equitable subrogation doctrine in Georgia

2014Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “where it was the intent of the parties to substitute a new creditor’s rights for the rights of the creditor that is being paid off, the new creditor steps into the shoes of the old creditor in terms of priority.” Kim v. First Intercontinental Bank, 326 Ga. App. 424, 426 (1) ( 756 SE2d 655 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “where it was the intent of the parties to substitute a new creditor’s rights for the rights of the creditor that is being paid off, the new creditor steps into the shoes of the old creditor in terms of priority.” Kim v. First Intercontinental Bank, 326 Ga. App. 424, 426 (1) ( 756 SE2d 655 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014In Davis v. Johnson, 241 Ga. 436 ( 246 SE2d 297 ) (1978), our Supreme Court set out the complete rule: Where one advances money to pay off an encumbrance on realty either at the instance of the owner of the property or the holder of the encumbrance, either upon the express understanding or under circumstances under which an understanding will be implied that the advance made is to be secured by the senior lien on the property, in the event the new security is for any reason not a first lien on the property, the holder of the security, if not chargeable with culpable or inexcusable neglect, wil

2014In Davis v. Johnson, 241 Ga. 436 ( 246 SE2d 297 ) (1978), our Supreme Court set out the complete rule: Where one advances money to pay off an encumbrance on realty either at the instance of the owner of the property or the holder of the encumbrance, either upon the express understanding or under circumstances under which an understanding will be implied that the advance made is to be secured by the senior lien on the property, in the event the new security is for any reason not a first lien on the property, the holder of the security, if not chargeable with culpable or inexcusable neglect, wil

2014Bayview, 301 Ga. App. at 588 (1). 2.

2014Bayview, 301 Ga. App. at 588 (1). 2.

2013See Byers, supra, 285 Ga. at 539 (4).

2013See Byers, supra, 285 Ga. at 539 (4).

2022Corp., 296 Ga. App. 709 ( 675 SE2d 594 ) (2009) (same); GMAC Mtg. v. Pharis, 328 Ga. App. 56, 58 (1) ( 761 SE2d 480 ) (2014)(“[u]nder the doctrine of equitable subrogation, where it was the intent of the parties to substitute a new creditor’s rights for the rights of the creditor that is being paid off, the new creditor steps into the shoes of the old creditor in terms of priority.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Cross v. Wilmington Trust Nat.

2022Corp., 296 Ga. App. 709 ( 675 SE2d 594 ) (2009) (same); GMAC Mtg. v. Pharis, 328 Ga. App. 56, 58 (1) ( 761 SE2d 480 ) (2014)(“[u]nder the doctrine of equitable subrogation, where it was the intent of the parties to substitute a new creditor’s rights for the rights of the creditor that is being paid off, the new creditor steps into the shoes of the old creditor in terms of priority.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Cross v. Wilmington Trust Nat.

2017See Johnson v. AgSouth Farm Credit, 267 Ga. App. 567, 569, 570 (3) ( 600 SE2d 664 ) (2004).

2017See Johnson v. AgSouth Farm Credit, 267 Ga. App. 567, 569, 570 (3) ( 600 SE2d 664 ) (2004).

2008But the trial court concluded, “[Washington Mutual] holds the senior security interest under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which interest has extinguished the interest of [Secured Equity and Fastback].” Equitable subrogation means that “in certain circumstances, a lender who pays off the lien of a senior creditor may step into the shoes of the senior creditor as to the priority of the senior creditor’s lien.” Greer v. Provident Bank, 282 Ga. App. 566, 568 ( 639 SE2d 377 ) (2006).

2008But the trial court concluded, “[Washington Mutual] holds the senior security interest under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, which interest has extinguished the interest of [Secured Equity and Fastback].” Equitable subrogation means that “in certain circumstances, a lender who pays off the lien of a senior creditor may step into the shoes of the senior creditor as to the priority of the senior creditor’s lien.” Greer v. Provident Bank, 282 Ga. App. 566, 568 ( 639 SE2d 377 ) (2006).

1985Underwriters, 149 Ga. App. 128, 129-130 (2) ( 253 SE2d 808 ) (1979) concerned a “claim for relief [which] was predicated on [a] statutory obligation.” In contrast to those cases, the instant case involves not a purely statutory right,, but a contract right with regard to which there exists a statutory enforcement provision. “ ‘To construe [OCGA § 9-3-22] as referring to every right conferred by statute or accruing “by operation of law,” and to stick to its letter as thus interpreted, would be to nullify other sections of the code fixing the period within which an aggrieved party shall bring an

1985Underwriters, 149 Ga. App. 128, 129-130 (2) ( 253 SE2d 808 ) (1979) concerned a “claim for relief [which] was predicated on [a] statutory obligation.” In contrast to those cases, the instant case involves not a purely statutory right,, but a contract right with regard to which there exists a statutory enforcement provision. “ ‘To construe [OCGA § 9-3-22] as referring to every right conferred by statute or accruing “by operation of law,” and to stick to its letter as thus interpreted, would be to nullify other sections of the code fixing the period within which an aggrieved party shall bring an

1985Co., 163 Ga. App. 20, 21 ( 293 SE2d 509 ) (1982), Ryder involved a claim for subrogation which was found to be “a purely statutory right as compared to a conventional or equitable subrogation claim. . . .” Similarly, Perry & Co. v. Knight Ins.

1985Co., 163 Ga. App. 20, 21 ( 293 SE2d 509 ) (1982), Ryder involved a claim for subrogation which was found to be “a purely statutory right as compared to a conventional or equitable subrogation claim. . . .” Similarly, Perry & Co. v. Knight Ins.