27 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Radison Properties, Inc. v. Flamingo Groves, Inc.green2 sentences2018Nat'l Bank, 508 So. 2d at 1324 ); see also Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Real Estate Depot, Inc., 42 So. 3d 258, 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable subrogation . . . is designed to apply where the claimant satisfied an obligation of another and then stands in the shoes of the satisfied creditor." (citing Radison Props., Inc. v. Flamingo Groves, Inc., 767 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000))). 2010See Radison Props., Inc. v. Flamingo Groves, Inc., 767 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). | 2 | 2 |
Caccavella v. Silvermangreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Caccavella v. Silverman, 814 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“When an initial tortfeasor is held liable for the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages, his remedy is an action for equitable subrogation against the subsequent tortfeasor.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 2017See, e.g., Caccavella v. Silverman, 814 So.2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“When an initial tortfeasor is held liable for the entirety of the plaintiffs, damages, his remedy is an action for equitable subrogation against the subsequent tortfeasor.”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakesgreen2 sentences2015The issue we address is whether, under Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So.2d 702 (Fla.1980), an initial tortfeasor or her insurer may assert an equitable subrogation claim against a subsequent tortfeasor when: (1) the initial tortfeasor was precluded from bringing the subsequent tortfeasor into the original personal injury action under Stuart v. Hertz, 351 So.2d 703 (Fla.1977); (2) judgment was entered against the initial tort-feasor for the full amount of the injured person’s damages, regardless of the initial tortfeasor’s portion of the fault; and (3) that judgment ha 2015Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 508 So.2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)) (determining an initial tortfeasor may only maintain an equitable subrogation claim against a subsequent tortfeasor when he has fully discharged the underlying debt owed to the plaintiffs); see also Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So.2d 702, 704 (Fla.1980) (“A subrogation suit is a separate, independent action against a subsequent tortfeasor by the initial tortfeasor. | 2 | 2 |
West American Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab Co.green2 sentences2021Co. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc., 495 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (stating that the doctrine of equitable subrogation “may be invoked wherever justice demands its application, irrespective of technical legal rules.”). 2 1999Additionally, this opinion recognizes and resolves further conflict between the opinion below and the opinion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in West American Insurance Co. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc., 495 So.2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), regarding the proper application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. | 1 | 4 |
Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat. Bankgreen2 sentences2018For example, "a refinancing lender is equitably subrogated to the priority of the first mortgage even where it has actual knowledge of an intervening lien." Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 (citing Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat'l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222 , 1227 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). 2011We believe it is not inappropriate to hold that one who is sued for alleged negligence and who, in an effort to save his property, including the expenditure of attorney’s fees, enters into a reasonable settlement is not a volunteer and is entitled to seek reimbursement under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 588 So.2d 909 , 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Rawson v. City of Omaha, 212 Neb. 159 , 322 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1982)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank, 792 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “equity will grant | 1 | 3 |
Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Real Estate Depot, Inc.green2 sentences2018Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1993); Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . "[T]he doctrine of equitable subrogation, a twin remedy to the equitable lien, is designed to apply where the claimant satisfied an obligation of another and then stands in the shoes of the satisfied creditor." Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . 2018Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1993); Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . "[T]he doctrine of equitable subrogation, a twin remedy to the equitable lien, is designed to apply where the claimant satisfied an obligation of another and then stands in the shoes of the satisfied creditor." Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . | 1 | 2 |
