mootness doctrine in Maine

2011Because of the “brief length of ... commitment,” and because it is likely “that the specific issue in the present case will be repeatedly presented,” In re Faucher, 558 A.2d at 706 , this exception to the mootness doctrine also applies. 2 B.

2004Another consequence of the commitment order is the prohibition against possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (g)(4) (2000). 1 *350 [¶ 11] We did not recite the collateral consequences of an involuntary commitment to a mental health hospital in In .re Faucher, 558 A.2d 705 (Me.1989), and there we declined to apply - a mootness exception to Faucher’s appeal from his involuntary commitment.

2015No appeal was taken from either of those decisions, and the hotel is now fully operational. [¶ 9] Although there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, see Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17 , 738 A.2d 1239 , none of them applies here because the collateral consequences that would flow from the decision are not “more than conjectural and insubstantial consequences,” Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 6 , 692 A.2d 1386 (quotation marks omitted); the appeal does not present an issue of great public concern, see Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17 , 738 A.2d 1239 ; and the issues in this case

2015No appeal was taken from either of those decisions, and the hotel is now fully operational. [¶ 9] Although there are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, see Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17 , 738 A.2d 1239 , none of them applies here because the collateral consequences that would flow from the decision are not “more than conjectural and insubstantial consequences,” Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 6 , 692 A.2d 1386 (quotation marks omitted); the appeal does not present an issue of great public concern, see Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17 , 738 A.2d 1239 ; and the issues in this case

2001Those exceptions are expressed in State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 578 (Me. 1979) as follows: First, the court will determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief.

1997The exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply when “(1) sufficient collateral consequences will flow from a determination of the questions presented, (2) the question, although moot in the immediate context, is of great public interest and should be addressed for future guidance of the bar and public, or (3) the issue may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of its fleeting or determinate nature.” Campaign for Transp., 658 A.2d at 215 (quoting Gleason, 404 A.2d at 578 ).

2021We ordered that the motion to dismiss be considered with the merits. 7 public concern’ that we address in order to provide future guidance; or (3) the issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶9] The public interest exception and the repeat presentation exception to the mootness doctrine both apply here.

2021When confronted with cases regarding involuntary emergency hospitalization or commitment, we have consistently determined the issues to be of great public concern and applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.2 See, e.g., In re Marcia E., 2012 ME 139 , ¶ 4 n.1, 58 A.3d 1115 ; In re Christopher H., 2011 ME 13, ¶ 12 , 12 A.3d 64 ; In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 9 , 850 A.2d 346 .

2003While Competitive Energy argues that this exception is applicable because of concerns relating to the anti-competitiveness associated with utilities favoring their affiliates, the unique nature of the Lease Agreement takes it outside the arena of issues of great public concern on which the bar and public need guidance. [¶ 26] A separate exception to the mootness doctrine exists for “issues [that] *1050 are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature[,]” id., which is applicable if there is a “ ‘reasonable expectation’ or ‘demonstrated probability that

1999Because there is no "real and substantial controversy, admitting of specific relief through a judgment of conclusive character," Halfway House, Inc., 670 A.2d at 1379 , this case is moot. [¶ 17] While the mootness doctrine generally bars review of cases that do not present a justiciable controversy, there are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine which may justify addressing the merits of an issue if: (1) Sufficient collateral consequences will result from the determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; (2) the appeal contains questions of great public concern that, i

2021When confronted with cases regarding involuntary emergency hospitalization or commitment, we have consistently determined the issues to be of great public concern and applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.2 See, e.g., In re Marcia E., 2012 ME 139 , ¶ 4 n.1, 58 A.3d 1115 ; In re Christopher H., 2011 ME 13, ¶ 12 , 12 A.3d 64 ; In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 9 , 850 A.2d 346 .

2021When confronted with cases regarding involuntary emergency hospitalization or commitment, we have consistently determined the issues to be of great public concern and applied the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.2 See, e.g., In re Marcia E., 2012 ME 139 , ¶ 4 n.1, 58 A.3d 1115 ; In re Christopher H., 2011 ME 13, ¶ 12 , 12 A.3d 64 ; In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 9 , 850 A.2d 346 .

