20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Walkergreen2 sentences2020“Smith’s vehicle was insured by a policy issued by Erie, which 5 In Stewart v. Walker, 597 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), another panel of this Court stated, “[W]e believe it sound policy to … impose a duty on an insurer faced with an uninsured motorist claim made by an injured passenger of its insured of bearing itself with all good faith towards the claimant[.]” Id. at 375 (quotation marks omitted). 2020“Smith’s vehicle was insured by a policy issued by Erie, which 5 In Stewart v. Walker, 597 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), another panel of this Court stated, “[W]e believe it sound policy to … impose a duty on an insurer faced with an uninsured motorist claim made by an injured passenger of its insured of bearing itself with all good faith towards the claimant[.]” Id. at 375 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Michael v. Wolfegreen2 sentences2018See Michael, 737 N.E.2d at 823 (providing that “to recover on an uninsured motorist claim, the insured must prove that there is no policy applicable to the vehicle driven by the tortfeasor”). 2006Citizens argues that Matteson is not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage because the semi truck was not an uninsured vehicle. "[Tjo recover on an uninsured motorist claim, the insured must prove that there is no policy applicable to the vehicle driven by the tortfea-sor." Michael v. Wolfe, 737 N.E.2d 820, 823 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). "[Aln insured may also establish a prima facie case. by showing that he has made reasonable efforts to determine whether an applicable insurance policy exists and these efforts have been fruitless. | 2 | 2 |
Spencer v. Bridgewatergreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Spencer v. Bridgewater, 757 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of the insurer because there was no showing that the insurer engaged in ill will or conscious wrongdoing in denying the insured’s uninsured motorist claim). 819 N.E.2d at 136 . 2004See, eg., Spencer v. Bridgewater, 757 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of the insurer because there was no showing that the insurer engaged in ill will or conscious wrongdoing in denying the insured's uninsured motorist claim). | Because we hold that Allstate was entitled to partial summary judgment on the bad faith claim, and because that issue is dispositive, we do not reach the merits of the default judgment, settlement agreement, and motion in limine issues raised by Allstate. | 2 | 2 |
Woodley v. Fieldsgreen1 sentence2008See, e.g., Spencer v. Bridgewater, 757 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of the insurer because there was no showing that the insurer engaged in ill will or conscious wrongdoing in denying the insured’s uninsured motorist claim). 819 N.E.2d at 136 . | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance v. Speergreen1 sentence2001The court then held that "under the facts of this case, ... it would be a tortured strain of the statute to include [the mother and daughter] as covered under the uninsured motorist clause of the [husband/father's insurance policy]." Id. at 259 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 1 |
Whitledge v. Jordangreen1 sentence2000See Whitledge v. Jordan, 586 N.E.2d 884, 885-86 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Erie Insurance v. Hickman Ex Rel. Smithgreen1 sentence1998Id. at 523, n. 4 . | 1 | 1 |
Tofany v. NBS Imaging Systems, Inc.green1 sentence1993See Tofany v. NBS Imaging Systems, Inc. (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 ; Sullivan v. American Casualty (1992), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 134, 139 . | 1 | 1 |
Fred J. Craft, Irene Craft, and Joanne Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Companygreen1 sentence1992Co. v. Shryer (1882), 85 Ind. 862 ); accord Croft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (ith Cir.1978), 572 F.2d 565, 570 (interpreting Indiana law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matteson v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America
green
1 sentence2018Co. of Am. , 844 N.E.2d 188 , 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gooch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 39 . 2004Id. at 39 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2002Second, in Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 219 Mich.App. 340 , 556 N.W.2d 207 (1996), the court was asked to determine whether an insured was “struck” by an uninsured motor vehicle when the insured’s automobile ran over a piece of metal that had come to rest in the road. 2002Second, in Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 219 Mich.App. 340 , 556 N.W.2d 207 (1996), the court was asked to determine whether an insured was “struck” by an uninsured motor vehicle when the insured’s automobile ran over a piece of metal that had come to rest in the road. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Atwood v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2002The trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the insurer was reversed because there was “a genuine issue of fact as to whether the limestone from the passing truck striking [the insured’s] windshield and injuring him was a sufficient striking or ‘actual physical contact’ ... to require coverage under the uninsured motorist clause of [the insured’s] policy.” Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sullivan v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa.
