mootness doctrine in District of Columbia

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C.1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not “capable of repetition yet evading review” even as to another litigant).

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not "capable of repetition yet evading review" even as to another litigant).

2014To fit within this exception to the mootness doctrine, “the challenged action must be of too short a duration to be litigated fully prior to its cessation or expiration.... ” McClain v. United States, 601 A.2d 80, 82 (D.C.1992).

2014To fit within this exception to the mootness doctrine, “the challenged action must be of too short a duration to be litigated fully prior to its cessation or expiration . . . .” McClain v. United States, 601 A.2d 80, 82 (D.C. 1992).

1995There is an exception to the mootness doctrine which the Supreme Court has confined, absent a class action, essentially to situations where: “ ‘(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’ ” In re W.L., 603 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1991) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 , 96 S.Ct. 347, 349 , 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975)) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 95 S.Ct. 553 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975)).

1995Instead, we have held that “[t]he quasi-class action nature of a ease, while a factor to be considered in a mootness challenge, is not a necessary condition to deciding an issue.” W.L., 603 A.2d at 841 .

2024Id.; see also Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, 50 F.4th 259, 278 (1st Cir. 2022) (“That a plaintiff’s ultimate recovery may be uncertain or even unlikely is of no moment to the mootness inquiry.

2024Id.; see also Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, 50 F.4th 259, 278 (1st Cir. 2022) (“That a plaintiff’s ultimate recovery may be uncertain or even unlikely is of no moment to the mootness inquiry.

2022See Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C. 1997).

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not "capable of repetition yet evading review" even as to another litigant).

2015See Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) (“this court ... enjoys flexibility in regard to mootness not possessed by the fed'eral courts”).

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had "long ago" completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C. 1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot" but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy" even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of A

1987That exception, classically stated in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S.Ct. 279, 283 , 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), permits appellate review of "short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review. . . ." See also, e.g., In re Curry, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 222-223 , 470 F.2d 368, 370-371 (1972); Alton & So.

1987That exception, classically stated in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S.Ct. 279, 283 , 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), permits appellate review of "short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review. . . ." See also, e.g., In re Curry, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 222-223 , 470 F.2d 368, 370-371 (1972); Alton & So.

1995See W.L., 603 A.2d at 841 ; Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 , 1324 n. 2 (D.C.1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 , 102 S.Ct. 1721 , 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982).

1995See id. (issue not moot because of the limited time a child remains in Receiving Home while awaiting foster home placement); Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1324 n. 2 (limited time period for pretrial detention renders confinement under the statute a practice “capable of repetition, yet evading review”).

2023Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles, 244 A.3d 703 , 705 (D.C. 2021) (brackets omitted). 21 Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)); see also Mission Prod.

2023Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles, 244 A.3d 703 , 705 (D.C. 2021) (brackets omitted). 21 Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)); see also Mission Prod.

2022Mootness and standing are related concepts in that, generally speaking (putting aside the exceptions to the mootness doctrine), the requisite interest that “must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Welsh v. McNeil, 162 A.3d 135, 144-45 (D.C. 2017) (Glickman, J., concurring in part).

2022While its failure to demonstrate that it has ceased the challenged practices would, by itself, 11 Because civil traffic citations are so ubiquitous, the principle that courts will generally not apply a mootness exception where the danger of recurrence stems from the possibility that a party will “violat[e] the law, get[] caught, and be[] convicted,” see Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15 (1998), has no force here.

2020He satisfies the second prong because, given the serious 40 See, e.g., Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71-72 (2013) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or ‘personal stake,’ in the outcome of the action. . . .

2015Appeals, 898 A.2d 902, 904-05 (D.C.2006) (quoting McClain v. United States, 601 A.2d 80, 81 (D.C.1992)).

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C.1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not “capable of repetition yet evading review” even as to another litigant).

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not "capable of repetition yet evading review" even as to another litigant).

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had “long ago” completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C.1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot” but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy” even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of Ar

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had "long ago" completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C. 1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot" but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy" even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of A

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had "long ago" completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C. 1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot" but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy" even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of A

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not "capable of repetition yet evading review" even as to another litigant).

2011See Tyler v. United States, 705 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1997) (en banc) (citing Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989), and distinguishing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1181 , 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982)); cf., Hardesty v. Draper, 687 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.1997) (concluding that case was moot where issue was not "capable of repetition yet evading review" even as to another litigant).

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had “long ago” completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C.1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot” but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy” even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of Ar

2011See, for example, Brown v. United States, 900 A.2d 184, 193 (D.C.2006) (reaching the merits even though appellant had "long ago" completed his jail sentence); Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 68 (D.C. 1997) (stating that we "will not normally decide questions which have become moot" but concluding that the "case remains a live controversy" even though contract had been cancelled); Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1991) ("[T]he decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of mootness, which arise in the context of the case or controversy requirement of A