27 California opinions name it 3 courts 1967–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Allstate Insurance v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2020Co. v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [prolonged delay of more than three years to make formal demand to initiate arbitration process concerning an uninsured motorist claim held to be unreasonable under the circumstances, thereby giving rise to a waiver of the right to arbitration].) Here, in any event, due to the extraordinary length of the delay involved in this unique case, we are convinced the prejudice described by Zurich was much more than hypothetical.4 We conclude that Emami’s 2018 demand for arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim was waived due to unreasonable delay. 2020Co. v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 [prolonged delay of more than three years to make formal demand to initiate arbitration process concerning an uninsured motorist claim held to be unreasonable under the circumstances, thereby giving rise to a waiver of the right to arbitration].) Here, in any event, due to the extraordinary length of the delay involved in this unique case, we are convinced the prejudice described by Zurich was much more than hypothetical.4 We conclude that Emami’s 2018 demand for arbitration of its underinsured motorist claim was waived due to unreasonable delay. | 1 | 2 |
Mallard v. Progressive Choice Insurancegreen2 sentences2019Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531 , 538-539, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 [statutorily mandated arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim].) The arbitration between Tang Energy *807 and AVIC USA was contractual, not statutorily mandated. 2019Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 531 , 538-539, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 487 [statutorily mandated arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim].) The arbitration between Tang Energy *807 and AVIC USA was contractual, not statutorily mandated. | 1 | 2 |
Hood v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to `"promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."' [Citations.]" ( Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 .) "When the motion has been submitted to the trial court on undisputed and stipulated facts, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the insurance policies and the applicable statutes, and instead determine these issues as a matter of law. [Citations.]" ( Travelers Indemnity Co. 2004"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to `"promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."' [Citations.]" ( Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 .) "When the motion has been submitted to the trial court on undisputed and stipulated facts, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the insurance policies and the applicable statutes, and instead determine these issues as a matter of law. [Citations.]" ( Travelers Indemnity Co. | 1 | 2 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences2004"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to `"promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."' [Citations.]" ( Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 .) "When the motion has been submitted to the trial court on undisputed and stipulated facts, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the insurance policies and the applicable statutes, and instead determine these issues as a matter of law. [Citations.]" ( Travelers Indemnity Co. 2004"The policy underlying motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues is to `"promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless trials."' [Citations.]" ( Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 323 , 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 .) "When the motion has been submitted to the trial court on undisputed and stipulated facts, we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the insurance policies and the applicable statutes, and instead determine these issues as a matter of law. [Citations.]" ( Travelers Indemnity Co. | 1 | 2 |
Hightower v. Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen2 sentences2016(See, e.g., Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 ; Brehm, supra, 166 3 The parties agreed to omit subdivision (c) of the proposed instruction, and the trial court struck subdivision (e). 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Hightower, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [“the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim”].) IDS fails to establish that the language of subdivision (d) was an incorrect statement of the law. 2016Exchange (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 853, 863 .) In Hightower, the court concluded that “the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim.” (Hightower, at p. 862.) The court in Hightower noted that a contrary rule would allow an insurer to “‘stonewall’ uninsured motorist claimants in every case but avoid bad faith liability through the simple act of requesting arbitration and refusing to pay until ordered to do so by an arbitrator.” (Id. at p. 863.) The court in Brehm reached a similar conclusio | 1 | 1 |
A.F. Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc.green2 sentences2010Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1129 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) 6 “ ‘Both section 425.16 and Civil Code section 47 are construed broadly, to protect the right of litigants to “ ‘the utmost freedom of access to the courts without [the] fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.’ ” [Citations.] Thus, it has been established for well over a century that a communication is absolutely immune from any tort liability if it has “ ‘some relation’ ” to judicial proceedings.’ ” (Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro. 2010Brown Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. Rhino Electric Supply, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1129 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ].) 6 “ ‘Both section 425.16 and Civil Code section 47 are construed broadly, to protect the right of litigants to “ ‘the utmost freedom of access to the courts without [the] fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.’ ” [Citations.] Thus, it has been established for well over a century that a communication is absolutely immune from any tort liability if it has “ ‘some relation’ ” to judicial proceedings.’ ” (Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro. | 1 | 1 |
