liability in tort doctrine in California

1991(See In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 553 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ].) Both before and during the Legislature’s consideration of whether to enact section 4558, the courts were applying the doctrine of strict liability in tort not only to manufacturers of products, but also to the various links in the commercial marketing chain including a retailer (Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, 262-263 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]), a wholesale-retail distributor (Barth v. B.F.

1991(See In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 553 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ].) Both before and during the Legislature’s consideration of whether to enact section 4558, the courts were applying the doctrine of strict liability in tort not only to manufacturers of products, but also to the various links in the commercial marketing chain including a retailer (Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, 262-263 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]), a wholesale-retail distributor (Barth v. B.F.

1985This sharply contrasts with the general view that “Only a seller who can be regarded as a merchant or as one engaged in the business of supplying goods of the kind involved in the case is subject to strict liability . . . .” (Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984) Products Liability, § 100 at p. 705.) We conformed to this viewpoint in Price where the court concluded “that for the doctrine of strict liability in tort to apply to a lessor of personalty, the lessor should be found to be in the business of leasing, in the same general sense as the seller of personalty is found to be i

1972In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.3d 245 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ] (decided subsequent to the granting of the motion for new trial in our case); and in McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co., supra, 274 Cal.App.2d 446, the doctrine of strict liability in tort was held applicable, under certain circumstances, to lessors who have placed articles on the market knowing that they are to be used without inspection for defects.

1971Its defect, if any, was only in the medical sense that it was not appropriate to her under the circumstances in which it was prescribed. *978 While the doctrine of strict liability in tort is no longer restricted to sales transactions (see, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 251-252 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ] [applied to bailor]; McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 446, 452-453 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [applied to lessor of personal property]; Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 325-326 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 ] [applied to one licensing use o

1971Its defect, if any, was only in the medical sense that it was not appropriate to her under the circumstances in which it was prescribed. *978 While the doctrine of strict liability in tort is no longer restricted to sales transactions (see, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 251-252 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ] [applied to bailor]; McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 446, 452-453 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [applied to lessor of personal property]; Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 325-326 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 ] [applied to one licensing use o

1989C The parties appropriately frame the issue as whether Sharp provided a product or service as they recognize strict tort liability case law has distinguished provision of services from provision of products. (6) The doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce. ( Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) Where purchase of a product is the primary objective or essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in distributing the produ

1985Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective. [Citations.]” The court recognized that the cases imposing strict liability had “usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff.” ( 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) The justification for departing from warranty theory and for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was the recognition that the liability was imposed by law and the refusal to permit t

1989Quoting extensively from Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 70 [ 207 A.2d 314, 325-326 ], the Kriegler court noted: “ ‘When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model, as in a Levitt or in a comparable project, he clearly relies on the skill of the developer . . . that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner ....’” ( 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 228 .) Following Kriegler , in Avner v. Longridge Estates (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607, 615 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 633 ], the doctrine of strict liability in tort was held applicable to a defendant who had developed property

1989Quoting extensively from Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 70 [ 207 A.2d 314, 325-326 ], the Kriegler court noted: “ ‘When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model, as in a Levitt or in a comparable project, he clearly relies on the skill of the developer . . . that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner ....’” ( 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 228 .) Following Kriegler , in Avner v. Longridge Estates (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607, 615 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 633 ], the doctrine of strict liability in tort was held applicable to a defendant who had developed property

1985Chief Justice Traynor first proposed the doctrine of strict liability in tort as the basis of recovery in defective product cases in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 150 P.2d 436 ].

1985Chief Justice Traynor first proposed the doctrine of strict liability in tort as the basis of recovery in defective product cases in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 150 P.2d 436 ].

1991Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 248-254 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]), personal property lessors and bailors (Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 250-253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ]), and a licensor of personalty in the form of coin-operated washing machines (Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 324-336 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 ]).

1991Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 248-254 [ 71 Cal.Rptr. 306 ]), personal property lessors and bailors (Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 250-253 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ]), and a licensor of personalty in the form of coin-operated washing machines (Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 324-336 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 ]).

1989Quoting extensively from Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. (1965) 44 N.J. 70 [ 207 A.2d 314, 325-326 ], the Kriegler court noted: “ ‘When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model, as in a Levitt or in a comparable project, he clearly relies on the skill of the developer . . . that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner ....’” ( 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 228 .) Following Kriegler , in Avner v. Longridge Estates (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607, 615 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 633 ], the doctrine of strict liability in tort was held applicable to a defendant who had developed property

1970(See Avner v. Longridge Estates (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607, 609, 614 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 633 ] (application to a mass builder of homes); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., supra, 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227-229 (same); Conolley v. Bull (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 183 ,. 195-197 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 689 ] (no application to seller of a single parcel of real estate); Halliday v. Greene (1967) 244 Cal.App.2d 482, 486-487 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 267 ] (same).) Our analysis of these authorities leads to the conclusion that for the doctrine of strict liability in tort to apply to a lessor of personalty, the lessor should be found t

1972In Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal.3d 245 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ] (decided subsequent to the granting of the motion for new trial in our case); and in McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co., supra, 274 Cal.App.2d 446, the doctrine of strict liability in tort was held applicable, under certain circumstances, to lessors who have placed articles on the market knowing that they are to be used without inspection for defects.

