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26 California opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Olsongreen2 sentences2023(See In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, & fn. 3 .) 4 The trial court made this factual finding, which Katia does not challenge on appeal, in its April 2022 findings and orders after hearing. 3 income and that it terminate spousal support. 2022(See In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, & fn. 3 .) 3 the parties’ respective incomes. | 7 | 7 |
In Re Benjamin D.green2 sentences1996In In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1469 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 468 ], this court wrote that “[t]he purposes and parties of family and juvenile proceedings, while often overlapping, are not the same . . .” (fn. omitted), and held accordingly that a juvenile court was perfectly within its power in considering evidence that had already been presented in a family law hearing. 1996In In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1469 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 468 ], this court wrote that “[t]he purposes and parties of family and juvenile proceedings, while often overlapping, are not the same . . .” (fn. omitted), and held accordingly that a juvenile court was perfectly within its power in considering evidence that had already been presented in a family law hearing. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Jennifer R.green2 sentences2025(In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704 , 712–713.) The family law presumption favoring joint custody does not apply to juvenile court custody orders entered after terminating jurisdiction. 2024Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.” (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712 [rejecting application, in dependency juvenile court, of a former family law presumption for joint legal custody].) An award of sole legal or physical custody to one parent “does not serve to ‘terminate’ the other’s parental rights or due 9 process interest in parenting.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 94 | 1 | 3 |
In Re Marriage of Laudemangreen2 sentences2016(E.g., Bodo, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 388; In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 ].) Moreover, the Catalano dicta is merely a variant of the well-established family law rule that child support obligations are law imposed as distinct from contractual, so the court always retains authority to ensure a minimum level of adequate child support. 2016(E.g., Bodo, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 388; In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1015 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 378 ].) Moreover, the Catalano dicta is merely a variant of the well-established family law rule that child support obligations are law imposed as distinct from contractual, so the court always retains authority to ensure a minimum level of adequate child support. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Nicholas H.green1 sentence2021(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206 .) “Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, . . . make[s] custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4 .) We review the juvenile court’s 14 custody order under the abuse of discretion standard. | 1 | 1 |
In Re John W.red1 sentence2015As justification for its decision, the court observed, “in fact, . . . it is a family law position that the custodial parent is to facilitate visitations, as well, with a noncustodial parent, and I think that’s not happening.” Contrary to the court’s premise, “the presumption of parental fitness ‘that underlies custody law in the family court just does not apply to dependency cases.’ ” (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 972 (John W.).) Here, mother admitted to physically abusing and allowing Jose to physically abuse her five-year-old son, Nathaniel. | 1 | 1 |
Siam v. Kizilbashgreen1 sentence2014Code, § 3027.1, subd. (a) [authorizing monetary sanctions on a person who knowingly makes a false accusation of child abuse or neglect in a child custody proceeding]; Robert J. v. Catherine D., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525 .) Second, a malicious prosecution claim "may not be based upon an unsuccessful civil harassment petition." (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1567 (Siam).) The Siam court explained that the civil harassment statutes provide a prompt and expeditious remedy for a victim who claims he or she has been threatened or harassed, and "[p]ermitting a malicious prose | 1 | 1 |
Begier v. Stromgreen2 sentences2009(See Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 885-888 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 ] [ex-husband cannot maintain malicious prosecution against ex-wife based on her filing of false police report accusing ex-husband of molesting their daughter]; Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 ] (Bidna) [husband may not maintain action for malicious prosecution against wife for her filing of multiple child custody proceedings, inasmuch as the “remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort 2009(See Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 885-888 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 ] [ex-husband cannot maintain malicious prosecution against ex-wife based on her filing of false police report accusing ex-husband of molesting their daughter]; Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 ] (Bidna) [husband may not maintain action for malicious prosecution against wife for her filing of multiple child custody proceedings, inasmuch as the “remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort | 1 | 1 |
Bidna v. Rosengreen2 sentences2009(See Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 885-888 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 ] [ex-husband cannot maintain malicious prosecution against ex-wife based on her filing of false police report accusing ex-husband of molesting their daughter]; Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 ] (Bidna) [husband may not maintain action for malicious prosecution against wife for her filing of multiple child custody proceedings, inasmuch as the “remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort 2009(See Begier v. Strom (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 877, 885-888 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 158 ] [ex-husband cannot maintain malicious prosecution against ex-wife based on her filing of false police report accusing ex-husband of molesting their daughter]; Bidna v. Rosen (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 251 ] (Bidna) [husband may not maintain action for malicious prosecution against wife for her filing of multiple child custody proceedings, inasmuch as the “remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort | 1 | 1 |
Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co.green2 sentences2005(Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 476, 479 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 662 ] (Pace); see § 116.110 et seq.) Pace observed that the Legislature’s intent in enacting the small claims process was to provide a simple and expeditious means to settle disputes over small amounts because ordinary litigation involved so much time and expense that legal resolution of such disputes was impractical. 2005(Pace v. Hillcrest Motor Co. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 476, 479 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 662 ] (Pace); see § 116.110 et seq.) Pace observed that the Legislature’s intent in enacting the small claims process was to provide a simple and expeditious means to settle disputes over small amounts because ordinary litigation involved so much time and expense that legal resolution of such disputes was impractical. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Powellgreen2 sentences1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, 1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, | 1 | 1 |
Pfefferle v. Lastretogreen2 sentences1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, 1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, | 1 | 1 |
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Olikergreen2 sentences1993(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 448 ].) The remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort liability for malicious prosecution to the family law bar. 1993(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 448 ].) The remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort liability for malicious prosecution to the family law bar. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riverside County Department of Public Social Services v. Randall S.
