person authorized claim in California

2015(Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226 .) The trial court must 7 then examine the information in chambers, outside the presence of any person except the proper custodian “and any other persons as the person authorized to claim the privilege is willing to have present.” (Evid.

2014(Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226 .) The trial court must then examine the information in chambers, outside the presence of any person except the proper custodian “and any other persons as the person authorized to claim the privilege is willing to have present.” (Evid.

2015Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,4 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” ( Mooc, supra, at p. 1226 ; Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) As the parties here agree, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 ; see also People v. Moreno (2011) 192 Cal

2015Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,4 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” ( Mooc, supra, at p. 1226 ; Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) As the parties here agree, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 ; see also People v. Moreno (2011) 192 Cal

1989(People v. McCarthy (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 547, 553 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) Evidence Code section 915, subdivision (b) describes the in camera hearing: “When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege under Article 9 (commencing with Section 1040) of Chapter 4 (official information and identity of informer) . . . and is unable to do so without requiring disclosure of the information claimed to be privileged, the court may require the person from •whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and hear

1989(People v. McCarthy (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 547, 553 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 822 ].) Evidence Code section 915, subdivision (b) describes the in camera hearing: “When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege under Article 9 (commencing with Section 1040) of Chapter 4 (official information and identity of informer) . . . and is unable to do so without requiring disclosure of the information claimed to be privileged, the court may require the person from •whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and hear

2015Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,4 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” ( Mooc, supra, at p. 1226 ; Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) As the parties here agree, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 ; see also People v. Moreno (2011) 192 Cal

2014Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,4 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” (Mooc, at p. 1226; Warrick, at p. 1019.) As the parties here agree, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 ; see also People v. Moreno (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 692, 701

2014Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information ‘in chambers’ in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as 13 he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: (1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the ‘conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint . . .’ and (3) facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little o

2014First, Evidence Code section 1045 simply requires that an in camera Pitchess hearing must be had “in conformity with” Evidence Code section 915, “ ‘i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present ....’” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ] (Alford); City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83 .) We observed in People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ] (Mooc): “[T]o protect the officer’s privacy, th

2014Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information ‘in chambers’ in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as 13 he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: (1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the ‘conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint . . .’ and (3) facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little o

2014First, Evidence Code section 1045 simply requires that an in camera Pitchess hearing must be had “in conformity with” Evidence Code section 915, “ ‘i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present ....’” (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 ] (Alford); City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83 .) We observed in People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ] (Mooc): “[T]o protect the officer’s privacy, th

2015Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,4 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” ( Mooc, supra, at p. 1226 ; Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) As the parties here agree, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 ; see also People v. Moreno (2011) 192 Cal

2014Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b); see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019 .) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations,5 the trial court must then disclose to the defendant “‘such information that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.’” ( Mooc, supra, at p. 1226 ; accord, Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for access to law enforcement personnel records is subject to review for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330 .) In Warrick, the California Supreme Court concluded

1982Code, § 916, subd. (a).) Although a broad suggestion that circumstances to which this provision would apply vest the court with discretion to “protect an absentee holder of the privilege who has not waived it” (Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 932-933 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 523 P.2d 643 ]) appears to conflict with the mandatory language of the provision and has been cogently criticized (Note (1975) 27 Hastings L.J. 99 , 120-121) and subsequently disregarded (cf., e.g., Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 158 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]), it remains proper for the court

1982Code, § 916, subd. (a).) Although a broad suggestion that circumstances to which this provision would apply vest the court with discretion to “protect an absentee holder of the privilege who has not waived it” (Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 932-933 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 523 P.2d 643 ]) appears to conflict with the mandatory language of the provision and has been cogently criticized (Note (1975) 27 Hastings L.J. 99 , 120-121) and subsequently disregarded (cf., e.g., Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 158 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]), it remains proper for the court

1980(I n re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 437, fn. 23 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 467 P.2d 557 , 44 A.L.R.3d 1 ].) Section 915, subdivision (b) provides: “When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege [of official information, identity of informer, or trade secret] ... and is unable to do so without requiring disclosure of the information claimed to be privileged, the court may require the person from whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized to c

1980(I n re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 437, fn. 23 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 467 P.2d 557 , 44 A.L.R.3d 1 ].) Section 915, subdivision (b) provides: “When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege [of official information, identity of informer, or trade secret] ... and is unable to do so without requiring disclosure of the information claimed to be privileged, the court may require the person from whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized to c

2023(See Stearns v. Los Angeles City School District (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 723 [privilege asserted by the court on behalf of an absent party regarding questions to the party’s former attorney, citing Evidence Code section 916 (providing in subdivision (a) that a presiding officer of a proceeding, including on his or her own motion, “shall” exclude privileged information sought from a person not authorized to claim the privilege in the absence of a “party to the proceeding who is a person authorized to claim the privilege”)]; People v. Vargas (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 516, 527 [citing Stearns and E