2006See Ten Voters of Biddeford v. City of Biddeford, 2003 ME 59, ¶ 8 , 822 A.2d 1196, 1200 (recognizing that one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine warranting adjudication is when " ‘issues ... may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting or determinate nature’ ”) (quoting Lewis v. State, 2000 ME 44, ¶ 4 , 747 A.2d 1191, 1192 ). 2 .

2006See Ten Voters of Biddeford v. City of Biddeford, 2003 ME 59, ¶ 8 , 822 A.2d 1196, 1200 (recognizing that one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine warranting adjudication is when " ‘issues ... may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting or determinate nature’ ”) (quoting Lewis v. State, 2000 ME 44, ¶ 4 , 747 A.2d 1191, 1192 ). 2 .

2025Co., 2002 ME 128, ¶ 7 , 802 A.2d 994 (explaining that “in the absence of any practical consequences, [a court’s decision] would be a meaningless abstract decision that the mootness doctrine is intended to prevent”). 8 [¶12] The McCallions urge us to consider that the 2024 registration has now been supplanted by a 2025 version, which the McCallions have appealed to the Board.

2025Co., 2002 ME 128, ¶ 7 , 802 A.2d 994 (explaining that “in the absence of any practical consequences, [a court’s decision] would be a meaningless abstract decision that the mootness doctrine is intended to prevent”). 8 [¶12] The McCallions urge us to consider that the 2024 registration has now been supplanted by a 2025 version, which the McCallions have appealed to the Board.

2022See Clark v. Hancock County Comm 'rs, 2014 ME 33 if 13, 87 A.3d 712 (recognizing three exceptions to the 3Even ifmootness did not serve as a sufficient basis for denial of Graham's Motion, the Court notes that his Motion does not set forth facts which constitute irreparable iajury, see Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 1980) (""Irreparable injury" is defined as "injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.""), or as discussed below, exhibit a likelihood of the success of the merits ofhis professional negligence claims. 4 Mootness doctrine: (1) sufficient

2022See Clark v. Hancock County Comm 'rs, 2014 ME 33 if 13, 87 A.3d 712 (recognizing three exceptions to the 3Even ifmootness did not serve as a sufficient basis for denial of Graham's Motion, the Court notes that his Motion does not set forth facts which constitute irreparable iajury, see Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 1980) (""Irreparable injury" is defined as "injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.""), or as discussed below, exhibit a likelihood of the success of the merits ofhis professional negligence claims. 4 Mootness doctrine: (1) sufficient

2020See Leigh, 2003 ME 22, ¶ 8 , 817 A.2d 881 . [¶11] We next consider whether the mootness exception relating to matters of great public concern applies here.

2020See Leigh, 2003 ME 22, ¶ 8 , 817 A.2d 881 . [¶11] We next consider whether the mootness exception relating to matters of great public concern applies here.

2016Turnpike Auth., 658 A.2d 213, 216 (Me.1995). 4 [¶ 10] The exception to the mootness doctrine for matters capable of repetition but evading review applies if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the same issues will imminently and repeatedly recur in future similar contexts.” Campaign for Sensible Transp., 658 A.2d at 215 (quotation marks omitted).

2016Turnpike Auth., 658 A.2d 213, 216 (Me.1995). 4 [¶ 10] The exception to the mootness doctrine for matters capable of repetition but evading review applies if there is a “reasonable likelihood that the same issues will imminently and repeatedly recur in future similar contexts.” Campaign for Sensible Transp., 658 A.2d at 215 (quotation marks omitted).

2015"The mootness doctrine preserves the 'flexibility of the law by not creating unnecessary precedent."' Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68 , ~ 10, 756 A.2d 942 (quoting Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 631 (Me. 1981)).

2000The mootness doctrine preserves the “flexibility of the law by not creating unnecessary precedent.” Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 631 (Me.1981). [¶ 11] Even if Betty successfully sued Bill pursuant to the MHRA, she would not be entitled to any remedies.

2017Here, however, we are not persuaded by Gail’s attorney’s argument that the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine applies, see Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting, 2016 ME 57 , ¶ 9 & n.4, 136 A.3d 714 ; cf. In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 12 , 850 A.2d 346 , and neither party has urged or demonstrated that any other exception applies.2 Accordingly, we dismiss Daniel’s appeal, with the single exception of the issue of the court’s order that Daniel pay GAL fees as a sanction, as discussed below.

