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20 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lindsey v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Lindsey v. State, 888 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. 2019See Lindsey v. State, 888 N.E.2d 319, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 4 We will address this argument, however, within the context of Lunkin’s claim that he was given the ineffective assistance of counsel when, as he claims, he was advised to admit to his status as a habitual offender. [15] When Lunkin pleaded guilty on July 8, 2013, the habitual offender statute in effect provided: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the state may seek to have a person sentenced as a habitual offender for any felony by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the per | 5 | 5 |
Timberlake v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591 , 597–98 (Ind. 2001). 2015Free-standing Double Enhancement Claim [7] On appeal, Davis raises a free-standing claim of trial error based on the use of the convictions under FC-165 to elevate his auto theft conviction to a class C felony and to support the habitual offender allegation, which he claims constituted an impermissible double enhancement. “[M]ost free-standing claims of error are not available in a postconviction proceeding because of the doctrines of waiver and res judicata.” Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591 , 597- 98 (Ind. 2001). | 2 | 4 |
Snider v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Here, Scruggs presents his claims of prosecutorial misconduct as free-standing claims of fundamental error, and does not explain how his claims were “demonstrably 1 Compare Snider v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind. 1984) (“[I]t is through a showing of fundamental error that the post-conviction court can bypass an obstacle to reaching the merits of a free standing claim erected by a prior procedural default.”) and Propes v. State, 550 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 1990) (“fundamental error is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief even absent preliminary proof of ineffective assistance 2008This Court asserted “it is through a showing of fundamental error that the post conviction court can bypass an obstacle to reaching the merits of a free standing claim erected by a prior procedural default.” Snider v. State, (1984) Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 . | 2 | 4 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002) (in post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal); Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597 (if an issue is known and available on direct appeal but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived; and if an issue is raised on direct appeal, but decided adversely, it is res judicata). 4 Jones’s citation to Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. 2003), is unavailing. 2013See Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002)). | 2 | 2 |
Ben-Yisrayl v. Stategreen2 sentences2016As such, the argument is waived; “[i]ssues that were available, but not presented, on direct appeal are forfeited on post- conviction review.” Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258 . 2015“The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000). | 1 | 2 |
Bailey v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Here, Scruggs presents his claims of prosecutorial misconduct as free-standing claims of fundamental error, and does not explain how his claims were “demonstrably 1 Compare Snider v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind. 1984) (“[I]t is through a showing of fundamental error that the post-conviction court can bypass an obstacle to reaching the merits of a free standing claim erected by a prior procedural default.”) and Propes v. State, 550 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 1990) (“fundamental error is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief even absent preliminary proof of ineffective assistance 2010Lindsey v. State, 888 N.E.2d 319, 324 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (discussing Bailey v. State, 472 N.E.2d 1260 (Ind.1985)), trans. denied. | 1 | 2 |
Propes v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Here, Scruggs presents his claims of prosecutorial misconduct as free-standing claims of fundamental error, and does not explain how his claims were “demonstrably 1 Compare Snider v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind. 1984) (“[I]t is through a showing of fundamental error that the post-conviction court can bypass an obstacle to reaching the merits of a free standing claim erected by a prior procedural default.”) and Propes v. State, 550 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 1990) (“fundamental error is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief even absent preliminary proof of ineffective assistance | 1 | 1 |
Stephenson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1029 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002)). 2013Stephenson, 864 N.E.2d at 1029 . 16 | 1 | 1 |
Conner v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Conner v. State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind.2005); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2008An error characterized as fundamental is one which is “blatant” and which if not rectified would deny the petitioner “fundamental due process.” Terry v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085 ; Johnson v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 . 2008An error characterized as fundamental is one which is “blatant” and which if not rectified would deny the petitioner “fundamental due process.” Terry v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085 ; Johnson v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 . | 3 | 1985–2008 |
Terry v. State
green
2 sentences2008An error characterized as fundamental is one which is “blatant” and which if not rectified would deny the petitioner “fundamental due process.” Terry v. State, (1984) Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085 ; Johnson v. State, (1979) 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 . 2002An error characterized as fundamental is one which is “blatant” and which if not rectified would deny the petitioner “fundamental due process.” Terry v. State, [ 465 N.E.2d 1085 (Ind.1984)]; Johnson v. State, [ 271 Ind. 145 , 390 N.E.2d 1005 (1979) ]. | 3 | 1985–2008 |
Bassett v. State
green
1 sentence2017See Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002) (in post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal); Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597 (if an issue is known and available on direct appeal but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived; and if an issue is raised on direct appeal, but decided adversely, it is res judicata). 4 Jones’s citation to Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. 2003), is unavailing. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McCary v. State
green
1 sentence2016McCary, 761 N.E.2d at 391 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Young v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. 1257 . [6] Thus, based on Young, Johnson’s petition for educational credit time should be treated as a post-conviction relief petition, not as a free-standing challenge to his sentence. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Canaan v. State
green
1 sentence2014Here, Scruggs presents his claims of prosecutorial misconduct as free-standing claims of fundamental error, and does not explain how his claims were “demonstrably 1 Compare Snider v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind. 1984) (“[I]t is through a showing of fundamental error that the post-conviction court can bypass an obstacle to reaching the merits of a free standing claim erected by a prior procedural default.”) and Propes v. State, 550 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. 1990) (“fundamental error is cognizable in a petition for post-conviction relief even absent preliminary proof of ineffective assistance | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2008Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Stevens v. State
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., Conner v. State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind.2005); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hendrix v. State
green
2 sentences1990Then, the supreme court decision in Hendriz v. State (1990), Ind., 557 N.E.2d 1012 , holds that a free-standing claim of fundamental error is never waived. 1990Then, the supreme court decision in Hendrix v. State (1990), Ind., 557 N.E.2d 1012 , holds that a free-standing claim of fundamental error is never waived. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.