Eastern Nat. Bk. v. Glendale Fed. Sav.green2 sentences2018Nat'l Bank, 508 So. 2d at 1324 ); see also Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Real Estate Depot, Inc., 42 So. 3d 258, 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable subrogation . . . is designed to apply where the claimant satisfied an obligation of another and then stands in the shoes of the satisfied creditor." (citing Radison Props., Inc. v. Flamingo Groves, Inc., 767 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000))). 2015Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 508 So.2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)) (determining an initial tortfeasor may only maintain an equitable subrogation claim against a subsequent tortfeasor when he has fully discharged the underlying debt owed to the plaintiffs); see also Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So.2d 702, 704 (Fla.1980) (“A subrogation suit is a separate, independent action against a subsequent tortfeasor by the initial tortfeasor. | 1 | 2 |
Rawson v. City of Omahagreen2 sentences2011We believe it is not inappropriate to hold that one who is sued for alleged negligence and who, in an effort to save his property, including the expenditure of attorney’s fees, enters into a reasonable settlement is not a volunteer and is entitled to seek reimbursement under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 588 So.2d 909 , 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Rawson v. City of Omaha, 212 Neb. 159 , 322 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1982)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank, 792 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “equity will grant 2011We believe it is not inappropriate to hold that one who is sued for alleged negligence and who, in an effort to save his property, including the expenditure of attorney’s fees, enters into a reasonable settlement is not a volunteer and is entitled to seek reimbursement under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 588 So.2d 909 , 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Rawson v. City of Omaha, 212 Neb. 159 , 322 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1982)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank, 792 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “equity will grant | 1 | 2 |
Palm Beach Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbeingreen1 sentence2018Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 1993); Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . "[T]he doctrine of equitable subrogation, a twin remedy to the equitable lien, is designed to apply where the claimant satisfied an obligation of another and then stands in the shoes of the satisfied creditor." Tribeca Lending Corp., 42 So. 3d at 262 . | 1 | 1 |
Diplomat Properties Ltd. Partnership v. Tecnoglass, LLCgreen1 sentence2018P'ship v. Tecnoglass, LLC, 114 So. 3d 357, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)). - 17 - Conclusion Because Tank Tech established that there were genuine issues of material fact relating to the equitable subrogation claim, the trial court erred by granting final summary judgment on that claim. | 1 | 1 |
Velazquez v. Serranogreen1 sentence2013A foreclosure sale of the Property was scheduled for August 2007, but days before the sale was to take place, Pinnacle Three Corp. (Appellee) paid all sums due to Bank United under the final judgment. 2 In so doing, Appellee was placed in the position of Bank United under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, whereby “one having a liability or a right ... in the premises pays a debt due by another under such circumstances that he is, in equity, entitled to the security or obligation held by the creditor whom he has paid.” Velazquez v. Serrano, 43 So.3d 82, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (internal cita | 1 | 1 |
US Fire Ins. v. Morrison Assur.green1 sentence2010Co. v. Morrison Assurance Co., 600 So.2d 1147, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Ranger Ins. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Eastern Marine, Inc.green1 sentence2006Id.; see also In re Eastern Marine, Inc., 104 B.R. 421, 423 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Fla.1989)(“Moreover, an equitable subrogation claim or right is not a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code. | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Scharpsgreen1 sentence2004“Equitable subro-gation affords relief in essentially every situation in which a non-volunteer pays a debt or discharges an obligation which in good conscience should have been met by another.” Price v. Scharps, 405 So.2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. New Age Development Corp.green1 sentence2001The other case relied on by the trial court is Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. New Age Development Corp., 625 So.2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in which the majority affirmed without opinion, but a special concurring opinion showed that the facts were the same as in Godwin. | 1 | 1 |
Jacobson v. Stategreen1 sentence1999Cf. Jacobson v. State, 476 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 1985) ("Having jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction over all issues, Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308 (Fla.1982), and dispose of the case on a ground other than the conflict ground."). | 1 | 1 |
National Surety Corporation v. Bimontegreen1 sentence1997See National Surety Corp. v. Bimonte, 143 So.2d 709, 710 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Nottingham Associatesgreen1 sentence1997See Wagner, 464 So.2d at 170 ; Arky, Freed, 537 So.2d at 562-63 . | 1 | 1 |
| Ulery v. Asphalt Paving, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Trade Winds Enterprises Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| De Pasquale v. F. W. Woolworth Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Woodhull v. . Rosenthalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stuart v. Hertz Corp.
