federal confrontation clause in California

2025“Evidence is substantially more 18 prejudicial than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372 , 413.) Under the federal confrontation clause, a criminal defendant has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 431 (Hopson).) The confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable

2022Because the entries on the card had not been made by the testifying expert himself, Cerda contends their admission violated California hearsay law and the federal confrontation clause as established by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).

2007The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." [16] At the time of defendant's trial, the federal confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th Amend., cl. 3) was deemed to preclude the use against a criminal accused, for truth, of the out-of-court statement of a declarant unavailable for cross-examination only if the statement did not (1) fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) otherwise exhibit "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .)

2007The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." [16] At the time of defendant's trial, the federal confrontation clause (U.S. Const., 6th Amend., cl. 3) was deemed to preclude the use against a criminal accused, for truth, of the out-of-court statement of a declarant unavailable for cross-examination only if the statement did not (1) fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) otherwise exhibit "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 .)

2025“Evidence is substantially more 18 prejudicial than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372 , 413.) Under the federal confrontation clause, a criminal defendant has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 431 (Hopson).) The confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable

2017Admission of such a statement violates the right to confrontation if the statement is testimonial hearsay , as the high court defines that term." ( Sanchez , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 680 , 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 , 374 P.3d 320 .) An improperly admitted hearsay statement ordinarily constitutes statutory error under the Evidence Code. ( Id. at p. 685, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 102 , 374 P.3d 320 .) Where the hearsay is testimonial and is admitted in violation of Crawford , the error is one of federal constitutional magnitude. ( Ibid. ) The gang evidence adduced here is comprised of a mixture of admissible ev

2023In announcing a test for determining whether a statement is testimonial for purposes of the federal confrontation clause (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822 ), the Davis court of 4 In light of our conclusion on this point, we find it unnecessary to consider whether, as the Attorney General suggests, Sherman had completed one or more of his underlying crimes when he turned off Doe’s phone.

2022In announcing a test for determining whether a statement is testimonial for purposes of the federal confrontation clause (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822 ), the Davis court of 4 In light of our conclusion on this point, we find it unnecessary to consider whether, as the Attorney General suggests, Sherman had completed one or more of his underlying crimes when he turned off Doe’s phone.

2000Thus, in analyzing the validity of the Court of Appeal’s decision nonetheless to uphold the trial court’s order permitting nondisclosure at trial, we examine the governing authorities under the federal confrontation clause. 7 A. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” CDelaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ].) “The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400

2000Thus, in analyzing the validity of the Court of Appeal’s decision nonetheless to uphold the trial court’s order permitting nondisclosure at trial, we examine the governing authorities under the federal confrontation clause. 7 A. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” CDelaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ].) “The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400

2000We observed that the measure permitted the admission of hearsay at preliminary examinations and thus amounted to a state constitutional exception to the right to confrontation enunciated in the state Constitution. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1076-1077.) *349 As for the federal confrontation clause, and the federal case law requiring reliable hearsay testimony, Whitman observed that Proposition 115 amply guaranteed reliability because . . the experience and training requirements of [Penal Code section 872] help assure that the hearsay testimony of the investigating officer will indeed be

2000We observed that the measure permitted the admission of hearsay at preliminary examinations and thus amounted to a state constitutional exception to the right to confrontation enunciated in the state Constitution. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1076-1077.) *349 As for the federal confrontation clause, and the federal case law requiring reliable hearsay testimony, Whitman observed that Proposition 115 amply guaranteed reliability because . . the experience and training requirements of [Penal Code section 872] help assure that the hearsay testimony of the investigating officer will indeed be

2026J. such as “mislabeling, mixing the wrong ingredients, or failing to follow routine precautions against contamination”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 814 (Cooper) [“ ‘[T]he Kelly/Frye rule tests the fundamental validity of a new scientific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with which it is applied,’ ” such that “ ‘[c]areless testing affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility’ ”].) And if the People prevail at a Kelly hearing, they must still present evidence at trial concerning the technique and its application in the case, at which time a defendant’s f

2025“Evidence is substantially more 18 prejudicial than probative [citation] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372 , 413.) Under the federal confrontation clause, a criminal defendant has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; People v. Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 431 (Hopson).) The confrontation clause “bars ‘admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless [the witness] was unavailable

2023(Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59 , 68–69 (Crawford); accord, People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569 , 580–581.) Here, there is no dispute L.F.’s videotaped statement to the police constitutes testimonial hearsay for Sixth Amendment purposes.

2000Thus, in analyzing the validity of the Court of Appeal’s decision nonetheless to uphold the trial court’s order permitting nondisclosure at trial, we examine the governing authorities under the federal confrontation clause. 7 A. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” CDelaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ].) “The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400

2000Thus, in analyzing the validity of the Court of Appeal’s decision nonetheless to uphold the trial court’s order permitting nondisclosure at trial, we examine the governing authorities under the federal confrontation clause. 7 A. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “ ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” CDelaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [ 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ].) “The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400

1998Since Probst's statements were relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt and "were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1322 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 .) Finally, defendant points to a small number of hearsay statements that he claims do not fall within the scope of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay

1998Since Probst's statements were relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt and "were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1322 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 .) Finally, defendant points to a small number of hearsay statements that he claims do not fall within the scope of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay

1998Since Probst's statements were relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt and "were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1322 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 .) Finally, defendant points to a small number of hearsay statements that he claims do not fall within the scope of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay

1998Since Probst's statements were relevant to the issue of defendant's guilt and "were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence. [Citations.]" ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 552 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1322 , 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 .) Finally, defendant points to a small number of hearsay statements that he claims do not fall within the scope of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay

1991A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial." ( 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) A few years later, the high court squarely held that the federal confrontation clause does not require that full adversarial safeguards, such as presentation of witnesses and cross-examination of their testimony, be made available for every pretrial probable cause hearing. ( Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103,

1991A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial." ( 390 U.S. at p. 725 [ 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260 ].) A few years later, the high court squarely held that the federal confrontation clause does not require that full adversarial safeguards, such as presentation of witnesses and cross-examination of their testimony, be made available for every pretrial probable cause hearing. ( Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103,

1989(See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484-485 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) But because Ortega’s statements were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence.

1989(See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484-485 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 ].) But because Ortega’s statements were properly admitted under the well recognized state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the federal confrontation clause would likewise permit admission of such evidence.

1989(See Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-183 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 ]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 393 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 ]; Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ].) D.

1989(See Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-183 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 ]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 393 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 ]; Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ].) D.

1989(See Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-183 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 ]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 393 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 ]; Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ].) D.

1989(See Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-183 [ 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 157 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 ]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 393 [ 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397 , 106 S.Ct. 1121 ]; Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [ 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-608 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 ].) D.

1984(Pointer v. Texas, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 407 [ 13 L.Ed.2d at p. 928 ]; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 515 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ].) The United States Supreme Court has refrained from making sweeping declarations which would determine the validity under the confrontation clause of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.

1984(Pointer v. Texas, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 407 [ 13 L.Ed.2d at p. 928 ]; People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 515 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 668 P.2d 738 ].) The United States Supreme Court has refrained from making sweeping declarations which would determine the validity under the confrontation clause of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.