2017Here, however, we are not persuaded by Gail’s attorney’s argument that the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine applies, see Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting, 2016 ME 57 , ¶ 9 & n.4, 136 A.3d 714 ; cf. In re Walter R., 2004 ME 77, ¶ 12 , 850 A.2d 346 , and neither party has urged or demonstrated that any other exception applies.2 Accordingly, we dismiss Daniel’s appeal, with the single exception of the issue of the court’s order that Daniel pay GAL fees as a sanction, as discussed below.

2020“When determining whether a case is moot, [the court] examine[s] whether there remain sufficient potential effects flowing from resolution of the litigation to justify application of the court's limited resources.” Id. 13-B M.R.S. § 715(2) In this case, the Court has already heard evidence and argument on Plaintiffs’ claim, undercutting the policy rationale behind the mootness doctrine.

2012Anthem filed this timely, expedited appeal in hopes of avoiding the mootness inquiry that guided our decision in Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48 , 18 A.3d 824 .

2021A.I. v. State, 2020 ME 6 , ¶ 9, 223 A.3d 910 (setting forth the exceptions to the mootness doctrine).

2021Second, the Court finds that the issues surrounding the 2014 lease fall under the mootness exception for issues that “are capable of repetition but evade review because of their 14 fleeting or indeterminate nature.” A.I., 2020 ME 6 , ¶ 9, 223 A.3d 910 .

2018Such cases are moot"); Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167 , <Jr 8 ("An issue that is technically moot may still be addressed on appeal if one of the three narrow, yet established, exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies: 1) sufficient collateral consequences will flow from a determination of the questions presented, 2) the question, although moot in the immediate context, is of great public interest and should be addressed for future guidance of the bar and public, or 3) the issue may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of its fleeting or d

2010When determining whether a case falls within the great public interest exception, we consider “whether the question is public or private, how much court officials need an authoritative determination for future rulings, and how likely the question is to recur in the future.” Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 9 , 810 A.2d 418, 422 (quotation marks omitted).

2016Id. '!I'!I 6, 13.

2011Id. [¶ 13] The repeat presentation exception to mootness applies where “the issue may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of its fleeting or determinate nature.” In re Marcial O., 1999 ME 64, ¶ 10 , 728 A.2d 158, 161 .

2017Id.

1997Lynch v. Town of Kittery, 473 A.2d 1277, 1279 (Me.1984); Nat’l Coun. on Comp.

2017See In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶¶ 7-8 , 140 A.3d 1226 ; In re Ciara H., 2011 ME 109, ¶ 3 , 30 A.3d 835 .

2017See In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶¶ 7-8 , 140 A.3d 1226 ; In re Ciara H., 2011 ME 109, ¶ 3 , 30 A.3d 835 .

2015Madore, 1998 ME 178 , ~ 8, 715 A.2d 157 .

2015Madore, 1998 ME 178 , ~ 8, 715 A.2d 157 .

1998See Bennett, 289 A.2d at 32 ; Irish, 551 A.2d at 862 .

1997Bennett, 289 A.2d at 32 . [¶ 7] We also reject the court’s conclusion that application of the mootness doctrine in this case would create a class of cases insulated from appellate scrutiny.

2022See Clark v. Hancock County Comm 'rs, 2014 ME 33 if 13, 87 A.3d 712 (recognizing three exceptions to the 3Even ifmootness did not serve as a sufficient basis for denial of Graham's Motion, the Court notes that his Motion does not set forth facts which constitute irreparable iajury, see Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 1980) (""Irreparable injury" is defined as "injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.""), or as discussed below, exhibit a likelihood of the success of the merits ofhis professional negligence claims. 4 Mootness doctrine: (1) sufficient

2022See Clark v. Hancock County Comm 'rs, 2014 ME 33 if 13, 87 A.3d 712 (recognizing three exceptions to the 3Even ifmootness did not serve as a sufficient basis for denial of Graham's Motion, the Court notes that his Motion does not set forth facts which constitute irreparable iajury, see Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 1980) (""Irreparable injury" is defined as "injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.""), or as discussed below, exhibit a likelihood of the success of the merits ofhis professional negligence claims. 4 Mootness doctrine: (1) sufficient