Arizona rule in Arizona

2021Evid. 702. 8 HANSEN v. CHON-LOPEZ Opinion of the Court Consequently, we stated we would “continue to apply the longstanding Arizona rule that the results of polygraph tests are per se inadmissible.” Id. ¶19 Hansen concedes polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial, but he argues that this does not automatically preclude the introduction of such evidence in a grand jury proceeding.

2021Evid. 702. 8 HANSEN v. CHON-LOPEZ Opinion of the Court Consequently, we stated we would “continue to apply the longstanding Arizona rule that the results of polygraph tests are per se inadmissible.” Id. ¶19 Hansen concedes polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial, but he argues that this does not automatically preclude the introduction of such evidence in a grand jury proceeding.

1994Under Arizona law, a person who is not a party to a contract can recover under that contract only if he is a primary beneficiary under the terms of the contract: The Arizona rule is that in order for a person to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, an intention to benefit that person must be indicated in the contract itself, Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148 , 302 P.2d 534 (1956); Basurto v. Utah Construction & Mining Company, 15 Ariz. App. 35 , 485 P.2d 859 (1971).

1994Under Arizona law, a person who is not a party to a contract can recover under that contract only if he is a primary beneficiary under the terms of the contract: The Arizona rule is that in order for a person to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, an intention to benefit that person must be indicated in the contract itself, Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148 , 302 P.2d 534 (1956); Basurto v. Utah Construction & Mining Company, 15 Ariz. App. 35 , 485 P.2d 859 (1971).

1989The Arizona rule is that in order for a person to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, an intention to benefit that person must be indicated in the contract itself____ The contemplated benefit must be both intentional and direct, ... and ‘it must definitely appear that the parties intend to recognize the third party as the primary party in interest.’ Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178 , 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981), quoting *390 Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148, 154 , 302 P.2d 534, 538 (1956) (citations omitted).

1989The Arizona rule is that in order for a person to recover as a third-party beneficiary of a contract, an intention to benefit that person must be indicated in the contract itself____ The contemplated benefit must be both intentional and direct, ... and ‘it must definitely appear that the parties intend to recognize the third party as the primary party in interest.’ Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178 , 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981), quoting *390 Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148, 154 , 302 P.2d 534, 538 (1956) (citations omitted).

2012See Morgan Bank, 164 Ariz. at 538 , 794 P.2d at 962 .

2012See Morgan Bank, 164 Ariz. at 538 , 794 P.2d at 962 .

2009See Vargas, 127 Ariz. at 61 , 618 P.2d at 231 (“To permit the use of plea discussions for impeachment would have a strong chilling effect on plea negotiations.”).

2009See Vargas, 127 Ariz. at 61 , 618 P.2d at 231 (“To permit the use of plea discussions for impeachment would have a strong chilling effect on plea negotiations.”).

2007Unlike the situation in Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 350 Mo. 572 , 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1943), the parent company here will not be subjected to liability for the acts of its subsidiaries or for its own actions through its subsidiaries.

2007Unlike the situation in Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 350 Mo. 572 , 166 S.W.2d 1065, 1067-68 (1943), the parent company here will not be subjected to liability for the acts of its subsidiaries or for its own actions through its subsidiaries.

2006Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, ¶ 19 , 977 P.2d 769, 775 (1999) (“[Rule 54(b) ] is designed as a compromise between the policy against interlocutory appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of an immediate appeal to prevent an injustice.”); see also Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, ¶ 16 , 975 P.2d 700, 703 (1999) (“The application of federal Rule 54(b) is helpful in our interpretation of the Arizona rule.”).

2006Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, ¶ 19 , 977 P.2d 769, 775 (1999) (“[Rule 54(b) ] is designed as a compromise between the policy against interlocutory appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of an immediate appeal to prevent an injustice.”); see also Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, ¶ 16 , 975 P.2d 700, 703 (1999) (“The application of federal Rule 54(b) is helpful in our interpretation of the Arizona rule.”).

2006Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, ¶ 19 , 977 P.2d 769, 775 (1999) (“[Rule 54(b) ] is designed as a compromise between the policy against interlocutory appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of an immediate appeal to prevent an injustice.”); see also Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, ¶ 16 , 975 P.2d 700, 703 (1999) (“The application of federal Rule 54(b) is helpful in our interpretation of the Arizona rule.”).

2006Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, ¶ 19 , 977 P.2d 769, 775 (1999) (“[Rule 54(b) ] is designed as a compromise between the policy against interlocutory appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of an immediate appeal to prevent an injustice.”); see also Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, ¶ 16 , 975 P.2d 700, 703 (1999) (“The application of federal Rule 54(b) is helpful in our interpretation of the Arizona rule.”).