Beach v. Harco National Insurancegreen2 sentences2010Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 93 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 454 ] (Beach), an insurance company was sued for bad faith due to its handling of an uninsured motorist claim. 2010Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 93 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 454 ] (Beach), an insurance company was sued for bad faith due to its handling of an uninsured motorist claim. | 1 | 1 |
Garretson v. Postgreen2 sentences2010Statutes govern nonjudicial foreclosure, but that is not an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ [Citation.] Statutes also govern stop notices, but such notices do not constitute ‘ “official proceeding^] authorized by law,” ’ either.” Unlike the statutory requirement that the parties agree to submit to contractual arbitration for the resolution of uninsured motorist claim disputes, “[n]onjudicial foreclosure merely provides a nonjudicial, private alternative to judicial foreclosure.” (Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1521 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ], italics added.) Furthermore, t 2010Statutes govern nonjudicial foreclosure, but that is not an ‘official proceeding authorized by law.’ [Citation.] Statutes also govern stop notices, but such notices do not constitute ‘ “official proceeding^] authorized by law,” ’ either.” Unlike the statutory requirement that the parties agree to submit to contractual arbitration for the resolution of uninsured motorist claim disputes, “[n]onjudicial foreclosure merely provides a nonjudicial, private alternative to judicial foreclosure.” (Garretson v. Post (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1521 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 ], italics added.) Furthermore, t | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992For example, the insurer's subrogation right to go against the negligent third party ... will be lost unless something is done within one year after the accident." ( Aetna Cas. & *1296 Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 333, 340 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 476 ].) Subsequently, however, the Legislature amended the subrogation provision of section 11580.2 to specifically allow the insurer to bring an action against the uninsured motorist "within three years from the date that payment was made hereunder." (§ 11580.2, subd. (g).) This special statute of limitations takes precedence over the 1992For example, the insurer's subrogation right to go against the negligent third party ... will be lost unless something is done within one year after the accident." ( Aetna Cas. & *1296 Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 333, 340 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 476 ].) Subsequently, however, the Legislature amended the subrogation provision of section 11580.2 to specifically allow the insurer to bring an action against the uninsured motorist "within three years from the date that payment was made hereunder." (§ 11580.2, subd. (g).) This special statute of limitations takes precedence over the | 1 | 1 |
Kachig v. Boothegreen2 sentences1992(Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 630 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) The complaint must set forth sufficient facts to bring the claim within the statutory definition of an uninsured motorist claim. 1992(Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 630 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) The complaint must set forth sufficient facts to bring the claim within the statutory definition of an uninsured motorist claim. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Jacksongreen2 sentences1992Code, § 1063.1, subd. (c)(1).) [3] The focus of this case is on that portion of the definition set forth above which provides that the claim be one "imposed by law and within the coverage of an insurance policy of the insolvent insurer." Since section 11580.2 is incorporated into every auto policy by law ( In re Marriage of Jackson (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 479, 484 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 508 ]), this uninsured motorist claim is only "within the coverage" of the policy if the insured has complied with section 11580.2, subdivision (i). 1992Code, § 1063.1, subd. (c)(1).) [3] The focus of this case is on that portion of the definition set forth above which provides that the claim be one "imposed by law and within the coverage of an insurance policy of the insolvent insurer." Since section 11580.2 is incorporated into every auto policy by law ( In re Marriage of Jackson (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 479, 484 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 508 ]), this uninsured motorist claim is only "within the coverage" of the policy if the insured has complied with section 11580.2, subdivision (i). | 1 | 1 |
Branham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences1992Co. (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 27, 30 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 304 ].) In 1969, the Legislature added subdivision (k) to section 11580.2, requiring an insurance company to notify an insured who has made an uninsured motorist claim of the provisions of subdivision (i) at least 30 days before the expiration of the one-year time limit. 1992Co. (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 27, 30 [ 121 Cal. Rptr. 304 ].) In 1969, the Legislature added subdivision (k) to section 11580.2, requiring an insurance company to notify an insured who has made an uninsured motorist claim of the provisions of subdivision (i) at least 30 days before the expiration of the one-year time limit. | 1 | 1 |
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Alogreen1 sentence1982When Agency refused to play ball, Lumbermens filed the case at bench. *767 Lumbermens’ policy contains the following hybrid pro rata and excess clause: “If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by Part One of this policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned autom | 1 | 1 |
