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27 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 471619green2 sentences2015See Farmers, 792 F.2d at 1402 (holding that § 541(a) addresses only the transfer of debtor's interest to the estate and is "irrelevant" as to the threshold determination of the existence and scope of the debtor's interest). 2015See Farmers, 792 F.2d at 1402 (holding that § 541(a) addresses only the transfer of debt- or’s interest to the estate and is “irrelevant” as to the threshold determination of the existence and scope of the debtor’s interest). | 2 | 2 |
Brendan McKown v. Simon Property Group Incgreen2 sentences2015See 689 F.3d at 1093 . 2015See 689 F.3d at 1093 . | 2 | 2 |
cluster 393283green2 sentences2013See Shannon v. Pay ’N Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 730 , 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (adopting Ninth Circuit’s standard for proving business necessity articulated in Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981)). ¶27 Here, Mr. Fey did not claim that the district engaged in intentional discrimination. 2013See Shannon v. Pay 'N Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 730 , 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (adopting Ninth Circuit's standard for proving business necessity articulated in Contreras v. City ofLos Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981)). | 2 | 2 |
Shannon v. Pay 'N Save Corp.green2 sentences2013See Shannon v. Pay ’N Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 730 , 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (adopting Ninth Circuit’s standard for proving business necessity articulated in Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981)). ¶27 Here, Mr. Fey did not claim that the district engaged in intentional discrimination. 2013See Shannon v. Pay ’N Save Corp., 104 Wn.2d 722, 730 , 709 P.2d 799 (1985) (adopting Ninth Circuit’s standard for proving business necessity articulated in Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981)). ¶27 Here, Mr. Fey did not claim that the district engaged in intentional discrimination. | 2 | 2 |
Charles H. Keating, Jr. v. Office of Thrift Supervisiongreen2 sentences2001See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-325 ; Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 . [41] Trustees of Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mechanical, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (comparing civil complaint and criminal indictment to determine if wrongful conduct alleged is the same); Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.1993). [42] United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. 2000See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-25 ; Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 . | 2 | 2 |
Bravo v. Dolsen Companiesgreen1 sentence2023See Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 755 (federal authority can be persuasive where the texts of both federal and state laws are similar); Nelson, 195 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
State Of Washington v. Angel Rose Marie Nelsongreen1 sentence2023See Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 755 (federal authority can be persuasive where the texts of both federal and state laws are similar); Nelson, 195 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horstgreen1 sentence2018Because federal courts have found sufficient control over quality based on any of the three factors, we apply the Ninth Circuit's test evaluating all three factors to determine whether any factor supports an assertion that the licensor possesses sufficient control over quality. 3 See, eq., Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678,679 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp.green1 sentence2018Mass. 1953)(holding the license valid and trademark rights maintained because the contract language provided for licensor's control over the quality of services provided by licensee). 4 See, e.q., Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Intl Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(explaining that it was not necessary for the license agreements to contain explicit provisions for the exercise of control and that actual control by licensor is sufficient to maintain trademark rights). 5 See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding that, alth | 1 | 1 |
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co.green1 sentence2018Mass. 1953)(holding the license valid and trademark rights maintained because the contract language provided for licensor's control over the quality of services provided by licensee). 4 See, e.q., Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Intl Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(explaining that it was not necessary for the license agreements to contain explicit provisions for the exercise of control and that actual control by licensor is sufficient to maintain trademark rights). 5 See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding that, alth | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wayne Cedric Bellgreen1 sentence2016E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419, 422 , 951 F.2d 399 (1991) (because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, “[t]his [was] not ... a ‘mere propinquity’ case and [court] need not take a position on the ‘automatic companion’ rule to decide it’’); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry); Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit’s rule of general justification conferring categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arre | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Reginald James Causeygreen1 sentence2016We simply hold that where there was good reason for an officer to apprehend that he was in a position of real danger from companions . . . that officer’s pat-down search is compatible with Terry."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ralph Donald Tharpegreen1 sentence2016E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419, 422 , 951 F.2d 399 (1991) (because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, “[t]his [was] not ... a ‘mere propinquity’ case and [court] need not take a position on the ‘automatic companion’ rule to decide it’’); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry); Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit’s rule of general justification conferring categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arre | 1 | 1 |
Fursman v. Ulrich (In Re First Protection, Inc.)green1 sentence2015See First Prot., 440 B.R. at 829 n.13. 14 No. 90891-5 Ninth Circuit's analysis in Farmers. | 1 | 1 |
