state law harmless error in California

2024The People urge us to apply the state law harmless error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , which provides that an error is harmless unless the defendant shows that it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.

2024That is, even if we “ ‘[a]ssum[e] the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury under these circumstances,’ the error was harmless.” (Prieto, at p. 251, quoting Sully, at p. 1231.) The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is governed by the state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been achieved in the absence of the error. ( Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 251‒252; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1231‒1232; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2023(Ibid.) The court held that generally the state law harmless error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applies except that the federal law standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies where the admission of the gang evidence in the trial on the substantive offenses rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2023Tran states that error 23 under section 1109 is subject to the state-law harmless error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson), unless the error rendered the trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair,’ ” in which case the stricter harmless error standard under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) applies.

2025(Vance, at p. 716.) And because the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in resentencing proceedings under section 1172.6 is merely a statutory right provided by the Legislature, “a violation of the right is subject to the state law harmless error standard.” (Vance, at pp. 716–717; accord, People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451 , 459 [“Even if the trial court erred in describing its role or applying the burden of proof, the error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that absent the error appellant would have achieved a more favorable result.”].) Defendant does n

2025(Vance, at p. 716; see People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735 , 746-747.) And because the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in resentencing proceedings under section 1172.6 is merely a statutory right provided by the Legislature, “a violation of the right is subject to the state law harmless error standard.” (Vance, at pp. 716-717; accord, People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451 , 459 [“Even if the trial court erred in describing its role or applying the burden of proof, the error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that absent the error appellant would

2023(See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209 [trial not fundamentally unfair where prosecutor relied on “testimony and prior statements of a few key witnesses”].) We therefore apply the state law harmless error standard articulated in Watson to weigh the assumed error.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209, italics omitted.) The court’s denial of bifurcation in this case did not cause fundamental unfairness such that the Chapman harmless error standard would apply.

2024That is, even if we “ ‘[a]ssum[e] the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury under these circumstances,’ the error was harmless.” (Prieto, at p. 251, quoting Sully, at p. 1231.) The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is governed by the state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been achieved in the absence of the error. ( Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 251‒252; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1231‒1232; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2023That is, even if we “ ‘[a]ssum[e] the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury under these circumstances,’ the error was harmless.” (Prieto, at p. 251, quoting Sully, at p. 1231.) The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is governed by the state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been achieved in the absence of the error. ( Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 251‒252; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1231‒1232; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2023(See Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 500 [error is harmless if a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury “would have found true [beyond a reasonable doubt] at least a single aggravating circumstance”]; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 465-468 [applying a two-step approach with a beyond a reasonable doubt standard at the first step and state law harmlessness at the second step]; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409- 410 [applying a two-step approach with state law harmlessness incorporated into both steps].) The same court that articulated the standard in Flores

2023(See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.) We also note that in People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346 , 1354, review granted March 15, 2023, S278266, two of the panel members who decided Flores concluded “[u]pon reflection” that “the rationale for adding a state law harmless error component [is] both logical and compelling.” 38 First, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of the aggravating factors relied on by the trial court: that defendant abused a position of trust.

2024(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 201 .) Samoata fails to carry his burden of showing there is a reasonable probability instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418 would have improved his results at trial.

2023(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196 [failure to instruct on lesser included offense 14 subject to the state law harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ].) No evidence suggests that one of the beatings G.D. suffered on July 2 was more severe than the other, or that for some other reason one would have left bruising, while the other did not.

2024Accordingly, we apply the state law harmless error standard set forth in Watson: “[T]he question posed is whether, in the absence of the improperly considered sentencing factor(s), there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for the appealing party—i.e., the imposition of a lesser sentence.” (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 941; see People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233 ; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 .) We conclude that on the record of this case, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for appellant. 5 Appellant contends Sandoval w

2023(See People v. Lynch ( May 27, 2022 , C094174 [nonpub. opn.], rev. granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.) Incidentally, the author of Flores and another justice who concurred in the Flores opinion have since been persuaded by “the rationale for adding a state law harmless error component” to the analysis and now endorse “the two-step harmless error standard articulated in Lopez.” (People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346 , 1354, rev. granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266.) We will apply the Dunn analysis to defendant’s claim, but it should be noted the outcome would be the same under Lopez.

2023(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209; see People v. Oliva (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 76 , 91-92 & fn. 8 [applying Watson standard]; People v. Ramos, 7 Defendant presented his own cell phone location data expert to make the point that, while the data did show he was in the area of the park at the time of the murder, he could have been at one of his relative’s houses in the surrounding neighborhood.

2021(People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 695 [finding no prejudice where there was no reasonable probability that the flight instruction affected the verdicts].) Any error in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the alleged error affected the verdict.

2015Justice Liu‘s concurring and dissenting opinion in that case would have found that Barrett had a state statutory right to be advised of her jury trial right, but further concluded that the error was harmless under the state law harmless error test of Watson, stating ―I would conclude on the basis of the evidence that there was no reasonable probability Barrett would have achieved a more favorable outcome had she been tried by a jury.‖ (People v. Barrett, supra, at p. 1151 (conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J.); see also id. at p. 1114 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J. [finding trial court erred in fa

2015(See People v. Milosavljevic (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 640, 647 (Milosavljevic).) “ ‘Under the Watson standard, prejudicial error is shown where “ ‘ “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” [the reviewing 8 The trial court had instructed the jury: “It is alleged that these crimes occurred February 1, 2010, February 8, 2010, February 15, 2010, and February 20, 2010.

2014Moreover, in light of Nelson’s testimony that Sudduth, whose voice she instantly recognized, called her to apologize a month or so after the shooting, any error was harmless under either the federal constitutional standard (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ]; People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 663 [Chapman harmless-error inquiry asks whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error]) or the state law harmless error standard (see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ;

2014(See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177 , 185–186; compare People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [applying harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard] with People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 561-562 [applying no reasonable probability of prejudice standard].) Under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , “where the defendant offered the same defense to all criminal acts and ‘the jury’s verdict implies that it did not believe the only defense offered,’ failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless error. [Citation.] … The error is also harmless ‘[w]here

2014(See People v. Wolfe (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 177 , 185–186; compare People v. Melhado (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 [applying harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard] with People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 561-562 [applying no reasonable probability of prejudice standard].) Under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 , “where the defendant offered the same defense to all criminal acts and ‘the jury’s verdict implies that it did not believe the only defense offered,’ failure to give a unanimity instruction is harmless error. [Citation.] … The error is also harmless ‘[w]here