2023(See Stearns v. Los Angeles City School District (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 723 [privilege asserted by the court on behalf of an absent party regarding questions to the party’s former attorney, citing Evidence Code section 916 (providing in subdivision (a) that a presiding officer of a proceeding, including on his or her own motion, “shall” exclude privileged information sought from a person not authorized to claim the privilege in the absence of a “party to the proceeding who is a person authorized to claim the privilege”)]; People v. Vargas (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 516, 527 [citing Stearns and E

2015If the judge determines that the information is privileged, neither the judge nor any other person may ever disclose, without the consent of a person authorized to permit disclosure, what was disclosed in the course of the proceedings in chambers.” 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.) Citing Olson, the court stated that it “‘deem[ed] such procedure to be an expedient one in view of the need to balance the respective rights of [the inmate] and the state in accordance with the views articulated in Prewitt.’” (Ibid.) The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its

2003Further, the court must exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: “(1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the ‘conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint. . .’ and (3) facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.’ ” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83 ; § 1045, subd. (b); see also Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ] [defendant entitled only to information that court, after conducting in camera review, determines is relevant to case].) *106 “The statuto

2003Further, the court must exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: “(1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the ‘conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint. . .’ and (3) facts which are ‘so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.’ ” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83 ; § 1045, subd. (b); see also Herrera v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1159 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 742 ] [defendant entitled only to information that court, after conducting in camera review, determines is relevant to case].) *106 “The statuto

2001Code, § 915, subd. (b); Gordon v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560, fn. 10 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The special master provisions of Penal Code section 1524 do not apply when a search is conducted of an attorney suspected of criminal activity. ( PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702, fn. 4 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 .) However, a trial court has the authority to conduct an in camera hearing to determine the validity of the *406 assertion of attorney-client privilege by an attorney suspected of criminal activity, notwithstanding the provisions o

2001Code, § 915, subd. (b); Gordon v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560, fn. 10 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The special master provisions of Penal Code section 1524 do not apply when a search is conducted of an attorney suspected of criminal activity. ( PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702, fn. 4 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 .) However, a trial court has the authority to conduct an in camera hearing to determine the validity of the *406 assertion of attorney-client privilege by an attorney suspected of criminal activity, notwithstanding the provisions o

2001Code, § 915, subd. (b); Gordon v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560, fn. 10 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The special master provisions of Penal Code section 1524 do not apply when a search is conducted of an attorney suspected of criminal activity. ( PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702, fn. 4 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 .) However, a trial court has the authority to conduct an in camera hearing to determine the validity of the *406 assertion of attorney-client privilege by an attorney suspected of criminal activity, notwithstanding the provisions o

2001Code, § 915, subd. (b); Gordon v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1560, fn. 10 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The special master provisions of Penal Code section 1524 do not apply when a search is conducted of an attorney suspected of criminal activity. ( PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1702, fn. 4 , 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 .) However, a trial court has the authority to conduct an in camera hearing to determine the validity of the *406 assertion of attorney-client privilege by an attorney suspected of criminal activity, notwithstanding the provisions o

2000Code,] § 1045, subd. (b).) [¶] In addition to the exclusion of specific categories of information from disclosure, [Evidence Code] section 1045 establishes general criteria to guide the *426 court’s determination and insure that the privacy interests of the officers subject to the motion are protected. ... [¶] The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 742-743.) The term “confiden

2000Code,] § 1045, subd. (b).) [¶] In addition to the exclusion of specific categories of information from disclosure, [Evidence Code] section 1045 establishes general criteria to guide the *426 court’s determination and insure that the privacy interests of the officers subject to the motion are protected. ... [¶] The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 742-743.) The term “confiden

1982Code, § 916, subd. (a).) Although a broad suggestion that circumstances to which this provision would apply vest the court with discretion to “protect an absentee holder of the privilege who has not waived it” (Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 932-933 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 523 P.2d 643 ]) appears to conflict with the mandatory language of the provision and has been cogently criticized (Note (1975) 27 Hastings L.J. 99 , 120-121) and subsequently disregarded (cf., e.g., Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 158 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]), it remains proper for the court

1982Code, § 916, subd. (a).) Although a broad suggestion that circumstances to which this provision would apply vest the court with discretion to “protect an absentee holder of the privilege who has not waived it” (Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 932-933 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 523 P.2d 643 ]) appears to conflict with the mandatory language of the provision and has been cogently criticized (Note (1975) 27 Hastings L.J. 99 , 120-121) and subsequently disregarded (cf., e.g., Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148, 158 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 450 ]), it remains proper for the court