| Trustees of the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund v. Transworld Mechanical, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Griggs v. Duke Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Calvin L. Flettgreen1 sentence2016E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419, 422 , 951 F.2d 399 (1991) (because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, “[t]his [was] not ... a ‘mere propinquity’ case and [court] need not take a position on the ‘automatic companion’ rule to decide it’’); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry); Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit’s rule of general justification conferring categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arre | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ronald \Boo\" Colvin"
green
2 sentences2009Armstrong filed a dissent. [4] Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir.2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir.2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit's approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir.2006). 2009Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit’s approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). | 4 | 2007–2009 |
Burrell v. United States
green
2 sentences2009Armstrong filed a dissent. [4] Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir.2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir.2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit's approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir.2006). 2009Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit’s approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). | 4 | 2007–2009 |
City of Seattle v. Long
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 167 . 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2025 |
State v. Demery
green
2 sentences2011Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 763-65 , 30 P.3d 1278 . 2011Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 763-65 , 30 P.3d 1278 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Elmore
green
2 sentences2010Elmore, 155 Wash.2d at 778 , 123 P.3d 72 . 2010Elmore, 155 Wn.2d at 778 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Dean Lafromboise
green
2 sentences2009Armstrong filed a dissent. [4] Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir.2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir.2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit's approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir.2006). 2009Kilgore argues we should adopt the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s rule for determining finality for purposes of collateral review set forth in United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2000), and United States v. LaFromboise, 427 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2005), or alternatively, the Second Circuit’s approach to finality for purposes of retroactivity in Burrell v. United States, 467 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Carl Dexter Moore
green
2 sentences2001Moore, 159 F.3d at 1160 . 2001Moore, 159 F.3d at 1160 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Federal Savings & Loan Insurance v. Molinaro
green
2 sentences2001See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-325 ; Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 . [41] Trustees of Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat'l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mechanical, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (comparing civil complaint and criminal indictment to determine if wrongful conduct alleged is the same); Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.1993). [42] United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. 2000See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324-25 ; Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903 . | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Adelaida Torres-Lopez v. Robert May
green
1 sentence2019Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 643 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Bryan McKie
green
2 sentences2016E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419, 422 , 951 F.2d 399 (1991) (because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, “[t]his [was] not ... a ‘mere propinquity’ case and [court] need not take a position on the ‘automatic companion’ rule to decide it’’); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry); Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit’s rule of general justification conferring categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arre 2016E.g., United States v. McKie, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 419, 422 , 951 F.2d 399 (1991) (because stop was justified by reasonable suspicion consistent with Terry, “[t]his [was] not ... a ‘mere propinquity’ case and [court] need not take a position on the ‘automatic companion’ rule to decide it’’); Flett, 806 F.2d at 827 (companion search limited by Terry); Bell, 762 F.2d at 499 (same); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We need not go so far as the Ninth Circuit’s rule of general justification conferring categorical reasonableness upon searches of all companions of the arre | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Roach
green
1 sentence2013Finding no statute on point, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's doctrine of credit for time spent at liberty, holding that "a convicted person is entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent erroneously at liberty due to the State's negligence, provided that the convicted person has not contributed to his release, has not absconded legal obligations while at liberty, and has had no further criminal convictions." Roach, 150 Wn.2d at 37 . -9- 69866-4-1/10 Dalseg addressed whether defendants who served their sentences on work release at the State's recommendation were entitled to cre | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dalseg
green
1 sentence2013Dalseg, 132 Wn. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
cluster 413285
green
1 sentence2012The Ninth Circuit has analyzed this issue in Alvarez, 697 F.2d 1333 , and Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d 1301 , albeit under the standing provision of the repealed FLCRA, former 7 U.S.C. § 2050a(a), which contained language nearly identical in form and substance to RCW 19.30.170(1). 18 We find nothing in Washington case law that conflicts with this jurisprudence or that would influence the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers Bodine Produce Company, Inc. Robert Fletcher, D/B/A Fletcher Farms
green
1 sentence2012The Ninth Circuit has analyzed this issue in Alvarez, 697 F.2d 1333 , and Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d 1301 , albeit under the standing provision of the repealed FLCRA, former 7 U.S.C. § 2050a(a), which contained language nearly identical in form and substance to RCW 19.30.170(1). 18 We find nothing in Washington case law that conflicts with this jurisprudence or that would influence the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Demery
green
2 sentences2011Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 763-65 , 30 P.3d 1278 . 2011Demery, 144 Wash.2d at 763-65 , 30 P.3d 1278 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Elmore green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.