private attorney general doctrine in Idaho

2009Furthermore, the Harrises rely on Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 , 682 P.2d 524 (1984), for their argument that they are entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.

2009Furthermore, the Harrises rely on Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571 , 682 P.2d 524 (1984), for their argument that they are entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine.

2000While the Petitioners argue these tests have been met in this case, we have repeatedly held that "[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court." Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 378 , 913 P.2d at 1148 ; see also Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47, 49 , 878 P.2d 746, 748 (1994).

2000While the Petitioners argue these tests have been met in this case, we have repeatedly held that "[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court." Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 378 , 913 P.2d at 1148 ; see also Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47, 49 , 878 P.2d 746, 748 (1994).

2021In Smith v. Idaho Comm’n on Redistricting, 136 Idaho 542, 546 , 38 P.3d 121, 125 (2001), we held that the private attorney general doctrine was applicable, even without a factual record, where petitioners “pursued the vindication of [a] right vigorously and the pursuit of such benefited a large number of Idahoans.” Reclaim and the Committee likewise assert that theirs is exactly the kind of case for which the doctrine was created: one pursued to protect the public and uphold the Idaho Constitution.

2021In Smith v. Idaho Comm’n on Redistricting, 136 Idaho 542, 546 , 38 P.3d 121, 125 (2001), we held that the private attorney general doctrine was applicable, even without a factual record, where petitioners “pursued the vindication of [a] right vigorously and the pursuit of such benefited a large number of Idahoans.” Reclaim and the Committee likewise assert that theirs is exactly the kind of case for which the doctrine was created: one pursued to protect the public and uphold the Idaho Constitution.

2026The private attorney general doctrine “contemplate[s] an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal.” Flynn v. Sun Valley Brewing Co., 175 Idaho 612 , 568 P.3d 831 , 844– 45 (2025) (citing Friends of Farm to Mkt. v. Valley Cnty., 137 Idaho 192, 201 , 46 P.3d 9, 18 (2002)).

2026The private attorney general doctrine “contemplate[s] an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal.” Flynn v. Sun Valley Brewing Co., 175 Idaho 612 , 568 P.3d 831 , 844– 45 (2025) (citing Friends of Farm to Mkt. v. Valley Cnty., 137 Idaho 192, 201 , 46 P.3d 9, 18 (2002)).

2025Flynn asks this Court to overrule its decision in Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 572 , 917 P.2d 403, 406 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v. State Department of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547 , 976 P.2d 473 (1999), in which this Court determined that Idaho Code section 12-117 preempted an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. 7 IDOL counters that the Commission’s decision is based on substantial and competent evidence and argues it should be affirmed.

2025Flynn asks this Court to overrule its decision in Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569, 572 , 917 P.2d 403, 406 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v. State Department of Finance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547 , 976 P.2d 473 (1999), in which this Court determined that Idaho Code section 12-117 preempted an award of attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. 7 IDOL counters that the Commission’s decision is based on substantial and competent evidence and argues it should be affirmed.

1997The proper phraseology *724 is: "The strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation.” See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 325 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977) (emphasis added); County of Ada v. Red Steer Drive Ins of Nevada, Inc., 101 Idaho 94, 100 , 609 P.2d 161, 167 (1980) (emphasis added). 5 .

1997The proper phraseology *724 is: "The strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation.” See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 325 , 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (1977) (emphasis added); County of Ada v. Red Steer Drive Ins of Nevada, Inc., 101 Idaho 94, 100 , 609 P.2d 161, 167 (1980) (emphasis added). 5 .

2000While the Petitioners argue these tests have been met in this case, we have repeatedly held that "[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court." Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 378 , 913 P.2d at 1148 ; see also Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47, 49 , 878 P.2d 746, 748 (1994).

2000While the Petitioners argue these tests have been met in this case, we have repeatedly held that "[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court." Boundary Backpackers, 128 Idaho at 378 , 913 P.2d at 1148 ; see also Miller v. EchoHawk, 126 Idaho 47, 49 , 878 P.2d 746, 748 (1994).