2004See Lindsley, 191 Ariz. at 198 , 953 P.2d at 1251 (“ ‘but for’ cause ... is a necessary but not sufficient condition to restitution ... the distinguishing feature is how directly the loss flows from the crime”); see also State v. Modrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 1, 297 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1055 (App.2004) (upholding restitution awarded for “reasonable” expenses related to *54 murder victim’s children’s trial attendance).

2004See Lindsley, 191 Ariz. at 198 , 953 P.2d at 1251 (“ ‘but for’ cause ... is a necessary but not sufficient condition to restitution ... the distinguishing feature is how directly the loss flows from the crime”); see also State v. Modrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 1, 297 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1055 (App.2004) (upholding restitution awarded for “reasonable” expenses related to *54 murder victim’s children’s trial attendance).

2004See Lindsley, 191 Ariz. at 198 , 953 P.2d at 1251 (“ ‘but for’ cause ... is a necessary but not sufficient condition to restitution ... the distinguishing feature is how directly the loss flows from the crime”); see also State v. Modrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 1, 297 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1055 (App.2004) (upholding restitution awarded for “reasonable” expenses related to *54 murder victim’s children’s trial attendance).

2004See Lindsley, 191 Ariz. at 198 , 953 P.2d at 1251 (“ ‘but for’ cause ... is a necessary but not sufficient condition to restitution ... the distinguishing feature is how directly the loss flows from the crime”); see also State v. Modrid, 207 Ariz. 296, ¶ 1, 297 , 85 P.3d 1054, 1055 (App.2004) (upholding restitution awarded for “reasonable” expenses related to *54 murder victim’s children’s trial attendance).

1988See Shaw v. Johnson, 15 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 , 59 P.2d 876, 879 (1936).

1988See Shaw v. Johnson, 15 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 , 59 P.2d 876, 879 (1936).

1984See Brown v. Providence Gas Co., 445 F. Supp. 459 (D.R.I. 1976); Ecenrode v. Household Finance Corp. of South Dover, 422 F. Supp. 1327 (D.Del. 1976).

1984See Brown v. Providence Gas Co., 445 F. Supp. 459 (D.R.I. 1976); Ecenrode v. Household Finance Corp. of South Dover, 422 F. Supp. 1327 (D.Del. 1976).

2017A.R.S. § 13-753; Atkins, 636 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242 .

2013In prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded, Atkins employed the clinical definition of that condition. ¶ 50 In Atkins, the Court determined that “mentally retarded” offenders are “categorically excluded from execution” by the Eighth Amendment. 536 U.S. at 318 , 122 S.Ct. 2242 ; accord id. at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242 .

2014Rule 702 and Daubert ¶ 17 Prior to 2010, Arizona’s standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony was the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).

2014Evid., prefatory emt. to 2012 amend. (“Where the language of an Arizona rule parallels that of a federal rule, federal court decisions interpreting the federal rule are persuasive but not binding with respect to interpreting the Arizona rule.”). ¶ 8 The Advisory Committee Notes to the federal rule state that the original version of Federal Rule 702 permitted the admission of “cold” testimony: “The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the fa

1984In State v. Wilson , 134 Ariz. 551 , 554 , 658 P.2d 204 , 207 (App. 1982), the court of appeals stated that the Arizona standard concerned the prosecutor's "motive" to provoke a mistrial.

1984In State v. Wilson , 134 Ariz. 551 , 554 , 658 P.2d 204 , 207 (App. 1982), the court of appeals stated that the Arizona standard concerned the prosecutor's "motive" to provoke a mistrial.

1984We have stated, in refusing to bar a retrial, that the double jeopardy theory could not prevail where nothing in the record indicated that "the State engaged in any intentional misconduct or that the defendant was in any way subjected to harassment or oppression. . . ." State v. Wright , 112 Ariz. 446 , 450 , 543 P.2d 434 , 438 (1975) (emphasis supplied). *Page 106 It is essential to compare the course of prosecutorial conduct in this case with other cases treating the double jeopardy issue.

1984We have stated, in refusing to bar a retrial, that the double jeopardy theory could not prevail where nothing in the record indicated that "the State engaged in any intentional misconduct or that the defendant was in any way subjected to harassment or oppression. . . ." State v. Wright , 112 Ariz. 446 , 450 , 543 P.2d 434 , 438 (1975) (emphasis supplied). *Page 106 It is essential to compare the course of prosecutorial conduct in this case with other cases treating the double jeopardy issue.