theft instruction in California

2025(Id. at p. 351.) After concluding there was substantial evidence warranting a theft instruction, the court further held that the omission was prejudicial because “the jury was never presented with the factual question posed by the omitted theft instructions,” specifically, “whether the intent to steal was formulated after defendant had inflicted the fatal blows . . . .” (Id. at p. 352.) Instruction on the lesser included offense was therefore necessary to mitigate “ ‘the substantial risk’ ” that, “ ‘[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plain

2023But in Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 692-693, the California Supreme Court distinguished Ramkeesoon because the instructions in that case did not highlight the timing of intent.

2023Defendant cites People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346 , which found prejudicial error in a failure to give a theft instruction.

2023Defendant cites People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346 , which found prejudicial error in a failure to give a theft instruction.

2024(See Flynn, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 772 .) 6 Gefrerer also argues “the contents of the note, ‘don’t play’ can reasonably be interpreted not as a threat but as an indication of a serious invocation of the ‘hand it over’ policy.” We disagree that this was a reasonable interpretation of the note and that this point would be relevant.

2021The use of force or fear to escape or otherwise retain even temporary 9 possession of the property constitutes robbery. [Citations.]” (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 772 .) As mentioned above, “[i]t is the conduct of the perpetrator who resorts to violence to further his theft, and not the decision of the victim to confront the perpetrator, that should be analyzed in considering whether a robbery has occurred.” (Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 264 .) Applying these principles, we conclude the trial court was correct in omitting the theft instruction.

1990(See 50 Cal.3d at p. 277 .) Appellant admitted he knew Rhodes was carrying a gun; he knew Rhodes had used the gun to take money from customers in the past; he knew Rhodes invited him to use the gun on this occasion; Rhodes in fact did use the gun.

1990(See 50 Cal.3d at p. 277 .) Appellant admitted he knew Rhodes was carrying a gun; he knew Rhodes had used the gun to take money from customers in the past; he knew Rhodes invited him to use the gun on this occasion; Rhodes in fact did use the gun.

2025(Id. at p. 351.) After concluding there was substantial evidence warranting a theft instruction, the court further held that the omission was prejudicial because “the jury was never presented with the factual question posed by the omitted theft instructions,” specifically, “whether the intent to steal was formulated after defendant had inflicted the fatal blows . . . .” (Id. at p. 352.) Instruction on the lesser included offense was therefore necessary to mitigate “ ‘the substantial risk’ ” that, “ ‘[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plain

2024Testimony by a witness that she was “trained as a teller to remain calm and follow robbers’ instructions during a robbery” is not substantial evidence to support a theft instruction when the teller testifies she “was in fact ‘shocked’ and ‘traumatized’ by [the robber’s] actions.” ( Bordelon, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1319–1320.) And it is not relevant that the shock and trauma derived from written words rather than outward actions.

2022Second, he only agreed to settle and settled for a relatively small amount “[a]fter he was notified that his case was being investigated.” And third, Lee’s attorney claimed he was owed “about $15,000” for his work on the case, leaving Lee a balance of only “$3,000 to cover his alleged loss.” 9 Thus, the affidavit provides more than “ ‘a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing.’ ” (People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 161 .) It is entirely reasonable to infer from the facts Detective Herndon relayed that Lee moved his property

2022Citing Lee’s testimony in this regard, the People argued that “money was tight,” so Lee “invented the insurance claim.” However, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived “[i]f the defendant fails to object to the asserted misconduct and does not request an instruction or admonition to lessen any possible prejudice . . . .” (People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 36 , citing People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 762 .) Here, there was no such objection or request for an admonition, and for that reason, the issue is waived.

2022Lee argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by “eliciting testimony concerning [Lee’s] financial condition, and then underscoring this testimony in his summation as a motive for crime.” Indeed, “[u]nder the well- established rule, a defendant’s poverty generally may not be admitted to prove a motive to commit a robbery or theft; reliance on such evidence is deemed unfair to the defendant, and its probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076 .) Here, the People cross-examined Lee about his income, which was lower than he expect

2022Citing Lee’s testimony in this regard, the People argued that “money was tight,” so Lee “invented the insurance claim.” However, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are waived “[i]f the defendant fails to object to the asserted misconduct and does not request an instruction or admonition to lessen any possible prejudice . . . .” (People v. Nguyen (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 28, 36 , citing People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 762 .) Here, there was no such objection or request for an admonition, and for that reason, the issue is waived.

2021The use of force or fear to escape or otherwise retain even temporary 9 possession of the property constitutes robbery. [Citations.]” (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 772 .) As mentioned above, “[i]t is the conduct of the perpetrator who resorts to violence to further his theft, and not the decision of the victim to confront the perpetrator, that should be analyzed in considering whether a robbery has occurred.” (Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 264 .) Applying these principles, we conclude the trial court was correct in omitting the theft instruction.