green
2 sentences2021(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206 .) “Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, . . . make[s] custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4 .) We review the juvenile court’s 14 custody order under the abuse of discretion standard. 2020(In re Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 711-713.) While family law has a presumption favoring joint custody, “application of a family-law-based joint custody presumption would be inconsistent with the purpose of juvenile court law.” (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206 .) Instead, the dependency court, “ ‘which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In sum, we conclude the juvenile court acted within its | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Green v. Uccelli
green
2 sentences2016It is not generally applicable to the issue of sealing court files." (Lechowick, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 , citing Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119 .) When the court closes a family law hearing or part of a proceeding to the public, "it follows that, unless the court's order suggests to the contrary, any and all exhibits and transcripts deriving from any such proceeding should likewise be considered confidential." (Lechowick, at p. 1413.) However, section 214 "is not a device by which a court may close to the public all proceedings in a given family law matter. 2015It is not generally applicable to the issue of sealing court files." (Lechowick, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 , citing Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119 .) When the court closes a family law hearing or part of a proceeding to the public, "it follows that, unless the court's order suggests to the contrary, any and all exhibits and transcripts deriving from any such proceeding should likewise be considered confidential." (Lechowick, at p. 1413.) However, section 214 "is not a device by which a court may close to the public all proceedings in a given family law matter. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Sundquist v. Lechowick
green
2 sentences2016It is not generally applicable to the issue of sealing court files." (Lechowick, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 , citing Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119 .) When the court closes a family law hearing or part of a proceeding to the public, "it follows that, unless the court's order suggests to the contrary, any and all exhibits and transcripts deriving from any such proceeding should likewise be considered confidential." (Lechowick, at p. 1413.) However, section 214 "is not a device by which a court may close to the public all proceedings in a given family law matter. 2015It is not generally applicable to the issue of sealing court files." (Lechowick, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 , citing Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119 .) When the court closes a family law hearing or part of a proceeding to the public, "it follows that, unless the court's order suggests to the contrary, any and all exhibits and transcripts deriving from any such proceeding should likewise be considered confidential." (Lechowick, at p. 1413.) However, section 214 "is not a device by which a court may close to the public all proceedings in a given family law matter. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
In Re Marriage of Brown and Yana
green
1 sentence2024Rather the juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.” (In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712 [rejecting application, in dependency juvenile court, of a former family law presumption for joint legal custody].) An award of sole legal or physical custody to one parent “does not serve to ‘terminate’ the other’s parental rights or due 9 process interest in parenting.” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana (2006) 37 Cal.4th 94 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Montenegro v. Diaz
green
1 sentence2022Father Has Not Shown the Judgment Is Void Because of a Purportedly Missing Finding Finally, Father makes a two-part contention that the trial court erred by not making a finding necessary for the court’s judgment regarding child custody and that the purported error rendered the judgment “void and unenforceable.” The first premise rests on a family law rule that “a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification.” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256 , italics added (Montenegro). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Robert J. v. CATHERINE D.
green
1 sentence2014Code, § 3027.1, subd. (a) [authorizing monetary sanctions on a person who knowingly makes a false accusation of child abuse or neglect in a child custody proceeding]; Robert J. v. Catherine D., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525 .) Second, a malicious prosecution claim "may not be based upon an unsuccessful civil harassment petition." (Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1567 (Siam).) The Siam court explained that the civil harassment statutes provide a prompt and expeditious remedy for a victim who claims he or she has been threatened or harassed, and "[p]ermitting a malicious prose | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Victor Valley Transit Authority v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
1 sentence2013(See In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, fn. 3 ; In re Marriage of Zywiciel (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1080 .) 3 The March 1, 2012 hearing proceeded before Judge Michelle Court, who was new to the case. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Beard v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, 1997Proc., §§ 395, 396; Moore v. Powell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 583, 587 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 914 ]; Pfefferle v. Lastreto (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 575, 580-581 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 834 , 99 A.L.R.2d 663 ].) In 1939, the Legislature amended Code of Civil Procedure section 396b to provide a family law exception to the general rule: Upon the hearing of a motion for change of venue, “the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the same transferred to the proper court; provided, however, that the court in an action for divorce or separate maintenance, may, | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Mostman
green
2 sentences1993(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 448 ].) The remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort liability for malicious prosecution to the family law bar. 1993Our Supreme Court has stated that the "most promising remedy for excessive litigation does not lie in an expansion of malicious prosecution liability" but in "sanctions for frivolous or delaying conduct" the first time around. ( Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 873 [ 254 Cal. Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 448 ].) The remedy for egregious conduct in family law court is for the family law bench to nip it in the bud with appropriate sanctions, not to expand tort liability for malicious prosecution to the family law bar. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Smith v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1977Some members of the family law bar have construed Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349 , as telling them they were all retroactively guilty of malpractice. 7 The majority opinion in the case at bench could be construed as telling them that they must also, retroactively and prospectively, be swamis with soothsaying capability as to the competency of subsequent counsel without a say in the selection of subsequent legal representation. 1977Some members of the family law bar have construed Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349 , as telling them they were all retroactively guilty of malpractice. [7] *190 The majority opinion in the case at bench could be construed as telling them that they must also, retroactively and prospectively, be swamis with soothsaying capability as to the competency of subsequent counsel without a say in the selection of subsequent legal representation. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.