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27 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Montgomery County Hospital District v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025Our conclusion that McCorquodale was required to initiate an action under the City’s grievance procedures is supported by 24 our decision in Smith, wherein we concluded that even “[i]n the absence of a statutory standard or a standard created by an employee manual detailing the required contents of a public employee’s notice of appeal, . . . the notice must give the employer fair notice that the public employee desires to appeal the employer’s disciplinary decision and fair notice of the decision made by the employer from which the employee desires to appeal.” Smith, 181 S.W.3d at 850 ; see al 2010Smith, 181 S.W.3d at 850 (holding that, in the absence of a statutory standard or a standard created by an employee manual detailing the required contents of a public employee’s notice of appeal, an employee must give fair notice of her decision to appeal and of the decision appealed from). | 6 | 7 |
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc.green2 sentences2018Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what will follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance justice." Endicott-Johnson Corporation, 45 S.Ct. at 62-63 . 2016Further, in the absence of a statutory requirement, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that it is not essential that a complainant be given notice before the issuance of an execution .against his tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment, he must take notice of what will follow, "no further notice being necessary to advance justice.” See Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc,, 266 U.S. 285, 288 , 45 S.Ct. 61 , 69 L.Ed. 288 (1924). | 3 | 10 |
Medical Arts Hospital v. Robisongreen1 sentence2025Our conclusion that McCorquodale was required to initiate an action under the City’s grievance procedures is supported by 24 our decision in Smith, wherein we concluded that even “[i]n the absence of a statutory standard or a standard created by an employee manual detailing the required contents of a public employee’s notice of appeal, . . . the notice must give the employer fair notice that the public employee desires to appeal the employer’s disciplinary decision and fair notice of the decision made by the employer from which the employee desires to appeal.” Smith, 181 S.W.3d at 850 ; see al | 1 | 1 |
Tarrant County v. McQuarygreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Tarrant County v. McQuary, 310 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (citing Montgomery Cnty Hosp. | 1 | 1 |
Jennings v. Stategreen2 sentences2016In Jennings v. State, we were asked whether a verdict form was considered a part of the jury instructions.14 Although Jennings did not attempt to answer the question we do today, our opinion provides insight into the term “informal verdict.” In the absence of a statutory requirement for including a jury-verdict form as a part of the court’s charge, this Court historically was ambivalent over their use.15 Acknowledging Article 37.10(a) as a vestige of a time when verdict forms were not used with regularity, we noted, “In fact, Article 37.10 expressly acknowledges the possibility of an ‘informal 2016App. 2010). 15 Id. at 309 & n.13. 16 Id. at 309 . 17 See, e.g., Murphree v. State, 115 S.W. 1189, 1190 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Murphree v. Stategreen1 sentence2016App. 2010). 15 Id. at 309 & n.13. 16 Id. at 309 . 17 See, e.g., Murphree v. State, 115 S.W. 1189, 1190 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lottgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procédural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i]n the absence of a statutory framework to determine mental retardation”). . 2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals
green
2 sentences2015The Court in Mays held that “[t]he performance of a clear statutory duty which is ministerial and nondiscretionary may be directed by the District Court without notice and hearing in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary.” Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d at 79 . 2015Respondent cites Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988) to support his claim that a lawsuit was not required to invoke the district court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the Commissioners Court. [Actually, Respondent primarily cites a concurring opinion in Mays, and not the majority holding.] The Supreme Court held in Mays that “[t]he performance of a clear statutory duty which is ministerial and nondiscretionary may be directed by the District Court without notice and hearing in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary.” Quite simply, Mays is not applicable to | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Texas a & M University System v. Koseoglu
green
1 sentence2017Hughes does not allege that the County's immunity is waived by any statute, and in the absence of a statutory waiver, Lawson is not implicated here. 8 See Koseoglu , 233 S.W.3d at 839 ; A.I. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re the Guardianship of Bays
green
1 sentence2012Endicott–Johnson Corp, 266 U.S. at 288 , 45 S. Ct. at 62–63; In re Guardianship of Bays , 355 S.W.3d at 720 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i 2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ex Parte Jordan
green
