Ninth Circuit standard in Arizona

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir.2002) ("juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and "district court did not err in increasing [defendant's] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 516, 517 (2002) (in rejecting defendant's contention that "because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir.2002) ("juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and "district court did not err in increasing [defendant's] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 516, 517 (2002) (in rejecting defendant's contention that "because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir.2002) ("juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and "district court did not err in increasing [defendant's] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 516, 517 (2002) (in rejecting defendant's contention that "because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir.2002) ("juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and "district court did not err in increasing [defendant's] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 516, 517 (2002) (in rejecting defendant's contention that "because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir.2002) ("juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and "district court did not err in increasing [defendant's] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 , 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 513, 516, 517 (2002) (in rejecting defendant's contention that "because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the

2003See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (“juvenile adjudications can rightly be characterized as ‘prior convictions’ for Apprendi purposes,” and “district court did not err in increasing [defendant’s] sentence based on his prior juvenile adjudications”); People v. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 516, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (in rejecting defendant’s contention that “because a person previously tried as a juvenile had no right to a jury trial in juvenile court, the prior juvenile adjudication cannot constitutionally be treated as a prior conviction for the purpo

1982Under the Ninth Circuit standard, to amount to ineffective assistance, “[djefense counsel’s errors or omissions must reflect a failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney .... ” Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1542 , 59 L.Ed.2d 793 (1979).

1982Under the Ninth Circuit standard, to amount to ineffective assistance, “[djefense counsel’s errors or omissions must reflect a failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or diligence of a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney .... ” Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1542 , 59 L.Ed.2d 793 (1979).

1982Appellant urges that this court replace the Arizona “farce, sham, or mockery of justice” test for counsel’s effectiveness, State v. Williams, 122 Ariz. 146, 150 , 593 P.2d 896, 900 (1979), with the Ninth Circuit’s standard of “reasonably competent and effective defense representation.” Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1978).

1982Appellant urges that this court replace the Arizona “farce, sham, or mockery of justice” test for counsel’s effectiveness, State v. Williams, 122 Ariz. 146, 150 , 593 P.2d 896, 900 (1979), with the Ninth Circuit’s standard of “reasonably competent and effective defense representation.” Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1978).

2024Therefore, if the Ninth Circuit has announced a clear rule on an issue of substantive federal statutory law . . . we will look first to the Ninth Circuit rule in interpreting substantive federal statutory law.” Id. at 533 ¶ 9 (emphasis added).

2024Therefore, if the Ninth Circuit has announced a clear rule on an issue of substantive federal statutory law . . . we will look first to the Ninth Circuit rule in interpreting substantive federal statutory law.” Id. at 533 ¶ 9 (emphasis added).

2011The court in Shoen adopted a Ninth Circuit standard the United States Supreme Court subsequently overturned in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20-21 , 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), and Rancho urges us to follow the more stringent standard Winter announced.

2011The court in Shoen adopted a Ninth Circuit standard the United States Supreme Court subsequently overturned in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20-21 , 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), and Rancho urges us to follow the more stringent standard Winter announced.

2026Alarm, 242 Ariz. at 516-17, ¶¶ 10-14 (applying federal law to the issue of waiver under the FAA). ¶11 In Security Alarm, we adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rule governing waiver under the FAA.1 242 Ariz. at 517 , ¶¶ 14-16.

2026Alarm, 242 Ariz. at 516-17, ¶¶ 10-14 (applying federal law to the issue of waiver under the FAA). ¶11 In Security Alarm, we adopted the Ninth Circuit’s rule governing waiver under the FAA.1 242 Ariz. at 517 , ¶¶ 14-16.

2023His claim is therefore preempted under the first step of the Ninth Circuit’s test, “and the analysis ends there.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Barton v. Creasey Co. of Clarksburg, 718 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (N.D.

2020See In re Bilzerian, 258 B.R. at 858 (dismissing no asset bankruptcy when "receivership is already in place for the purposes of marshaling and liquidating [debtor's] assets"). ¶37 Concluding that Husband's bankruptcy was a "no asset" case, we turn to our preclusion analysis. ¶38 While we generally "look first to the Ninth Circuit rule in interpreting substantive federal statutory law," Weatherford ex rel.