green
1 sentence1993See Tofany v. NBS Imaging Systems, Inc. (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 ; Sullivan v. American Casualty (1992), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 134, 139 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1992Thus, the court below was correct that insurance companies have a duty to "assist the policy holder from whom they took premiums...." Although the trial court's expression of that duty seems directed at Hawkeye, which took premiums from Stewart, we believe it sound policy to also impose a duty on an insurer faced with an uninsured motorist claim made by an injured passenger of its insured of bearing itself "'with all good faith towards the claimant. ...'" Huff, 266 Ind. at 424 , 363 N.E.2d at 991 (quoting Aetna Ins. 1992Thus, the court below was correct that insurance companies have a duty to "assist the policy holder from whom they took premiums...." Although the trial court's expression of that duty seems directed at Hawkeye, which took premiums from Stewart, we believe it sound policy to also impose a duty on an insurer faced with an uninsured motorist claim made by an injured passenger of its insured of bearing itself "'with all good faith towards the claimant. ...'" Huff, 266 Ind. at 424 , 363 N.E.2d at 991 (quoting Aetna Ins. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Panos v. Perchez
green
1 sentence1990Panos v. Perchez (1989), Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Chicago Motor Club
green
2 sentences1990Thus, the Bocek court held the insured’s uninsured motorist claim failed because the underlying right of action no longer existed—there was no “legal[] entitlement] to recover damages.” *873 Bocek, 175 Ind.App. at 75 , 369 N.E.2d at 1097 . 1990Thus, the Bocek court held the insured’s uninsured motorist claim failed because the underlying right of action no longer existed—there was no “legal[] entitlement] to recover damages.” *873 Bocek, 175 Ind.App. at 75 , 369 N.E.2d at 1097 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Combs
green
1 sentence1987This court found the claimant was "upon" the insured automobile and summary judgment in his favor was proper. 446 N.E.2d at 1007 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hoosier Ins. Co., Inc. v. Mangino
green
1 sentence1984Mangino, supra. The uninsured motorist clause appearing in one of Hunter's insurance policies states that Town & Country agrees "to pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, herein called 'bodily injury', sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobile ..." This is substantially similar to the related provision in Hu | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Capps v. Klebs
green
1 sentence1980Although we agree that the uninsured motorist provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the insured, see" Capps v. Klebs, (1978) Ind.App., 382 N.E.2d 947 , under the facts of this ease, we believe that it would be a tortured strain of the statute to include Beverly and Donna as covered under the uninsured motorist clause of the Indiana Farmers policy. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Ely v. State Farm Ins.
green
1 sentence1976Ind. App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (transfer denied)], it may appear that this court approved an ‘exception,’ the effect of which was to limit protection under an uninsured motorist clause to less than all the persons statutorily required to be protected, such is not the case. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Page v. Insurance Co. of North America
green
1 sentence1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Coker Ex Rel. Estate of Coker v. Nationwide Insurance
green
1 sentence1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Smith v. Allstate Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins 1972Co., supra; Page v. Insurance Company of North America (1967), 256 Cal. App. 2d 374 , 64 Cal. Rep. 89 ; Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra; Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (La. 1966), 191 So. 2d 901 ; Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. (1968), 251 S. Car. 175, 161 S. E. 2d 175 ; Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1970 Tenn.), 456 S. W. 2d 654 ; Amidvich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 45 , 170 N. W. 2d 813 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *702 As a result, the absence of physical contact between the injured person and a hit-and-run vehicle is fatal to a claim under an unins | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Stephens v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1970Co., 182 Neb. 562 , 156 N.E.2d 133 , that the proper interpretation of our statutes on uninsured motorist's liabilities is that the uninsured motorist clause is a substitute liability policy. 1970Co., 182 Neb. 562 , 156 N. E. 2d 133 , that the proper interpretation of our statutes on uninsured motorist’s liabilities is that the uninsured motorist clause is a substitute liability policy. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.