gift clause in California

2026The gift clause of the California Constitution Under article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution, “The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual.” (See Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693 (Chapman), citing Cal. Const., former art.

2026(Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 697 .) While the court recognized the plaintiff could not recover on a negligence claim because “the state [was] not liable in damages for the negligent acts of its officers,” it concluded the action was “not founded upon negligence constituting a tort, pure and simple,” but instead, was “substantially” based on “the alleged breach of a contract” and, at the time of the loss, the law was “well expressed” that “a state is bound by the same rules as an individual in measuring its liability on a contract.” (Id. at pp. 693–694.) Thus, although the Legislature had “n

2026What is made out by this objection is not that there is no liability and no claim, but that there is no remedy.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) As Chapman teaches, the gift clause prohibits the Legislature from “creat[ing] any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696 ; accord, Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517 ; Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22 ; see R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th 12 at p. 111; West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) Thus, “[i]n assessing whether legislation impr

2026What is made out by this objection is not that there is no liability and no claim, but that there is no remedy.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) As Chapman teaches, the gift clause prohibits the Legislature from “creat[ing] any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696 ; accord, Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517 ; Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22 ; see R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th 12 at p. 111; West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) Thus, “[i]n assessing whether legislation impr

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2024(Id. at p. 200.) Similarly, in Jordan, the court of appeal concluded an arbitration award violated the gift clause because it awarded fees in excess of the maximum authorized by the Legislature in connection with the action. ( Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438–442, 450.) The court stated that awarding fees in excess of the state’s maximum exposure was “akin to payment of a wholly invalid claim and violates the gift clause.” (Id. at p. 450.) In contrast to Conlin, Orange County, and Jordan, which involved only discrete payments to private parties with no larger public goal, in the prese

2026(Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 22 (Conlin); accord Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [payment for “a wholly invalid claim . . . serves no public purpose and violates the gift clause”].) In analyzing whether a statute effectively provides payment for an unenforceable or wholly invalid claim under the gift clause, the California Supreme Court has distinguished prospective liability from retroactive liability.

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2026What is made out by this objection is not that there is no liability and no claim, but that there is no remedy.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) As Chapman teaches, the gift clause prohibits the Legislature from “creat[ing] any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696 ; accord, Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517 ; Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22 ; see R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th 12 at p. 111; West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) Thus, “[i]n assessing whether legislation impr

2026What is made out by this objection is not that there is no liability and no claim, but that there is no remedy.’ ” (Ibid., italics added.) As Chapman teaches, the gift clause prohibits the Legislature from “creat[ing] any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” (Chapman, supra, 104 Cal. at p. 696 ; accord, Heron, supra, 209 Cal. at p. 517 ; Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 22 ; see R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th 12 at p. 111; West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259; O.B., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 939.) Thus, “[i]n assessing whether legislation impr

2026(Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 914 .) 10 before.’ ” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1259–1260.) The differences between the claims presentation requirement and the statute of limitations are not “material for purposes of the gift clause.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1262.) If plaintiff had sent the District a letter asserting his claim in 1977, the gift clause would not limit the Legislature’s power to revive his untimely action.

2025But these cases do not address the gift clause or the GCA statutes discussed above, and 12 the District otherwise fails to address the language in these authorities acknowledging that “[g]enerally, a cause of action for childhood sexual molestation accrues at the time of molestation.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 210 ; see Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 913 [“cause of action had accrued in the ripeness sense at the latest in 1994, the time of the last alleged molestation”].) And as the courts in O.B. and West Contra Costa Unified concluded, the District’s other authorities—i.e., Heron v

2014(Id. at p. 589.) In dicta, the Dunn court went on to express its conclusion that “the same reasoning which warrants a presumption that a husband did not intend by the expenditure of community funds for the benefit of his wife’s separate property to create a lien upon said property compels the conclusion that he did not expect repayment for the community funds expended by him to improve his wife’s separate property or to relieve it of an encumbrance.” (Dunn, supra, 211 Cal. at p. 589 .) Essentially, the Dunn court articulated 18 that if the husband used community property to improve his wife’s

2002(Wolfe, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 972 .) 5 As Wolfe also discusses, applying a gift presumption to marital property is inconsistent with public policy, which presumes acquisitions during a marriage are community.

