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51 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arnold v. Arizona Department of Health Servicesgreen2 sentences2023ATTORNEY FEES ¶101 DOW requests attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-348 and “the private attorney general doctrine” as laid out in Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593 (1989). 2022“The private attorney general doctrine is an equitable rule which permits courts in their discretion to award attorney’s fees . . . .” Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609 (1989). | 32 | 35 |
Walter Ansley v. Banner Health Networkgreen2 sentences2026We Decline to Award Copperstate’s Attorneys Fees Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine. ¶19 “To receive an award of attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine, the prevailing party must ‘vindicate[ ] a right that (1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance.’” Lane v. City of Scottsdale, 258 Ariz. 460 , 469 ¶ 30 (App. 2024) (quoting Ansley v. Banner Health Network, 248 Ariz. 143 , 153 ¶ 39 (2020)). ¶20 While we appreciate the effect of Copperstate’s efforts in “vindicat[ing] the authority of Arizona municipali 2024See Ansley v. Banner Health Network, 248 Ariz. 143, 153, ¶ 39 (2020) (“Fees are permissible under the private attorney general doctrine for a party who has vindicated a right that (1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance.”). ¶50 Ehrich requests attorney’s fees on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-349, 13-2314.04(A), (N). | 5 | 7 |
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassellgreen2 sentences2020Interest v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 371 (App. 1991). ¶42 Finally, the enforcement of federal Medicaid provisions, particularly the full measure of benefits, is unquestionably of great societal importance. ¶43 The hospitals make two arguments as to why the private attorney general doctrine should not apply. 2016EORP/STATE Opinion of the Court 72, 837 P.2d 158 , 173–74 (App. 1991) (allowing judgment to run against intervenor-defendants and awarding plaintiffs attorneys’ fees against defendants and intervenor-defendants under the private attorney general doctrine); McKesson Chem. | 2 | 4 |
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Societyred2 sentences2020But Alyeska was based on a lack of statutory authority for federal courts to award fees in that case, id. at 247 , whereas this Court has recognized the private attorney general doctrine in cases that satisfy the Arnold criteria, as this case does. 2019See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245-71 (1975) (doctrine does not allow fees award in challenge to federal agency action); Challenge, Inc. v. State ex rel. | 2 | 3 |
Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointmentsgreen2 sentences2025ATTORNEY FEES ¶29 Oak Creek requests fees and costs under Section 12-341 and the private attorney general doctrine. ¶30 The private attorney general doctrine “is an equitable rule which permits courts in their discretion to award attorney’s fees to a party who has vindicated a right that: 1) benefits a large number of people; 2) requires private enforcement; and 3) is of societal importance.” Dobson v. State, 233 Ariz. 119, 124, ¶ 18 (2013). 2014Given that standard, together with the uncontroverted evidence in this case reflecting that no other entity will likely reach the three million population threshold for more than eighty- five years, the probability that another entity will enter the class is attenuated and theoretical. ¶18 Appellants request an award of attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine, which is an equitable rule permitting courts to award attorneys’ fees to parties who have vindicated a right that “(1) benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3) is of societal import | 2 | 2 |
State v. Boykingreen2 sentences2020Corbin v. Tocco, 173 Ariz. 587, 595 (App. 1992); see State v. Boykin, 112 Ariz. 109, 114 (1975). ¶39 Fees are permissible under the private attorney general doctrine for a party who has vindicated a right that (1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance. 1993Discretionary Denial of Fee Award Although Arizona law recognized the private attorney general doctrine in the mid-1970’s, see State v. Boykin, 112 Ariz. 109, 114 , 538 P.2d 383, 388 (1975), the doctrine was not applied to award fees in a reported Arizona case until Arnold . | 2 | 2 |
Cave Creek Unified School District v. Duceygreen2 sentences2020Dist. v. Ducey, 231 Ariz. 342, 353, ¶ 34 (App. 2013) (explaining the private attorney general doctrine permits a discretionary award of fees to a party that has vindicated an important public right) (citing Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609 (1989)). 2013After considering those factors, the court of appeals concluded that an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to Cave Creek was appropriate because the litigation’s outcome “affects funding for Arizona’s public education, [which] necessarily benefits a large number of people”; “absent private enforcement, the legislature may have continued to operate under its erroneous interpretation of § 15-901.01”; and “public education [funding] ... has continual importance in this state.” Cave Creek, 231 Ariz. at 353 ¶¶ 35-36, 295 P.3d at 451 . | 1 | 2 |