1997In Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303 (1977), the California Supreme Court determined that the private attorney general doctrine is limited to cases brought by “public interest litigants” represented by “private attorney’s acting pro bono publico or members of ‘public interest’ law firms.” Id., 141 Cal.Rptr. at 324-25 , 569 P.2d at 1313-14 .

1997In Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303 (1977), the California Supreme Court determined that the private attorney general doctrine is limited to cases brought by “public interest litigants” represented by “private attorney’s acting pro bono publico or members of ‘public interest’ law firms.” Id., 141 Cal.Rptr. at 324-25 , 569 P.2d at 1313-14 .

1996In Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, Boundary County, 121 Idaho 684 , 827 P.2d 697 (1992), the Court affirmed an attorney fee award under the private attorney general doctrine and declined to address whether I.C. §§ 12-117 or 12-121 applied.

1996In Fox v. Board of County Comm’rs, Boundary County, 121 Idaho 684 , 827 P.2d 697 (1992), the Court affirmed an attorney fee award under the private attorney general doctrine and declined to address whether I.C. §§ 12-117 or 12-121 applied.

2019Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 285 , 912 P.2d 644, 653 (1996) (stating that the factors used to determine whether the award attorney’s fees under the private attorney general doctrine “indicate that there must be some resolution of the substantive issues before a decision on attorney fees can be reached.”); Wensman v. Farmers Ins.

2019Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 285 , 912 P.2d 644, 653 (1996) (stating that the factors used to determine whether the award attorney’s fees under the private attorney general doctrine “indicate that there must be some resolution of the substantive issues before a decision on attorney fees can be reached.”); Wensman v. Farmers Ins.

2009Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 143 Idaho 695, 702 , 152 P.3d 566, 573 (2007).

2009Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 143 Idaho 695, 702 , 152 P.3d 566, 573 (2007).

2002Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, "[i]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency and a person, the court shall award the person reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds in favor of the person and also finds that the state agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The Court of Appeals has held that this provision authorizes attorney's fees when an appeal corrects mistakes that an agency "should never have made." Fox v. Board of County Comm'rs, 121 Idaho 686, 692-93 , 827 P.2d 699, 705-06 (C

2002Idaho Code § 12-117 provides, "[i]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency and a person, the court shall award the person reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds in favor of the person and also finds that the state agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The Court of Appeals has held that this provision authorizes attorney's fees when an appeal corrects mistakes that an agency "should never have made." Fox v. Board of County Comm'rs, 121 Idaho 686, 692-93 , 827 P.2d 699, 705-06 (C

2001This Court recently wrote that " `[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court.'" Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 129 , 15 P.3d 1129, 1137 (2000) (citations omitted) "Because of the unique nature of these proceedings, there have been no factual findings by a trial court, and we do not believe it *125 is the proper exercise of this Court's power to make such findings." Id.

2001This Court recently wrote that " `[w]hether the three-part test for determining to award attorney fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine is met requires a factual determination by the trial court.'" Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 129 , 15 P.3d 1129, 1137 (2000) (citations omitted) "Because of the unique nature of these proceedings, there have been no factual findings by a trial court, and we do not believe it *125 is the proper exercise of this Court's power to make such findings." Id.

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624 ; Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 684 , 873 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1994); Valentine v. Perry, 118 Idaho 653, 655 , 798 P.2d 935, 937 (1990); Shurtliff v. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 268 , 815 P.2d 461, 466 (Ct.App.1991); Bur ns v. County of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625 , 818 P.2d 327, 329 , aff'd, 120 Idaho 614 , 818 P.2d 318 (1991).

1997The Court also determined that ISEEO was not entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, saying that the Hellar three-pronged test “indicate[s] that there must be some resolution of the substantive issues before a decision on attorney fees can be reached.” Id. at 285, 912 P.2d at 653.

1996If the question were simply a conflict between I.C. §§ 12-121 and -117, the latter would prevail. *407 See Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400 , 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995) (applying the tort claims act attorney fee standard of I.C. § 6-918A over I.C. § 12-121).

1996If the question were simply a conflict between I.C. §§ 12-121 and -117, the latter would prevail. *407 See Tomich v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 400 , 901 P.2d 501, 507 (1995) (applying the tort claims act attorney fee standard of I.C. § 6-918A over I.C. § 12-121).