16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc.green2 sentences2017(To preserve an issue: “(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” (citation omitted)). ¶16 When a party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and (continued . . .) was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50–52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge 2017(To preserve an issue: “(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” (citation omitted)). ¶16 When a party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and (continued . . .) was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50–52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge | 3 | 4 |
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences2008In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that Utah courts may award attorney fees under this doctrine when “the ‘vindication of a strong or societally important public policy’ takes place and the necessary costs in doing so ‘transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.’ ” Id. at 783 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)); see also Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, ¶ 18 , 15 P.3d 1266 (stating that “in Stewart [the supreme court] recogniz 2008In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that Utah courts may award attorney fees under this doctrine when “the ‘vindication of a strong or societally important public policy’ takes place and the necessary costs in doing so ‘transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.’ ” Id. at 783 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)); see also Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, ¶ 18 , 15 P.3d 1266 (stating that “in Stewart [the supreme court] recogniz | 3 | 4 |
Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ 2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ | 2 | 7 |
Carrier v. Salt Lake Countygreen2 sentences2017Patterson , 2011 UT 68 , ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 828 , citing Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty. , 2004 UT 98 , ¶¶ 42-43, 104 P.3d 1208 (refusing to consider appellant's argument that it was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50-52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge to the district court's findings of fact because the district court had not been sufficiently "alerted" to the error claimed on appeal); Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc. , 605 P.2d 775 , 776 (Utah 1980) (r 2017Patterson , 2011 UT 68 , ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 828 , citing Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty. , 2004 UT 98 , ¶¶ 42-43, 104 P.3d 1208 (refusing to consider appellant's argument that it was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50-52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge to the district court's findings of fact because the district court had not been sufficiently "alerted" to the error claimed on appeal); Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc. , 605 P.2d 775 , 776 (Utah 1980) (r | 2 | 3 |
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerkgreen2 sentences2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ 2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ | 1 | 3 |
James v. Prestongreen1 sentence2011See, eg., Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ¶¶ 42-43 , 104 P.3d 1208 (refusing to consider appellant's argument that it was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶¶ 50-52 , 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge to the district court's findings of fact because the district court had not been sufficiently "alerted" to the error claimed on appeal); Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775, 776 (Utah 1980) (rejecting appellant's negligence claim because | 1 | 1 |
In Re Jensengreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn., 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d at 212 (recognizing that “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified”); Starbird v. County of San Benito, 122 Cal.App.3d 657 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 149, 153 (1981) (awarding fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiffs “vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito County which were ignored by the officials charged with enfor 2008See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn., 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d at 212 (recognizing that “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified”); Starbird v. County of San Benito, 122 Cal.App.3d 657 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 149, 153 (1981) (awarding fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiffs “vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito County which were ignored by the officials charged with enfor | 1 | 1 |
Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2008Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 109 (5th ed.1941)); see also Woodland Hills Residents Ass’n, Inc. v. City Council of L.A., 23 Cal.3d 917 , 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d 200, 211 (1979) (stating that awarding court “must realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an important right so as to justify an attorney fee award under a private attorney general theory”). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. San Francisco Board of Permit Appealsgreen2 sentences2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain 2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain | 1 | 1 |
Faust v. KAI Technologies, Inc.green2 sentences2008In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that Utah courts may award attorney fees under this doctrine when “the ‘vindication of a strong or societally important public policy’ takes place and the necessary costs in doing so ‘transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.’ ” Id. at 783 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)); see also Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, ¶ 18 , 15 P.3d 1266 (stating that “in Stewart [the supreme court] recogniz 2008In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), the supreme court held that Utah courts may award attorney fees under this doctrine when “the ‘vindication of a strong or societally important public policy’ takes place and the necessary costs in doing so ‘transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization.’ ” Id. at 783 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977)); see also Faust v. KAI Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, ¶ 18 , 15 P.3d 1266 (stating that “in Stewart [the supreme court] recogniz | 1 | 1 |
Starbird v. County of San Benitogreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn., 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d at 212 (recognizing that “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified”); Starbird v. County of San Benito, 122 Cal.App.3d 657 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 149, 153 (1981) (awarding fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiffs “vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito County which were ignored by the officials charged with enfor 2008See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Assn., 154 Cal.Rptr. 503 , 593 P.2d at 212 (recognizing that “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified”); Starbird v. County of San Benito, 122 Cal.App.3d 657 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 149, 153 (1981) (awarding fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiffs “vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito County which were ignored by the officials charged with enfor | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain 2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain | 1 | 1 |
Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Commissiongreen2 sentences2008Prior to oral argument in this case, “the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney fees [was] abuse of discretion.” Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 20 , 89 P.3d 148 ; accord Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm’n, 2005 UT App 347, ¶ 5 , 121 P.3d 39 (Better Dental Health I). 2008Prior to oral argument in this case, “the appropriate standard for reviewing equitable awards of attorney fees [was] abuse of discretion.” Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 20 , 89 P.3d 148 ; accord Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm’n, 2005 UT App 347, ¶ 5 , 121 P.3d 39 (Better Dental Health I). | 1 | 1 |
Taggart v. Highway Board for the North Latah County Highway Districtgreen2 sentences2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private 2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private | 1 | 1 |
Umrein v. Heimbignergreen2 sentences2007Regarding the vindication of this strong and societally important public policy issue, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that defending the “integrity of the ... initiative process! ]” benefits all citizens of the State and “is the type of public benefit that ... makes an award of attorney fees appropriate.” Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250 , 959 P.2d 49, 71 (1998); see also Umrein v. Heimbigner, 53 Or.App. 871 , 632 P.2d 1367, 1371-73 (1981) (awarding attorney fees under Oregon’s version of the private attorney general doctrine because parties exercising the constitutional right to place i 2007Regarding the vindication of this strong and societally important public policy issue, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that defending the “integrity of the ... initiative process! ]” benefits all citizens of the State and “is the type of public benefit that ... makes an award of attorney fees appropriate.” Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250 , 959 P.2d 49, 71 (1998); see also Umrein v. Heimbigner, 53 Or.App. 871 , 632 P.2d 1367, 1371-73 (1981) (awarding attorney fees under Oregon’s version of the private attorney general doctrine because parties exercising the constitutional right to place i | 1 | 1 |
Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledogreen2 sentences2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private 2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Penagreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc.green2 sentences2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private 2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private | 1 | 1 |
City of Sacramento v. Drewgreen2 sentences2007Cf. City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal.App.3d 1287 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 704, 710 (1989) (considering whether the grounds given by the trial court in denying an attorney fee award were consistent with the legal principles, substantive law, and the policy and purpose behind the private attorney general doctrine). 2007Cf. City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal.App.3d 1287 , 255 Cal.Rptr. 704, 710 (1989) (considering whether the grounds given by the trial court in denying an attorney fee award were consistent with the legal principles, substantive law, and the policy and purpose behind the private attorney general doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
| Maria P. v. Rilesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Armatta v. Kitzhabergreen | 1 | 1 |
Baggett v. Gatesgreen2 sentences2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private 2007Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348 , 188 Cal.Rptr. 873 , 657 P.2d 365, 368-69 (1983) (engaging in full record review to overturn trial court's decision to award fees); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal.3d 128 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 232 , 649 P.2d 874, 881-83 (1982) (overturning trial court's denial of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine after a review of the record); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. ( In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 130 Idaho 718 , 947 P.2d 391, 394-95, 396-99 (1997) (purporting to review for abuse of discretion, but appearing to treat each prong of the private | 1 | 1 |
| Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weiss v. Brunogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. San Francisco Board of Permit Appealsgreen2 sentences2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain 2008Such motivation serves the important public policy of “ensuring] that [the] County was governed by rule of law, not of man.” Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, 121 Idaho 686 , 827 P.2d 699, 706 (Ct.App.1991). ¶ 13 Although some courts have refused to award fees under the private attorney general doctrine where the plaintiff has a large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, see, e.g., Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals, 74 Cal.App.4th 961 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 567-68 (1999) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion denying fees because although the plain | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017(To preserve an issue: “(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” (citation omitted)). ¶16 When a party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and (continued . . .) was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50–52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge 2017(To preserve an issue: “(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” (citation omitted)). ¶16 When a party fails to raise and argue an issue on appeal, or raises it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and (continued . . .) was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50–52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge | 4 | 2011–2017 |
Hughes v. Cafferty
green
2 sentences2008The court further explained that such a public policy question is appropriate for de novo review because “appellate judges, who have the benefit of deliberating as a panel and reviewing the well-considered arguments of the parties on appeal, have an advantaged position to review such considerations.” Id. ¶ 10 Our de novo review is further guided by supreme court precedent explaining that an equitable award of attorney fees, even under the private attorney general doctrine, turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case: “ ‘Equitable remedies ... are distinguished by their flexibilit 2008The court further explained that such a public policy question is appropriate for de novo review because “appellate judges, who have the benefit of deliberating as a panel and reviewing the well-considered arguments of the parties on appeal, have an advantaged position to review such considerations.” Id. ¶ 10 Our de novo review is further guided by supreme court precedent explaining that an equitable award of attorney fees, even under the private attorney general doctrine, turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case: “ ‘Equitable remedies ... are distinguished by their flexibilit | 3 | 2005–2008 |