Meyer v. Stategreen1 sentence2022See Meyer v. State, 246 Ariz. 188 , 195–96 ¶¶ 25–31 (App. 2019) (awarding fees to legislators successfully challenging the constitutionality of a law); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Corbin v. Toccogreen1 sentence2020Corbin v. Tocco, 173 Ariz. 587, 595 (App. 1992); see State v. Boykin, 112 Ariz. 109, 114 (1975). ¶39 Fees are permissible under the private attorney general doctrine for a party who has vindicated a right that (1) benefits a large number of people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance. | 1 | 1 |
Byers-Watts v. Parkergreen2 sentences2010See Defenders of Wildlife, 199 Ariz. at 428, ¶¶ 65-66 , 18 P.3d at 739 . 2010See Defenders of Wildlife, 199 Ariz. at 428, ¶¶ 65-66 , 18 P.3d at 739 . | 1 | 1 |
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Departmentgreen2 sentences2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . 2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
Timmons v. City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . 2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
London v. Green Acres Trustgreen2 sentences2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . 2006See generally, Fischel, id. (discussing the general proposition that enhancement is rare); Kadish v. Ariz. State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 333 , 868 P.2d 335, 346 (App.1993) (applying the private attorney general doctrine); Timmons v. City of Tucson, 171 Ariz. 350, 357 , 830 P.2d 871, 878 (App.1991) (applying statutory fee shifting doctrine); London v. Green Acres Trust, 159 Ariz. 136, 148 , 765 P.2d 538, 550 (App.1988) (applying the "bad faith” exception). 11 . | 1 | 1 |
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hullgreen2 sentences2002See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 199 Ariz. 411, ¶ 65 , 18 P.3d 722, ¶ 65 (App.2001). 2002See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 199 Ariz. 411, ¶ 65 , 18 P.3d 722, ¶ 65 (App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Larkin v. State Ex Rel. Rottasgreen2 sentences1993Larkin, 175 Ariz. at 417 , 857 P.2d at 1271 . 1993Larkin, 175 Ariz. at 417 , 857 P.2d at 1271 . | 1 | 1 |
CORTARO WATER USERS'ASS'N v. Steinergreen2 sentences1991See Cortaro Water Users’ Ass’n v. Steiner, 148 Ariz. 314 , 316, 714 P.2d 807 , 809 (1986) (Arizona follows the general American rule that each party must bear its own fees absent authority under statute or contract directing otherwise); Arnold v. Dept. of Health Services, 160 Ariz. 593, 608-09 , 775 P.2d 521, 536-37 (1989) (notwithstanding the American rule, courts may award attorneys’ fees under equitable rules, including the private attorney general doctrine). 1991See Cortaro Water Users’ Ass’n v. Steiner, 148 Ariz. 314 , 316, 714 P.2d 807 , 809 (1986) (Arizona follows the general American rule that each party must bear its own fees absent authority under statute or contract directing otherwise); Arnold v. Dept. of Health Services, 160 Ariz. 593, 608-09 , 775 P.2d 521, 536-37 (1989) (notwithstanding the American rule, courts may award attorneys’ fees under equitable rules, including the private attorney general doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cave Creek Unified School District v. Ducey
green
2 sentences2024Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1 , 8 ¶ 26 (2013) (quoting Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2024Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1 , 8 ¶ 26 (2013) (quoting Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 609 (1989)). | 4 | 2021–2024 |
McKesson Chemical Co. v. Van Waters & Rogers
green
2 sentences2016Co., a div. of Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Van Waters & Rogers, 153 Ariz. 557 , 739 P.2d 211 (App. 1987) (remanding for the trial court to determine whether intervenor-defendant was entitled to attorneys’ fees as prevailing party and awarding intervenor-defendant attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal). ¶43 Therefore, relief can run against an intervenor-defendant. 2016Co., a div. of Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Van Waters & Rogers, 153 Ariz. 557 , 739 P.2d 211 (App. 1987) (remanding for the trial court to determine whether intervenor-defendant was entitled to attorneys’ fees as prevailing party and awarding intervenor-defendant attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal). ¶43 Therefore, relief can run against an intervenor-defendant. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co.
green
2 sentences2018Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co. , 241 Ariz. 131 , 134 ¶¶ 4-5, 384 P.3d 814 , 817 (App. 2016). 2018Silver v. Pueblo Del Sol Water Co. , 241 Ariz. 131 , 134 ¶¶ 4-5, 384 P.3d 814 , 817 (App. 2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
2 sentences2007Cf. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 (“Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be[.]”). ¶ 25 Carlson requests an award of his attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine and A.R.S. § 12-341 (2003). 2007Cf. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 (“Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be[.]”). ¶ 25 Carlson requests an award of his attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine and A.R.S. § 12-341 (2003). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department
green
2 sentences1993Kadish, 155 Ariz. at 498 , 747 P.2d at 1197 . 1993Kadish, 155 Ariz. at 498 , 747 P.2d at 1197 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.