green
2 sentences2017On appeal, the Fifth District considered whether [A]n initial tortfeasor or her insurer may assert an equitable subrogation claim against a subsequent tortfeasor when: (1) the initial tortfeasor was precluded from bringing the subsequent tortfeasor into the original personal injury action under Stuart v. Hertz, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977); (2) judgment was entered against the initial tortfeasor for the full amount of the injured person’s damages, regardless of the initial tortfeasor’s portion of fault; and (3) that judgment has not been completely paid by the initial tortfeasor or her insurer. 2017On appeal, the Fifth District considered whether [A]n initial tortfeasor or her insurer may assert an equitable subrogation claim against a subsequent tortfeasor when: (1) the initial tortfeasor was precluded from bringing the subsequent tortfeasor into the original personal injury action under Stuart v. Hertz, 351 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1977); (2) judgment was entered against the initial tortfeasor for the full amount of the injured person’s damages, regardless of the initial tortfeasor’s portion of fault; and (3) that judgment has not been completely paid by the initial tortfeasor or her insurer. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA
green
2 sentences2017We later expounded on what was required for an initial tortfeasor to assert an equitable subrogation claim in Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999), where we held that equitable subrogation is “generally appropriate” when five factors are satisfied: (1) the subrogee made the payment to protect his or her own interest, (2) the subrogee did not act as a volunteer, (3) the subrogee was not primarily liable for the debt, (4) the subrogee paid off the entire debt, and (5) subrogation would not work any injustice to the rights of a third party. 2017The injured party, having received full compensation for all injuries, is not a party to the litigation and is spared the trauma of an extensive malpractice trial.” Id, In so holding, we “aligned Florida with jurisdictions relying upon subrogation as a remedy of affording an initial tortfeasor equitable apportionment of liability when a victim’s injuries have been negligently aggravated by an attending doctor.” Id. (citations omitted). - We later expounded on what was required for an initial tortfeasor to assert an equitable subrogation claim in Dade County School Board v. Radio Station WQBA, | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Boley v. Daniel
green
2 sentences1992Although the doctrine does not apply to mere volunteers, Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121 , 72 So. 644 (1916), it will arise when a party discharges an obligation to protect an interest in, or right to, property. 1987Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121 , 72 So. 644 (1916). | 2 | 1987–1992 |
Public Health Trust of Dade Cty. v. Valcin
green
1 sentence2018On appeal, Tank Tech argues that summary judgment was improper because (1) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the equitable subrogation claim; (2) the trial court erred in finding that Valley Tank owed no duty to Tank Tech and that there was no factual basis to show that Valley Tank was negligent in its testing of the USTs; (3) Valley Tank's failure to meet the presumption set forth in Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987), precluded entry of summary judgment; and (4) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding which of the two enti | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Transport Intern. Pool v. Pat Salmon & Sons of Fla.
green
1 sentence2011To argue that it should not be barred from equitable subrogation because of its failure to properly evaluate the preemptive impact of the Graves Amendment, Daimler cites cases that involve mistakes of fact— West American Insurance Co. v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc., 495 So.2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), and Transport International Pool, Inc. v. Pat Salmon & Sons of Fla., Inc., 609 So.2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hewitt Hewitt v. Punta Gorda State Bank
green
1 sentence2001The language we quoted from Godwin explains that the doctrine is "employed to relieve from fraud or mistake, but is not allowed if it works any injustice to the rights of others." Godwin, 145 So. at 885-86 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Savoie v. State
green
1 sentence1999Cf. Jacobson v. State, 476 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 1985) ("Having jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction over all issues, Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308 (Fla.1982), and dispose of the case on a ground other than the conflict ground."). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
ARKY, FREED v. Bowmar Instrument Corp.
green
1 sentence1997See Wagner, 464 So.2d at 170 ; Arky, Freed, 537 So.2d at 562-63 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Schilling v. Bank of Sulphur Springs
neutral
2 sentences1997In Schilling v. Bank of Sulphur Springs, 109 Fla. 181 , 147 So. 218 (1933), a third-party purchase money mortgage was utilized by the mortgagor to acquire certain property. 1997In Schilling v. Bank of Sulphur Springs, 109 Fla. 181 , 147 So. 218 (1933), a third-party purchase money mortgage was utilized by the mortgagor to acquire certain property. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kala Investments, Inc. v. Sklar
green
1 sentence1992Kala, 538 So.2d at 918 (quoting Rawson, 381 N.W.2d at 322) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Newcomer v. Masini
green
2 sentences1989And in Newcomer v. Masini, 45 Wash. App. 284 , 724 P.2d 1122 (1986), a defendant who settled with the plaintiff and was later absolved of all liability was held to be entitled to recover the settlement money under a theory of subrogation from the third-party defendant found solely responsible. 1989And in Newcomer v. Masini, 45 Wash. App. 284 , 724 P.2d 1122 (1986), a defendant who settled with the plaintiff and was later absolved of all liability was held to be entitled to recover the settlement money under a theory of subrogation from the third-party defendant found solely responsible. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Waterhouse v. McDevitt and Street Co.
green
1 sentence1988Having the convenient and practical remedy of filing its security agreement under the U.C.C., the surety company is not entitled to disregard it and rely on the remedy of equitable subrogation to ambush a financing bank which has dutifully filed its security interest as provided by law. [18] Our holding in this case is consistent with, and parallel to, Waterhouse v. McDevitt & Street Co., 387 So.2d 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), in which this court held that a bank with a perfected security interest had priority over a surety which did not perfect its security interest but which claimed a superior r | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Cuesta, Rey Co. v. Newsom, as Liquidator green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| TRADE WINDS ENTERPRISES CORP. v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| General Acc. Fire & Life v. American Cas. Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Furlong v. Leybourne green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.