2020See In re Bilzerian, 258 B.R. at 858 (dismissing no asset bankruptcy when "receivership is already in place for the purposes of marshaling and liquidating [debtor's] assets"). ¶37 Concluding that Husband's bankruptcy was a "no asset" case, we turn to our preclusion analysis. ¶38 While we generally "look first to the Ninth Circuit rule in interpreting substantive federal statutory law," Weatherford ex rel.

2010Hall, 204 Ariz. at 447, ¶ 16 , 65 P.3d at 95 ; see Ariz. R.Crim.

2010Hall, 204 Ariz. at 447, ¶ 16 , 65 P.3d at 95 ; see Ariz. R.Crim.

2009In Arizona the relevant inquiry in determining whether a character trait is an essential element is whether the trait is an "operative fact which under substantive law delennines the rights and liabilities of the parties.” Lehman, 126 Ariz. at 391 , 616 P.2d at 66 (citation omitted). 8 .

2009In Arizona the relevant inquiry in determining whether a character trait is an essential element is whether the trait is an "operative fact which under substantive law delennines the rights and liabilities of the parties.” Lehman, 126 Ariz. at 391 , 616 P.2d at 66 (citation omitted). 8 .

2004See Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530, 531, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 911, 912 (2003) (approving de novo review of legal issues). ¶ 5 Shotwell premises her position that the Determination should be automatically admissible on policy concerns and Ninth Circuit case law holding that EEOC reasonable cause determinations are per se admissible in Title VII lawsuits.

2004See Nielson v. Patterson, 204 Ariz. 530, 531, ¶ 5 , 65 P.3d 911, 912 (2003) (approving de novo review of legal issues). ¶ 5 Shotwell premises her position that the Determination should be automatically admissible on policy concerns and Ninth Circuit case law holding that EEOC reasonable cause determinations are per se admissible in Title VII lawsuits.

2004We need not decide whether to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s rule, however, because even were we to do so, Moody’s claim would fail. ¶ 42 Because Moody has waived this claim by failing to interpose timely objections or file a motion in limine, he must demonstrate that any error “contributed] to or significantly affect[ed] the verdict.” State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424 , 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988).

2004We need not decide whether to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s rule, however, because even were we to do so, Moody’s claim would fail. ¶ 42 Because Moody has waived this claim by failing to interpose timely objections or file a motion in limine, he must demonstrate that any error “contributed] to or significantly affect[ed] the verdict.” State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424 , 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988).

2003This court has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s standard of review for such issues, which entitles a defendant to a new trial if the jury receives extrinsic evidence and “it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283 , 645 P.2d 784, 798 (1982) (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1979)).

2003This court has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s standard of review for such issues, which entitles a defendant to a new trial if the jury receives extrinsic evidence and “it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283 , 645 P.2d 784, 798 (1982) (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1979)).

2003This court has adopted the Ninth Circuit’s standard of review for such issues, which entitles a defendant to a new trial if the jury receives extrinsic evidence and “it cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict.” State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283 , 645 P.2d 784, 798 (1982) (citing United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir.1979)).

2003In applying that standard, this court observed that “[a]ny private communication, contact or tampering with a juror gives rise to a strong presumption that the verdict has been tainted.” State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 557 , 875 P.2d 788, 790 (1994) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50 , 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892)).

2003In applying that standard, this court observed that “[a]ny private communication, contact or tampering with a juror gives rise to a strong presumption that the verdict has been tainted.” State v. Miller, 178 Ariz. 555, 557 , 875 P.2d 788, 790 (1994) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 , 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50 , 13 S.Ct. 50, 52-53 , 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892)).

1998See Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.1967).

1998See Beecher v. Wallace, 381 F.2d 372 (9th Cir.1967).

1996See State v. Maese, 27 Ariz.App. 379, 381 , 555 P.2d 348, 350 (1976) (Ninth Circuit rule controls; defendant would receive same result in federal court review of sentence).

1996See State v. Maese, 27 Ariz.App. 379, 381 , 555 P.2d 348, 350 (1976) (Ninth Circuit rule controls; defendant would receive same result in federal court review of sentence).