equitable subrogation doctrine in Indiana

2024See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 651-52 (Ind. 2005) (“The doctrine of equitable subrogation . . . arises from the discharge of a debt and permits the party paying off a creditor to succeed to the creditor’s rights in relation to the debt.”). [30] Great American’s arguments are nonstarters.

2015Equitable Subrogation [24] Our supreme court redefined the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which has been recognized in Indiana for more than a century, in Bank of New York v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 651 (Ind. 2005).

2007Equity One, however, contends that in light of the undisputed facts, the trial court should have given its mortgage priority over Bank One’s mortgage based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which we have described as “a highly favored doctrine, which is to be given a liberal application.” Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.

2001In Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 737-38 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied, this court discussed the doctrine of equitable subrogation: Equitable subrogation is applicable when a "party, not [acting as] a mere volunteer, pays the debt of another which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the one primarily liable." Loving v. Ponderosa Sys., Inc., (1985) Ind., 479 N.E.2d 531, 536 (citing National Mutual Ins.

2012Bules v. Marshall Cnty., 920 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. 2010).

2012Bules v. Marshall Cnty. 920 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind.2010).

2001In Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 737-38 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied, this court discussed the doctrine of equitable subrogation: Equitable subrogation is applicable when a "party, not [acting as] a mere volunteer, pays the debt of another which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the one primarily liable." Loving v. Ponderosa Sys., Inc., (1985) Ind., 479 N.E.2d 531, 536 (citing National Mutual Ins.

2001In Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 785, 737-38 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied, this court discussed the doctrine of equitable subrogation: ' Equitable subrogation is applicable when a "party, not [acting as] a mere volunteer, pays the debt of another which, in good conscience, should have been paid by the one primarily liable." Loving v. Ponderosa Sys., Inc., (1985) Ind., 479 N.E.2d 531, 586 (citing Notional Mutual Ins.

2012“The nature of equitable subrogation is, as its name indicates, equity.” Neu v. Gibson, 928 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Ind. 2010).

2012The trial court also found that “though other findings dispose of this litigation between Gibson and the Neus and Washington Mutual,” the Neus and Washington Mutual “would be entitled to assume the first lien position of Irwin Mortgage Corporation, in the amount of $506,016.34 under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.” Id.

2016Id. at *8. [11] It is true that “when new facts are elicited on remand which materially affect the questions at issue, the trial court may apply the law to the new facts.” Estate of Martin by Martin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 667 N.E.2d 219, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also Am.

2014In so doing, we noted the general requirement of privity between the attorney and the party claiming malpractice: As a general rule, a plaintiff may recover against a professional who negligently makes representations or gives advice “only if there is privity of contract or if the negligent professional had actual knowledge that the plaintiff would be affected by the representations made.” Keybank National Association v. Shipley, 846 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (quoting Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), adopted in part by 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind.1988)).

2014In so doing, we noted the general requirement of privity between the attorney and the party claiming malpractice: As a general rule, a plaintiff may recover against a professional who negligently makes representations or gives advice “only if there is privity of contract or if the negligent professional had actual knowledge that the plaintiff would be affected by the representations made.” Keybank National Association v. Shipley, 846 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied (quoting Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), adopted in part by 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind.1988)).

2004Bank of New York v. Nally, 790 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).