1 sentence2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Atkins v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i 2004These federal courts are also waiting for Texas to establish this state's substantive and procedural implementation of Atkins. [8] See, e.g., Ex parte Jordan, 758 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (setting out judicial guidelines and procedures to address "incompetency to be executed" habeas corpus claims under Ford v. Wainwright because Legislature had not yet enacted statute to implement Supreme Court decision). [9] See, e.g., State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303 , 779 N.E.2d 1011 , 1014 (2002) (judicially setting out substantive standards and procedural guidelines for determining Atkins claims "[i | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Hatton
green
2 sentences1958Ass’n v. Hatton, 152 Tex. 199 , 255 S.W.2d 848, 851 , wherein it is stated: “It is well established in the jurisprudence of this state that in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary, an injured litigant cannot be compelled to submit himself or his injured parts to an examination by his adversary or even by an impartial examiner.” The injured party does not lose his immunity from involuntary examination merely because he points out to the jury the part of his body that has been injured or in which he suffers pain. 1958Ass’n v. Hatton, 152 Tex. 199 , 255 S.W.2d 848, 851 , wherein it is stated: “It is well established in the jurisprudence of this state that in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary, an injured litigant cannot be compelled to submit himself or his injured parts to an examination by his adversary or even by an impartial examiner.” The injured party does not lose his immunity from involuntary examination merely because he points out to the jury the part of his body that has been injured or in which he suffers pain. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Safeway Stores, Inc., of Texas v. Rutherford
green
1 sentence1958Texas Electric Ry. v. Rowell, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 788 ; Safeway Stores v. Rutherford, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 1055 , affirmed 130 Tex. 465 , 111 S.W.2d 688 ; 24-A Texjur., p. 542, sec. 6. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Texas Electric Ry. v. Rowell
neutral
1 sentence1958Texas Electric Ry. v. Rowell, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 788 ; Safeway Stores v. Rutherford, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 1055 , affirmed 130 Tex. 465 , 111 S.W.2d 688 ; 24-A Texjur., p. 542, sec. 6. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Rutherford
green
2 sentences1958Texas Electric Ry. v. Rowell, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 788 ; Safeway Stores v. Rutherford, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 1055 , affirmed 130 Tex. 465 , 111 S.W.2d 688 ; 24-A Texjur., p. 542, sec. 6. 1958Texas Electric Ry. v. Rowell, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 788 ; Safeway Stores v. Rutherford, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 1055 , affirmed 130 Tex. 465 , 111 S.W.2d 688 ; 24-A Texjur., p. 542, sec. 6. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Brooklyn Public Library v. City of New York
neutral
2 sentences1951Brooklyn Public Library v. City of N. Y., 222 App. Div. 422 , 226 N.Y.S. 491 , loc. cit. 502(3); Burdick v. Richmond, 16 R.I. 502 , 17 A. 917 . 1951Brooklyn Public Library v. City of N. Y., 222 App. Div. 422 , 226 N.Y.S. 491 , loc. cit. 502(3); Burdick v. Richmond, 16 R.I. 502 , 17 A. 917 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Burdick v. Richmond
green
2 sentences1951Brooklyn Public Library v. City of N. Y., 222 App. Div. 422 , 226 N.Y.S. 491 , loc. cit. 502(3); Burdick v. Richmond, 16 R.I. 502 , 17 A. 917 . 1951Brooklyn Public Library v. City of N. Y., 222 App. Div. 422 , 226 N.Y.S. 491 , loc. cit. 502(3); Burdick v. Richmond, 16 R.I. 502 , 17 A. 917 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Mellinger v. City of Houston (Tex. 1-18-1887)
green
2 sentences1950Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 36, 37 , 3 S.W. 249 . 1950Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 36, 37 , 3 S.W. 249 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Jackson v. Amador
green
1 sentence1936The rule of caveat emptor applies in such cases, and the landlord is not liable for subsequent injuries resulting from such defects.” The text is supported by many cases, including the following: Perez v. Rabaud, 76 Tex. 191 , 13 S.W. 177 , 7 L.R.A. 620 , Jones-O’Shaughnessy Lumber Co. v. Bond (Tex.Civ.App.) 79 S.W.(2d) 649 , and Jackson v. Amador (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W.(2d) 892 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Jones-O'Shaughnessy Lumber Co. v. Bond
neutral
1 sentence1936The rule of caveat emptor applies in such cases, and the landlord is not liable for subsequent injuries resulting from such defects.” The text is supported by many cases, including the following: Perez v. Rabaud, 76 Tex. 191 , 13 S.W. 177 , 7 L.R.A. 620 , Jones-O’Shaughnessy Lumber Co. v. Bond (Tex.Civ.App.) 79 S.W.(2d) 649 , and Jackson v. Amador (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W.(2d) 892 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Perez v. Rabaud
green
2 sentences1936The rule of caveat emptor applies in such cases, and the landlord is not liable for subsequent injuries resulting from such defects.” The text is supported by many cases, including the following: Perez v. Rabaud, 76 Tex. 191 , 13 S.W. 177 , 7 L.R.A. 620 , Jones-O’Shaughnessy Lumber Co. v. Bond (Tex.Civ.App.) 79 S.W.(2d) 649 , and Jackson v. Amador (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W.(2d) 892 . 1936The rule of caveat emptor applies in such cases, and the landlord is not liable for subsequent injuries resulting from such defects.” The text is supported by many cases, including the following: Perez v. Rabaud, 76 Tex. 191 , 13 S.W. 177 , 7 L.R.A. 620 , Jones-O’Shaughnessy Lumber Co. v. Bond (Tex.Civ.App.) 79 S.W.(2d) 649 , and Jackson v. Amador (Tex.Civ.App.) 75 S.W.(2d) 892 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.