O'MALLEY v. Wilshire Oil Co.green2 sentences1980“Arbitration is, of course, a matter of contract, and the parties may freely delineate the area of its application.” (O' Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 482, 490 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 452 , 381 P.2d 188 ].) In the present matter, Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), requires the contract to provide for certain matters; the statute therefore becomes a part of the contract, “imposing an arbitration agreement at least as broad as the statutory specifications.” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. 1980“Arbitration is, of course, a matter of contract, and the parties may freely delineate the area of its application.” (O' Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 482, 490 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 452 , 381 P.2d 188 ].) In the present matter, Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), requires the contract to provide for certain matters; the statute therefore becomes a part of the contract, “imposing an arbitration agreement at least as broad as the statutory specifications.” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Jenevein places primary reliance on Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040 , 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ( Manhattan Loft ), which held that a party to an arbitration involving real property could not record a lis pendens because "a lis pendens may only be filed when an action in a court of law is pending." ( Id. at p. 1045, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 .) The court in Manhattan Loft reversed an order granting a special motion to strike a cause of action for slander of title against the parties that had improperly recorded the lis pendens because the court concluded the plaintif 2019Jenevein places primary reliance on Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040 (Manhattan Loft), which held that a party to an arbitration involving real property could not record a lis pendens because “a lis pendens may only be filed when an action in a court of law is pending.” (Id. at p. 1045.) The court in Manhattan Loft reversed an order granting a special motion to strike a cause of action for slander of title against the parties that had improperly recorded the lis pendens because the court concluded the plaintiffs had shown a probability of prevailing. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Mercury Insurance Group v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2013Group v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 332 the court held that the trial court acted within its discretion under section 1281.2 when it denied a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim on the ground that the arbitration proceeding on the uninsured motorist claim and the pending personal injury action arose “out of the same transaction” and that compelling arbitration would give rise to “a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Id. at p. 350.) The court explained that “in the contractual arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator might concl 2013Group v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th 332 the court held that the trial court acted within its discretion under section 1281.2 when it denied a petition to compel arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim on the ground that the arbitration proceeding on the uninsured motorist claim and the pending personal injury action arose “out of the same transaction” and that compelling arbitration would give rise to “a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.” (Id. at p. 350.) The court explained that “in the contractual arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator might concl | 2 | 2000–2013 |
Corral v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence2021Corral, for example, did not involve a petition to compel 7 arbitration, but addressed whether the plaintiff’s bad faith action was barred by a prior arbitration award under principles of res judicata. ( Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1009–1010.) In Corral, unlike here, arbitration of the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim had already concluded. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brehm v. 21st Century Insurance
green
2 sentences2016Exchange (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 853, 863 .) In Hightower, the court concluded that “the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim.” (Hightower, at p. 862.) The court in Hightower noted that a contrary rule would allow an insurer to “‘stonewall’ uninsured motorist claimants in every case but avoid bad faith liability through the simple act of requesting arbitration and refusing to pay until ordered to do so by an arbitrator.” (Id. at p. 863.) The court in Brehm reached a similar conclusio 2016(See, e.g., Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 ; Brehm, supra, 166 3 The parties agreed to omit subdivision (c) of the proposed instruction, and the trial court struck subdivision (e). 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Hightower, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [“the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim”].) IDS fails to establish that the language of subdivision (d) was an incorrect statement of the law. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Maslo v. Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance
green
2 sentences2016(See, e.g., Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 ; Brehm, supra, 166 3 The parties agreed to omit subdivision (c) of the proposed instruction, and the trial court struck subdivision (e). 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Hightower, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [“the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim”].) IDS fails to establish that the language of subdivision (d) was an incorrect statement of the law. 2016(See, e.g., Maslo, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 637 ; Brehm, supra, 166 3 The parties agreed to omit subdivision (c) of the proposed instruction, and the trial court struck subdivision (e). 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1243-1244; Hightower, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 866 [“the mere availability of an arbitration procedure does not insulate an insurer from liability for bad faith in its handling of an uninsured motorist claim”].) IDS fails to establish that the language of subdivision (d) was an incorrect statement of the law. