equitable subrogation doctrine in Alabama

2009Although there is evidence indicating that Porter did not find the judgment lien, there is no evidence showing “something more than simple negligence.” Brooks, supra. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court correctly determined that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied to the Porter mortgage so that Porter assumed Yale’s position of priority to the extent Porter satisfied the Yale mortgage.

2008See Brooks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 599 So.2d 1163 (Ala.1992)(granting the purchasers’ request for equitable subrogation where the purchasers discharged a debt to the senior lienholder without knowledge that an intermediate vendor had mortgaged the property to a junior lienholder); Whitson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

2014MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). “ ‘The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.’ ” McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Ala.1979) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So.2d 250, 252 (1958)).

2014Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 70-71 , 171 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1969). 10 1130503 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). "'The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.'" McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Ala. 1979) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So. 2d 250, 252 (1958)).

2016See, e.g., McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Ala.1979) (‘“The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party....

2014MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). “ ‘The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.’ ” McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Ala.1979) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So.2d 250, 252 (1958)).

2008See, e.g., Bolman v. Lohman, 74 Ala. 507, 512 (1883) (“[W]here money is expressly advanced in order to extinguish a prior incumbrance, and is used for this purpose, with the just expectation on the part of the lender of obtaining a valid security; or where its payment is secured by a mortgage, which for any reason is adjudged to be defective, the lender or mortgagee may be subrogat-ed to the rights of the of the prior incum-brancer, whose claim he has satisfied, there being no intervening equity to prevent. ...

2008See, e.g., Bolman v. Lohman, 74 Ala. 507, 512 (1883) ("[W]here money is expressly advanced in order to extinguish a prior incumbrance, and is used for this purpose, with the just expectation on the part of the lender of obtaining a valid security; or where its payment is secured by a mortgage, which for any reason is adjudged to be defective, the lender or mortgagee may be subrogated to the rights of the of the prior incumbrancer, whose claim he has satisfied, there being no intervening equity to prevent....

1949Co., 225 Ala. 262 , at page 266, 142 So. 564 , at page 567, to be as follows: “The rule established by the weight of authorities, however, is that one who advances money to discharge a prior incumbrance at the instance of the mortgagor need not exercise the highest degree of care to discover an intervening incumbrance of the title, and mere constructive notice, imputed from *61 the existence of recordation, is not sufficient to preclude him from invoking the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the ábsence of culpable negligence.

1949Co., 225 Ala. 262 , at page 266, 142 So. 564 , at page 567, to be as follows: “The rule established by the weight of authorities, however, is that one who advances money to discharge a prior incumbrance at the instance of the mortgagor need not exercise the highest degree of care to discover an intervening incumbrance of the title, and mere constructive notice, imputed from *61 the existence of recordation, is not sufficient to preclude him from invoking the doctrine of equitable subrogation in the ábsence of culpable negligence.

2014Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 70-71 , 171 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1969). 10 1130503 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). "'The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.'" McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Ala. 1979) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So. 2d 250, 252 (1958)).

2014Co., 45 Wis. 2d 60, 70-71 , 171 N.W.2d 914, 918 (1969). 10 1130503 MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially). "'The general rule is that when an insurer pays the insured in accordance with the insurance contract for a loss of property proximately resulting from fire caused by the actionable misconduct of a third party, the insurer becomes, by the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the owner, pro tanto, of the claim of the insured against the third party.'" McGuire v. Wilson, 372 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Ala. 1979) (quoting City of Birmingham v. Walker, 267 Ala. 150, 154 , 101 So. 2d 250, 252 (1958)).

2009This decision was based on the language of the material-man’s lien statute, § 35-11-211, Ala.Code 1975, which expressly provides that mate-rialman’s liens “shall have priority over all other liens, mortgages or incumbrances created subsequent to the commencement of work on the building or improvement.” In light of the express legislative intent, this Court determined that to hold otherwise would “ ‘violate the equitable maxim that equity follows the law.’ ” 6 So.3d at 14 (quoting Richards v. Security Pacific Nat’l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 611 (Utah Ct.App.1993)).

2009See also Lawson, 6 So.3d at 15 (discussed infra, identifying the position expressed in Restatement (Third) of Property, but deeming it unnecessary under the facts presented to decide the issue whether to embrace the Restatement view that a refinancing mortgagee’s actual or constructive knowledge of intervening *487 liens did not automatically preclude a court from applying the doctrine of equitable subrogation).

2009Foster contends that this result conflicts with this Court’s recent decision in Ex parte Lawson, supra. In Lawson , this Court held that “the constructive notice supplied by the materialman’s lien statute defeats the lenders’ equitable-subrogation claim.” 6 So.3d at 14 .

2009This Court has stated the elements of equitable subrogation as follows: “(1) The loan or advancement must have been made and used to pay off the debt secured by the prior lien and it is the lender’s duty to see that the money is so applied, for the right of subrogation does not arise when the money advanced is to be applied at the discretion of the debtor; (2) the parties must contemplate that the lender will have security of equal dignity with the lien discharged by the payment; (3) the whole debt must be paid before subrogation can be enforced, that is, pro tanto subrogation is not recognize

2009This Court has stated the elements of equitable subrogation as follows: “(1) The loan or advancement must have been made and used to pay off the debt secured by the prior lien and it is the lender’s duty to see that the money is so applied, for the right of subrogation does not arise when the money advanced is to be applied at the discretion of the debtor; (2) the parties must contemplate that the lender will have security of equal dignity with the lien discharged by the payment; (3) the whole debt must be paid before subrogation can be enforced, that is, pro tanto subrogation is not recognize

1999This Court reversed, holding that the door-closing statute did not prevent National American, "which had qualified to do business in the state," 700 So.2d at 1364 (emphasis added), from recovering from Boh Brothers, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, amounts due from Boh Brothers to MMA that National American had paid on the claims of MMA's creditors.

1999Id. at 1365-67 .

1992No such judgment was ever entered." 425 So.2d at 1159-60 (citations omitted).