2019(Mar. 11, 2019, B280998) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177 , 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 2019 WL 1109629 .) "[U]se of the shorthand term 'identity theft' to describe the offense made punishable in section 530.5 does not provide a reason to read into the statute an additional element that cannot be found by referring to the language of the statute." ( Barba , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 , 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 .) The only language indicating a theft requirement appears in section 530.5, subdivision (e), which reads, "Every person who commits mail theft, as defined in Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United Stat

2019(Mar. 11, 2019, B280998) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177 , 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 2019 WL 1109629 .) "[U]se of the shorthand term 'identity theft' to describe the offense made punishable in section 530.5 does not provide a reason to read into the statute an additional element that cannot be found by referring to the language of the statute." ( Barba , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 , 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 .) The only language indicating a theft requirement appears in section 530.5, subdivision (e), which reads, "Every person who commits mail theft, as defined in Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United Stat

2019(Mar. 11, 2019, B280998) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177 , 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 2019 WL 1109629 .) "[U]se of the shorthand term 'identity theft' to describe the offense made punishable in section 530.5 does not provide a reason to read into the statute an additional element that cannot be found by referring to the language of the statute." ( Barba , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 , 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 .) The only language indicating a theft requirement appears in section 530.5, subdivision (e), which reads, "Every person who commits mail theft, as defined in Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United Stat

2019(Mar. 11, 2019, B280998) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177 , 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 580 , 2019 WL 1109629 .) "[U]se of the shorthand term 'identity theft' to describe the offense made punishable in section 530.5 does not provide a reason to read into the statute an additional element that cannot be found by referring to the language of the statute." ( Barba , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 , 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 .) The only language indicating a theft requirement appears in section 530.5, subdivision (e), which reads, "Every person who commits mail theft, as defined in Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United Stat

2016Defendant also distinguishes this case from People v. Burns, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 1251 , another purse-snatching case in which the Court of Appeal held a theft instruction was not supported by substantial evidence because undisputed evidence established the defendant grabbed the victim’s purse and used his strength, in addition to stepping on her foot, in order to overcome her resistance.

2016Defendant also distinguishes this case from People v. Burns, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 1251 , another purse-snatching case in which the Court of Appeal held a theft instruction was not supported by substantial evidence because undisputed evidence established the defendant grabbed the victim’s purse and used his strength, in addition to stepping on her foot, in order to overcome her resistance.

2016In People v. Haywood (Dec. 30, 2015, C078609) 243 Cal.App.4th 515 [ 2015 WL 9589809 ] (Haywood), a defendant sought to have his felony conviction under section 10851(a) designated as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47.

2015“While a general verdict of guilt may be sustained on evidence establishing any one of the consolidated theft offenses [citation], the offense shown by the evidence must be one on which the jury was instructed and thus could have reached its verdict.” (People v. Curtin (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 528, 531 ; accord, People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250-251 [because jury instructed only on theft by larceny, court could not look to embezzlement theory not before the jury in seeking to reconcile jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule]; People v. Beaver, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 .)

2015Code,] § 484.) 4 ‘The greater offense of robbery includes all of the elements of theft, with the additional element of a taking by force or fear. [Citation.] If the defendant does not harbor the intent to take property from the possessor at the time he applies force or fear, the taking is only a theft, not a robbery.’ ” (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 69 .) No evidence supported a theft instruction and the trial court properly refused to give that instruction.

2015(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149 [Watson test applies to failure to instruct on lesser included offense]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) IV.

2015(See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149 [Watson test applies to failure to instruct on lesser included offense]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) IV.

2015Theft instruction Miller contends that the trial court erred in failing to give a sua sponte instruction on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. “‘“Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery, which includes the additional element of force or fear.” [Citation.] If intent to steal arose only after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent. [Citations.]’ (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055-1056 [to constitute robbery, intent to steal is must be formed before or during the application of force].) ‘Nevertheless, “the existence 13

2014However, as Anderson explains, the accidental use of force in perpetrating a theft is not a defense to a robbery charge because the requisite intent for robbery is the specific intent to steal, not the intent to "apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to experience fear." ( Anderson, supra, 51 14 Cal.4th. at p. 995.) Like the rejected theory of accident in Anderson, Williams's theory of accident improperly adds to the crime of robbery what the Anderson court described as a "nonexistent element of intent," specifically, the "intent to cause the victim to experience force of fear.

2014However, as Anderson explains, the accidental use of force in perpetrating a theft is not a defense to a robbery charge because the requisite intent for robbery is the specific intent to steal, not the intent to "apply force against the victim or to cause the victim to experience fear." ( Anderson, supra, 51 14 Cal.4th. at p. 995.) Like the rejected theory of accident in Anderson, Williams's theory of accident improperly adds to the crime of robbery what the Anderson court described as a "nonexistent element of intent," specifically, the "intent to cause the victim to experience force of fear.

2014Where the effect of the omission can be ‘quantitatively assessed’ in the context of the entire record (and does not otherwise qualify as structural error), the failure to instruct on one or more elements is mere ‘ “trial error” ’ and thus amenable to harmless-error review.” (People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 413-414.) Harmonizing Mil and Cummings in regard to the particular facts of this case, we conclude omission of the theft instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.