's fees and costs here; and (b) even if the State had waived its immunity with respect to KRB's claims, KRB is not entitled to fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine. "'[T]he sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages, except where there has been a clear relinquishment of immunity and the State has consented to be sued.'" Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 129 Hawai i 454, 467, 304 P.3d 252, 265 (2013) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai i

2024The State argues that the Circuit Court erred in awarding attorney's fees and costs because (a) sovereign immunity bars an award of attorney's fees and costs here; and (b) even if the State had waived its immunity with respect to KRB's claims, KRB is not entitled to fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine. "'[T]he sovereign State is immune from suit for money damages, except where there has been a clear relinquishment of immunity and the State has consented to be sued.'" Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 129 Hawai i 454, 467, 304 P.3d 252, 265 (2013) (quoting Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai i

2017The dissent argues that our decision "opens the door for other private property owners to receive free services from the State.” Dissent at 482, 403 P.3d at 259.

2015The circuit court denied the Kala-kaua Group’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs based on its conclusion that the “State has not waived its sovereign immunity.” The circuit court erred in this regard because “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unavailing and inapposite” when the “case deals with a suit initiated by the State[.]” State ex rel Anzai v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 515-16 , 57 P.3d 433, 440-41 (2002).

2015The circuit court denied the Kala-kaua Group’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs based on its conclusion that the “State has not waived its sovereign immunity.” The circuit court erred in this regard because “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unavailing and inapposite” when the “case deals with a suit initiated by the State[.]” State ex rel Anzai v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 515-16 , 57 P.3d 433, 440-41 (2002).

2013I concur with the majority’s holding that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and satisfy the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine, see majority's opinion at 165-68, 307 P.3d at 145-48; that this court should address only Plaintiffs' request for appellate attorneys’ fees and costs, id. at 165, n. 3, 307 P.3d at 145, n. 3 (" '[Djecisions about fees incurred at the trial level are more properly within the trial court's discretion.’ ”) (quoting S. Utsunomiya Enters., Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club, 76 Hawai'i 396, 402 , 879 P.2d 501, 507 (1994)); and that Plaintiffs’ request for ap

2013I concur with the majority’s holding that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and satisfy the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine, see majority's opinion at 165-68, 307 P.3d at 145-48; that this court should address only Plaintiffs' request for appellate attorneys’ fees and costs, id. at 165, n. 3, 307 P.3d at 145, n. 3 (" '[Djecisions about fees incurred at the trial level are more properly within the trial court's discretion.’ ”) (quoting S. Utsunomiya Enters., Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club, 76 Hawai'i 396, 402 , 879 P.2d 501, 507 (1994)); and that Plaintiffs’ request for ap

2009Based on this rationale, this court stated that the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine "is to promote vindication of important public rights." Id. (quoting Arnold v. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593 , 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989)). [22] In discussing the three prongs of the doctrine in relation to the facts of Waiahole II, this court found that the first and third prongs of the doctrine were satisfied because Waiahole II "involved constitutional rights of profound significance, and all of the citizens of the state, present and future, stood to benefit from the decision." Id. at

2009Based on this rationale, this court stated that the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine "is to promote vindication of important public rights." Id. (quoting Arnold v. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593 , 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989)). [22] In discussing the three prongs of the doctrine in relation to the facts of Waiahole II, this court found that the first and third prongs of the doctrine were satisfied because Waiahole II "involved constitutional rights of profound significance, and all of the citizens of the state, present and future, stood to benefit from the decision." Id. at

2009However, in my view both the issue of attorney's fees and the private attorney general doctrine are beyond the scope of the state's waiver of sovereign immunity in this case, see Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of State, 106 Hawai'i 416, 432 , 106 P.3d 339, 355 (2005), thereby requiring a further waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the state's consent to be sued.

2009However, in my view both the issue of attorney's fees and the private attorney general doctrine are beyond the scope of the state's waiver of sovereign immunity in this case, see Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System of State, 106 Hawai'i 416, 432 , 106 P.3d 339, 355 (2005), thereby requiring a further waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the state's consent to be sued.