Arizona rule in California

2014Her election not to participate in the Arizona hearing is not attributable to the juvenile court and surely cannot deprive the court of its authority to act once jurisdiction had been ceded to it. 12 C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 101 , the case upon which Angela places primary reliance, supports our conclusion the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction in this case and any procedural error was harmless.

2014Her election not to participate in the Arizona hearing is not attributable to the juvenile court and surely cannot deprive the court of its authority to act once jurisdiction had been ceded to it. 12 C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 101 , the case upon which Angela places primary reliance, supports our conclusion the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction in this case and any procedural error was harmless.

2011L.Rev. 61, 107, fn. 321 [“Only the Ninth Circuit requires proof that the defendant subjectively intended to threaten the victim.”].) Thus, when the high court said, “ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” (Black, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 359 ), it did not thereby, for the first time, require proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech be taken as a threat.

2011L.Rev. 61, 107, fn. 321 ["Only the Ninth Circuit requires proof that the defendant subjectively intended to threaten the victim."].) *432 Thus, when the high court said, "`True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals" ( Black, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 359 ), it did not thereby, for the first time, require proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech be taken as a threat.

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 ["The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten."]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona's test, which is "substantially similar" to Black , "`true threats' are those statements made `in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily ha

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 [“The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten.”]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona’s test, which is “substantially similar” to Black , “ ‘true threats’ are those statements made ‘in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily h

2011Spitzer v. Cain (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 418 F.Supp.2d 457, 479 ["The relevant intent is the intent to communicate a threat, not as defense counsel maintains, the intent to threaten."]; Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller (2005) 210 Ariz. 513 [ 115 P.3d 107, 114 ] [under Arizona's test, which is "substantially similar" to Black , "`true threats' are those statements made `in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily ha

2007In State v. Prasertphong (2005) 210 Ariz. 496 [ 114 P.3d 828 ], the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that admission of a codefendant’s entire statement did not raise confrontation clause problems because the defendant “forfeited his Confrontation Clause right not to have [the codefendant’s] entire statement admitted against him when he made the tactical decision to introduce portions of the statement that, standing alone, had the serious potential to mislead the jury.” {State v Prasertphong, at p. 833; see also State v. Ellison (2006) 213 Ariz. 116, 130 [ 140 P.3d 899 ].) Holding that Crawford

2007In State v. Prasertphong (2005) 210 Ariz. 496 [ 114 P.3d 828 ], the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that admission of a codefendant’s entire statement did not raise confrontation clause problems because the defendant “forfeited his Confrontation Clause right not to have [the codefendant’s] entire statement admitted against him when he made the tactical decision to introduce portions of the statement that, standing alone, had the serious potential to mislead the jury.” {State v Prasertphong, at p. 833; see also State v. Ellison (2006) 213 Ariz. 116, 130 [ 140 P.3d 899 ].) Holding that Crawford

1980(See also Skouland v. Skouland (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 677 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 185 ].) *682 An examination of the record reveals that the Arizona motion was apparently resolved solely on the basis of affidavits.

1980(See also Skouland v. Skouland (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 677 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 185 ].) *682 An examination of the record reveals that the Arizona motion was apparently resolved solely on the basis of affidavits.

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946Thus, limiting its language to a discussion of such services *559 and premising its opinion in the main on the rationale of North Whittier Heights Citrus Assn. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 109 F.2d 76 , the court expressed its full conclusion as follows at page 687 [144 P.2d]; "We conclude that the claimants who worked in the Association's packing house are not agricultural laborers, ..." Consistent with such analysis, it reasonably follows that the narrowed point of decision in the later Arizona case does not affect its approval in the forepart of the opinion as to the propriety

1946These services, if done for the owner or tenant of the farm on which the materials in their raw or natural state are produced and as an incident to the farming operation, as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations, are agricultural." (Italics ours.) This same Arizona rule was involved in the later case of Employment Security Commission v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 61 Ariz. 96 [ 144 P.2d 682 ], wherein the court upheld the right of certain claimants to receive unemployment benefits.

1946These services, if done for the owner or tenant of the farm on which the materials in their raw or natural state are produced and as an incident to the farming operation, as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations, are agricultural." (Italics ours.) This same Arizona rule was involved in the later case of Employment Security Commission v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 61 Ariz. 96 [ 144 P.2d 682 ], wherein the court upheld the right of certain claimants to receive unemployment benefits.