free-standing claim in Illinois

2024Id. at 444 . ¶ 44 This court recently criticized Hobley in Martinez, claiming that it “deviated from both the spirit and the letter of the law as set forth in Washington,” and that “Hobley identified no principle or purpose that would be furthered by prohibiting a defendant from using the same evidence to assert both a constitutional claim of trial error and an actual innocence claim.” Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490, ¶ 102 .

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2006This court held, as a matter of due process under the state constitution, that a free-standing claim of innocence is cognizable in a proceeding under the state Post-Conviction Hearing Act, even though the Supreme Court decided in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that such a claim was not cognizable as a violation of due process in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

2006This court held, as a matter of due process under the state constitution, that a free-standing claim of innocence is cognizable in a proceeding under the state Post-Conviction Hearing Act, even though the Supreme Court decided in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that such a claim was not cognizable as a violation of due process in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

2025“To establish a claim of actual innocence, the supporting evidence must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . ¶ 97 A defendant may “use the same evidence to plead both a ‘free-standing’ claim of actual innocence and a claim of constitutional trial error.” People v. Flournoy 2024 IL 129353, ¶ 68 . -25- 1-23-1672 However, “in the end, if the evidence establishes a claim of constitutional trial error, it will not establish a ‘free-standing’ clai

2025“To establish a claim of actual innocence, the supporting evidence must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . ¶ 97 A defendant may “use the same evidence to plead both a ‘free-standing’ claim of actual innocence and a claim of constitutional trial error.” People v. Flournoy 2024 IL 129353, ¶ 68 . -25- 1-23-1672 However, “in the end, if the evidence establishes a claim of constitutional trial error, it will not establish a ‘free-standing’ clai

2025“To establish a claim of actual innocence, the supporting evidence must be (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 . ¶ 97 A defendant may “use the same evidence to plead both a ‘free-standing’ claim of actual innocence and a claim of constitutional trial error.” People v. Flournoy 2024 IL 129353, ¶ 68 . -25- 1-23-1672 However, “in the end, if the evidence establishes a claim of constitutional trial error, it will not establish a ‘free-standing’ clai

2024Instead, it said that a “ ‘free standing’ claim of actual innocence is one in which newly discovered evidence makes a persuasive showing that the [defendant] did not commit the charged offense, and was, therefore, wrongfully convicted.” Id.

2024While Taliani did not specifically address Martinez, it did reiterate that a free standing claim of actual innocence “is one in which newly discovered evidence is not being used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation with respect to the defendant’s trial or that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, ¶ 56 .

2023See Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 443-44 (defendant’s newly discovered fingerprint evidence, as well as evidence that officers engaged in a pattern and practice of torture, failed to support a free-standing claim of actual innocence as such evidence also was used to supplement his assertions of other constitutional violations); People v. Gonzalez, 2016 IL App (1st) 141660 , ¶ 30 (defendant’s actual innocence claim based on evidence that the detective had a pattern of coercing and intimidating witnesses in other cases failed, where the same evidence was used to supplement his assertion of a Brady viol

2022In Hobley, the defendant supported his actual innocence claim with newly discovered evidence of a negative fingerprint report and a second gasoline can, the same evidence - 17 - No. 1-21-0287 used to support his claim that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2019App. 3d at 984 , overruled on other grounds, People v. Young, 2018 IL 122598, ¶ 31 . ¶ 60 The situation is the same here.

2010In response to this general challenge by the defendant to the reasonableness of the assistance provided by postconviction counsel, the State asserts “that a petitioner’s claim of unreasonable assistance of post-conviction counsel is not cognizable as a free-standing claim in post-conviction proceedings.” As authority the State quotes from People v. Rossi, 387 Ill.

2010App. 3d 1054, 1059 , 902 N.E.2d 158 (2009), “When considering an appeal from the dismissal of a petitioner’s post-conviction petition, the appellate court is limited to considering matters that are of a constitutional dimension.” The defendant makes no reply to the State’s point of law.

2010Even if we were to liberally construe this contention to claim a violation of the duty “to make any amendments to the pro se post-conviction petition” (Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 412 ), the defendant fails to persuade us that a remand for compliance with Rule 651(c) is warranted.

1999In People v. Dunn, 306 Ill.App.3d 75 , 239 Ill.Dec. 37 , 713 N.E.2d 568 (1999), defendant was originally convicted of rape in 1979; he petitioned for post-conviction relief, asserting a free standing claim of innocence.

1999In People v. Dunn, 306 Ill.App.3d 75 , 239 Ill.Dec. 37 , 713 N.E.2d 568 (1999), defendant was originally convicted of rape in 1979; he petitioned for post-conviction relief, asserting a free standing claim of innocence.