2025Assembly Bill No. 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 claims serves a public purpose Even assuming, arguendo, Assembly Bill No. 218 somehow “authorizes expenditures within the scope of the gift clause, the expenditures are not ‘gifts’ because they serve a public purpose.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265.) “[A] public purpose embodies not only expenditures which are necessary for the continued existence of government, but also those ‘which may tend to make that government subserve

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2026(See, e.g., Conlin, supra, 99 Cal. at p. 19 [$54,015.37 payment to Mr. Conlin]; Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, 326 [$10,000 payment to Mr. Bourn].) The gift clause, however, has also been applied to statutes creating a category of liability without expressly appropriating funds, stating any amount, or specifically naming any recipients.

2025But these cases do not address the gift clause or the GCA statutes discussed above, and 12 the District otherwise fails to address the language in these authorities acknowledging that “[g]enerally, a cause of action for childhood sexual molestation accrues at the time of molestation.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 210 ; see Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 913 [“cause of action had accrued in the ripeness sense at the latest in 1994, the time of the last alleged molestation”].) And as the courts in O.B. and West Contra Costa Unified concluded, the District’s other authorities—i.e., Heron v

2025It was because of abuses which had crept into legislation by reason of the unlimited power theretofore exercised by the [L]egislature in determining what individual claims should be recognized by private statute, and to relieve in some degree legislators from the importunities of persons interested in securing such appropriations, that the power of the [L]egislature was thus limited by the present [C]onstitution of this state.’ ” (West Contra Costa, supra, at p. 1256, quoting Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 651 .) Although the term “gift” is statutorily defined as “a transfer of person

2024It was because of abuses which had crept into legislation by reason of the unlimited power theretofore exercised by the legislature in determining what individual claims should be recognized by private statute, and to relieve in some degree legislators from the importunities of persons interested in securing such appropriations, that the power of the legislature was thus limited by the present constitution of this state.” (Stevenson v. Colgan (1891) 91 Cal. 649, 651 .) The word “gift” as used in the gift clause is not limited to transfers of personal property, “ ‘but includes all appropriation

2026(DiCampli, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990 ; Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 811 ; R.L., supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113–114 & fn. 10.) As we have explained, however, procedural immunity has no bearing on the gift clause analysis under Chapman.

2024It did not.” (Id. at p. 213; accord, Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 907 .)11 In declining to construe the statutory reference to “the applicable statute of limitations” to encompass the claim presentation requirement, Shirk went on to observe that “timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . ‘ “ ‘a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant’ ” ’ [citation], and thus an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. [Citation.] Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that co

2026The Gift Clause Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution provides, “The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual.” In applying this provision, “the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a public or a private purpose.” (County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 877 .) “If the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are benefited by the expenditure.” (Ibid.) The gift clause prohibits appropriat

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2026Patrick v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 350, 352 (Patrick) held the gift clause did not bar a statute compensating people who slaughtered their contagious livestock.

2026Patrick v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 350, 352 (Patrick) held the gift clause did not bar a statute compensating people who slaughtered their contagious livestock.

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2024Servs. v. Superior Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 761, 766 ; Scott, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1605 .) Even if we had ruled that AB 218 authorizes expenditures within the scope of the gift clause, the expenditures are not “gifts” because they serve a public purpose.

2025But these cases do not address the gift clause or the GCA statutes discussed above, and 12 the District otherwise fails to address the language in these authorities acknowledging that “[g]enerally, a cause of action for childhood sexual molestation accrues at the time of molestation.” (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 210 ; see Rubenstein, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 913 [“cause of action had accrued in the ripeness sense at the latest in 1994, the time of the last alleged molestation”].) And as the courts in O.B. and West Contra Costa Unified concluded, the District’s other authorities—i.e., Heron v

2024Although we agree that the claim presentation requirement and the statutes of limitations are distinct, the District has not shown the differences are material for purposes of the gift clause.10 The District relies principally on the characterization of the claim presentation requirement in Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th 201 .