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ 2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ | 2 | 2015–2021 |
DOCTORS'COMPANY v. Drezga
green
2 sentences2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ 2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ | 2 | 2016–2021 |
Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County
green
2 sentences2021Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 2015 UT App 173, ¶ 40 , 355 P.3d 1047 (citation omitted). 2021Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 2015 UT App 173, ¶ 40 , 355 P.3d 1047 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Laws v. Grayeyes
green
2 sentences2021But, even assuming that to be true, Grayeyes would not be entitled to attorney _____________________________________________________________ 32 In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ¶ 48 , 86 P.3d 712 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 33 Vexatious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/vexatious (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 34 Wanton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/wanton (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 35 Oppressive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/oppressive 2021So we affirm the district court‘s denial of fees under the private attorney general doctrine. ¶49 ―As a general rule, Utah courts award attorney fees only to a prevailing party, and only when such action is permitted by either statute or contract.‖ 36 But ―[t]he absence of such authority . . . does not bar the court from awarding attorney fees ‗when it deems it appropriate in the interests of justice and equity.‘‖37 We have held that an award of attorney fees may be justified in cases ―in which the nonprevailing party acted ‗in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.‘‖38 ¶ | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re the Discipline of Sonnenreich
green
2 sentences2021But, even assuming that to be true, Grayeyes would not be entitled to attorney _____________________________________________________________ 32 In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ¶ 48 , 86 P.3d 712 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 33 Vexatious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/vexatious (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 34 Wanton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/wanton (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 35 Oppressive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/oppressive 2021But, even assuming that to be true, Grayeyes would not be entitled to attorney _____________________________________________________________ 32 In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ¶ 48 , 86 P.3d 712 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 33 Vexatious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/vexatious (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 34 Wanton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/wanton (last visited Sept. 14, 2021). 35 Oppressive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/oppressive | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Injured Workers Ass'n v. State
green
2 sentences2021Because Grayeyes has failed to carry his burden of establishing a basis for striking the statute down as unconstitutional, I would uphold the statute and conclude that he has not established a basis for application of a case-based standard for a fee award. ¶75 Grayeyes asserts that the legislature‘s disavowal of the private attorney general doctrine is an unconstitutional interference with the judiciary‘s power to regulate the practice of law under Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21 , 374 P.3d 14 . 2021Because Grayeyes has failed to carry his burden of establishing a basis for striking the statute down as unconstitutional, I would uphold the statute and conclude that he has not established a basis for application of a case-based standard for a fee award. ¶75 Grayeyes asserts that the legislature‘s disavowal of the private attorney general doctrine is an unconstitutional interference with the judiciary‘s power to regulate the practice of law under Injured Workers Association of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21 , 374 P.3d 14 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Patterson v. Patterson
green
2 sentences2017Patterson , 2011 UT 68 , ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 828 , citing Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty. , 2004 UT 98 , ¶¶ 42-43, 104 P.3d 1208 (refusing to consider appellant's argument that it was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50-52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge to the district court's findings of fact because the district court had not been sufficiently "alerted" to the error claimed on appeal); Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc. , 605 P.2d 775 , 776 (Utah 1980) (r 2017Patterson , 2011 UT 68 , ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 828 , citing Carrier v. Salt Lake Cty. , 2004 UT 98 , ¶¶ 42-43, 104 P.3d 1208 (refusing to consider appellant's argument that it was entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine because the issue was not argued below); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc. , 2004 UT 72 , ¶¶ 50-52, 99 P.3d 801 (declining to address appellant's challenge to the district court's findings of fact because the district court had not been sufficiently "alerted" to the error claimed on appeal); Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc. , 605 P.2d 775 , 776 (Utah 1980) (r | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Culbertson v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
green
2 sentences2008By allowing Hermes to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire which we condemned in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning authorities “are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof.” Culbertson I, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 56 , 44 P.3d 642 (quoting Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 30 , 979 P.2d 332 ). 2008By allowing Hermes to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire which we condemned in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning authorities “are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof.” Culbertson I, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 56 , 44 P.3d 642 (quoting Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 30 , 979 P.2d 332 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville
green
2 sentences2008By allowing Hermes to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire which we condemned in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning authorities “are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof.” Culbertson I, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 56 , 44 P.3d 642 (quoting Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 30 , 979 P.2d 332 ). 2008By allowing Hermes to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire which we condemned in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning authorities “are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof.” Culbertson I, 2001 UT 108, ¶ 56 , 44 P.3d 642 (quoting Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 30 , 979 P.2d 332 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Shipman v. Evans green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Baldwin v. Burton green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.