1971Its defect, if any, was only in the medical sense that it was not appropriate to her under the circumstances in which it was prescribed. *978 While the doctrine of strict liability in tort is no longer restricted to sales transactions (see, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 251-252 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 178 , 466 P.2d 722 ] [applied to bailor]; McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment Rental Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 446, 452-453 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [applied to lessor of personal property]; Garcia v. Halsett (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 325-326 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 ] [applied to one licensing use o

1969Eichler concedes that the doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to physical harm to property (Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal.App.2d 639, 649 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]) but argues that the doctrine cannot be applied to homes or builders.

1969Eichler concedes that the doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to physical harm to property (Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal.App.2d 639, 649 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 94 ]) but argues that the doctrine cannot be applied to homes or builders.

1991(See In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 553 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ].) Both before and during the Legislature’s consideration of whether to enact section 4558, the courts were applying the doctrine of strict liability in tort not only to manufacturers of products, but also to the various links in the commercial marketing chain including a retailer (Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, 262-263 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]), a wholesale-retail distributor (Barth v. B.F.

1991(See In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 553 [ 213 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 698 P.2d 637 ].) Both before and during the Legislature’s consideration of whether to enact section 4558, the courts were applying the doctrine of strict liability in tort not only to manufacturers of products, but also to the various links in the commercial marketing chain including a retailer (Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 256, 262-263 [ 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 , 391 P.2d 168 ]), a wholesale-retail distributor (Barth v. B.F.

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1989C The parties appropriately frame the issue as whether Sharp provided a product or service as they recognize strict tort liability case law has distinguished provision of services from provision of products. (6) The doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce. ( Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) Where purchase of a product is the primary objective or essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in distributing the produ

1989C The parties appropriately frame the issue as whether Sharp provided a product or service as they recognize strict tort liability case law has distinguished provision of services from provision of products. (6) The doctrine of strict liability in tort applies to producing and marketing enterprises responsible for placing products in the stream of commerce. ( Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) Where purchase of a product is the primary objective or essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in distributing the produ

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1989Squibb & Sons, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 672, 677 [ 221 Cal. Rptr. 447 , 710 P.2d 247 ]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 487 [ 275 P.2d 15 ]; Carmichael v. Reitz, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 978 .) Courts have also declined to apply strict liability where the transaction's service aspect predominates and any product sale is merely incidental to the provision of the service. ( Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 1022, 1027-1028 [ 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 , 54 A.L.R.3d 250 ].) In applying the doctrine of strict liability courts have recognized "`that the essence of the transactio

1986Code, § 1941.1, subd. (h)), and such a standard is also relevant to the definition of uninhabitability (see Knight v. Hallsthammar, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 58-59; Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 517 P.2d 1168 ]). 2 The Becker court noted that the justification for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was not a concern that warranty law failed to adequately define the manufacturer’s duty but that the intricacies of the law of sales applicable to commercial transactions might defeat the obvious representation of safety for intended use by th

1986Code, § 1941.1, subd. (h)), and such a standard is also relevant to the definition of uninhabitability (see Knight v. Hallsthammar, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 58-59; Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 704 , 517 P.2d 1168 ]). 2 The Becker court noted that the justification for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was not a concern that warranty law failed to adequately define the manufacturer’s duty but that the intricacies of the law of sales applicable to commercial transactions might defeat the obvious representation of safety for intended use by th

1985Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective. [Citations.]" The court recognized that the cases imposing strict liability had "usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff." ( 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) The justification for departing from warranty theory and for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was the recognition that the *459 liability was imposed by law and the refusal to per

1985Recognized first in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective. [Citations.]" The court recognized that the cases imposing strict liability had "usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff." ( 59 Cal.2d at p. 63 .) The justification for departing from warranty theory and for establishing a doctrine of strict liability in tort was the recognition that the *459 liability was imposed by law and the refusal to per

1977Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of strict liability in tort does not extend to the service of blood transfusions.” (Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at pp. 613-614; to the same effect see, McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 866, 870-871 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 444 ].) There is nothing in the instant record to suggest that Konyne is not an effective coagulant.

1977Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of strict liability in tort does not extend to the service of blood transfusions.” (Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at pp. 613-614; to the same effect see, McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 866, 870-871 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 444 ].) There is nothing in the instant record to suggest that Konyne is not an effective coagulant.

1971Corp. (1921) 187 Cal. 270, 280 [ 201 P. 599 ]; Lewis v. Franklin (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 177, 185 [ 326 P.2d 625 ].) Brown reasons there was evidence that it did not know, and reasonably could not have anticipated, the true purpose for which the crane “was designed and intended [by American] to be used” as required under California cases dealing with the doctrine of strict liability in tort (Thomas v. General Motors Corp. (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 81, 90-92 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 331, 340-341 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 194 ]; Oakes v. E.

1971Corp. (1921) 187 Cal. 270, 280 [ 201 P. 599 ]; Lewis v. Franklin (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 177, 185 [ 326 P.2d 625 ].) Brown reasons there was evidence that it did not know, and reasonably could not have anticipated, the true purpose for which the crane “was designed and intended [by American] to be used” as required under California cases dealing with the doctrine of strict liability in tort (Thomas v. General Motors Corp. (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 81, 90-92 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 301 ]; Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co. (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 331, 340-341 [ 79 Cal.Rptr. 194 ]; Oakes v. E.