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Silberg v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2010The subpoenas were thus issued “to achieve the objects of the litigation” and had “some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212 .) ¥he use of the subpoenas, as expressly sanctioned by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), therefore constituted privileged conduct. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2004Only damages proximately resulting from the breach—such as consequent economic loss or emotional distress, for example—are recoverable as compensation therefor.” (Neal, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 925 , italics omitted.) In Neal , the court made it clear that if an insured believes its insurer has breached its duties in handling an uninsured motorist claim, the damages from such alleged breach of the insurance contract are not related to the damages allegedly sustained by the insured from the accident itself. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Shrader
green
1 sentence1996Co. v. Shrader (Wyo. 1994) 882 P.2d 813, 833-834 , a bad faith action arising out of the carrier’s dealings with an uninsured motorist claim which resulted in a verdict for the insured, the carrier claimed on appeal that emotional distress damages should not have been included in the insured’s award. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Page v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences1992(Page v. Insurance Co. of North America (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 89 ].) Page involved a three-vehicle accident in which plaintiff had failed to allege any physical contact with a vehicle described in the pleadings as a “phantom vehicle.” Defendant INA had demurred to this count of the complaint. 1992(Page v. Insurance Co. of North America (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 374 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 89 ].) Page involved a three-vehicle accident in which plaintiff had failed to allege any physical contact with a vehicle described in the pleadings as a “phantom vehicle.” Defendant INA had demurred to this count of the complaint. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Freeman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1992Co., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 481 .) (5) Rangel complains that the Exchange was aware of possible good cause to proceed with arbitration sooner and that the Exchange was therefore in bad faith for not proceeding with the uninsured motorist claim. 1992Co., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 481 .) Rangel complains that the Exchange was aware of possible good cause to proceed with arbitration sooner and that the Exchange was therefore in bad faith for not proceeding with the uninsured motorist claim. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
CALIFORNIA STATE AUTO. ASSN. INTER-INS. v. Cohen
green
1 sentence1992(Cohen, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 .) In so concluding, the Cohen court cited as authority several cases stating that this statute creates an absolute prerequisite to the accrual of a potential cause of action under the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Saunders v. Cariss
green
2 sentences1991In Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], a pleading case, the court held that plaintiff Saunders could recover from Cariss, his insurance agent, the attorneys’ fees incurred in “persuading” his insurance company to pay the policy limits on an uninsured motorist claim. 1991In Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], a pleading case, the court held that plaintiff Saunders could recover from Cariss, his insurance agent, the attorneys’ fees incurred in “persuading” his insurance company to pay the policy limits on an uninsured motorist claim. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies
green
1 sentence1989Its ‘obvious purpose’ is to prevent the prejudicial use of such evidence in a proceeding to determine the insured’s liability. [Citation.]” (Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal.3d at p. 306 .) 4 Although Evidence Code section 1155 is not by its language applicable to this situation, it appears to us that the policy considerations underlying that statute would apply, and that *1444 they would not be served by permitting joinder of an insured’s action against his insurer for bad faith failure to settle an uninsured motorist claim with the underlying action against the third party tortfeasor. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Fellows v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1988In Fellows v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal. App.3d 55 , plaintiff sued defendant insurance company for damages for bad faith refusal to settle an uninsured motorist claim. 1988In Fellows v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 55 , plaintiff sued defendant insurance company for damages for bad faith refusal to settle an uninsured motorist claim. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Rowell v. Transpacific Life Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1985Co., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 818 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Held v. Arant
green
1 sentence1985In that vein, plaintiff does seem to make some connection between her “disfavored” characterization of the defense and the fact that defendants’ proposed fourth affirmative defense referred not only to plaintiff’s “bad faith conduct in the prosecuting, handling and management of the uninsured motorist claim” and her “failure to provide full and complete information to the defendants and their insuror [sic],” but also to plaintiff’s former attorney’s conduct in that regard, thus possibly implicating the policy considerations discussed in Held v. Arant, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 748 and Rowell v. Tra | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Lucas v. Hamm green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Mills v. Farmers Insurance Exchange green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Ruiz green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Garcia v. National Union Fire Insurance neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.