2026(Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 841, fn. 3 (Williams).)1 1 Even statutes of limitations, which the District concedes are procedural in the context of the gift clause, are frequently described as substantive.

2026(See, e.g., Granny Purps, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1 , 11 [“application of a statute of limitations is a substantive defense, not a procedural matter”]; Tabarrejo v. Superior Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849, 863 [“The statute of limitations is regarded as a substantive defense”]; Hambrecht & Quist Venture Partners v. American Medical Internat., Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1532 , 1542 8 In the pertinent context, the claims presentation requirement is procedural, not substantive.

2025We also observe “a ‘wide variety of welfare and other social programs have been upheld against constitutional challenge’ under the gift clause” using a “ ‘general public welfare’ rationale.” (West Contra Costa, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267–1268; see, e.g., Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 734 [state plan for aid and services to needy families with children]; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“old age security benefits”]; County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 282 [“release of liens held against the property of indigent recipients of aid”]; Scott v

2025(See, e.g., West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243 , 1252 (West Contra Costa).) The California School Boards Association and its Education Legal Alliance (hereafter identified collectively as CSBA) filed an amicus curiae brief in support of District. 2 1 Doe R.L. filed his original complaint on December 21, 2022; an amended complaint on February 14, 2023; a second amended complaint on June 9, 2023; and a third amended complaint, i.e., the operative complaint, on July 10, 2023. 2 “Ordinarily, an amicus curiae must take the case as it finds it and ac

2025(See, e.g., West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1243 , 1252 (West Contra Costa).) The California School Boards Association and its Education Legal Alliance (hereafter identified collectively as CSBA) filed an amicus curiae brief in support of District. 2 1 Doe R.L. filed his original complaint on December 21, 2022; an amended complaint on February 14, 2023; a second amended complaint on June 9, 2023; and a third amended complaint, i.e., the operative complaint, on July 10, 2023. 2 “Ordinarily, an amicus curiae must take the case as it finds it and ac

2025IV, § 31]; accord, Westly v. U.S. Bancorp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 577, 582 .) For example, in Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690 (Chapman), the California Supreme Court held that under the gift clause, the Legislature “has no power to create a liability against the state for any such past act . . . upon the part of its officers.” (Id. at p. 693 [discussing Cal. Const., former art.

2025IV, § 31]; accord, Westly v. U.S. Bancorp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 577, 582 .) For example, in Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690 (Chapman), the California Supreme Court held that under the gift clause, the Legislature “has no power to create a liability against the state for any such past act . . . upon the part of its officers.” (Id. at p. 693 [discussing Cal. Const., former art.

2025(See O.B., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___, fn. 7 [2025 Cal. App. Lexis 540, at p. *16, fn. 7]; West Contra Costa Unified, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1258, fn. 8.) The District further contends, though not under a proper argument heading (Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248, fn. 6 ), that West Contra Costa Unified is somehow deficient because it failed to discuss the history that led to enactment of the gift clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1879.

2025(See O.B., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___, fn. 7 [2025 Cal. App. Lexis 540, at p. *16, fn. 7]; West Contra Costa Unified, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1258, fn. 8.) The District further contends, though not under a proper argument heading (Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248, fn. 6 ), that West Contra Costa Unified is somehow deficient because it failed to discuss the history that led to enactment of the gift clause at the Constitutional Convention of 1879.

2025IV, § 31.) The gift clause prohibits “all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim, or which perchance may rest upon some moral or equitable obligation. [Citation.].)” (Allied Architects’ Assn. v. Payne (1923) 192 Cal. 431, 439 [discussing Cal. Const., former art.