mootness doctrine in Vermont

2024See 33 V.S.A. § 5318(a) (“At disposition, the court shall make such orders related to legal custody for a child who has been found to be [CHINS] as the court determines are in the best interests of the child.”); cf. In re P.S., 167 Vt. 63, 67 , 702 A.2d 98, 100 (1997) (holding that where hospitalization order on appeal “no longer has any effect on [appellant’s] commitment status or residence . . . the case is moot unless it fits within an exception to the mootness doctrine”).

2024See 33 V.S.A. § 5318(a) (“At disposition, the court shall make such orders related to legal custody for a child who has been found to be [CHINS] as the court determines are in the best interests of the child.”); cf. In re P.S., 167 Vt. 63, 67 , 702 A.2d 98, 100 (1997) (holding that where hospitalization order on appeal “no longer has any effect on [appellant’s] commitment status or residence . . . the case is moot unless it fits within an exception to the mootness doctrine”).

2014Skaskiw argues that we have recognized a mootness exception for cases that are “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ ” In re S.H., 141 Vt. 278, 281 , 448 A.2d 148, 149 (1982) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)), and argues that it should apply here.

2014Skaskiw argues that we have recognized a mootness exception for cases that are “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ ” In re S.H., 141 Vt. 278, 281 , 448 A.2d 148, 149 (1982) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)), and argues that it should apply here.

2017Nevertheless, appellant argues that this issue meets two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the exception for cases that are capable of repetition but evading review, State v. Condrick , 144 Vt. 362 , 363, 477 A.2d 632 , 633 (1984) ("A case is not moot when a situation is capable of repetition, yet evades review."), and (2) the exception for negative collateral consequences.

2017Nevertheless, appellant argues that this issue meets two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the exception for cases that are capable of repetition but evading review, State v. Condrick , 144 Vt. 362 , 363, 477 A.2d 632 , 633 (1984) ("A case is not moot when a situation is capable of repetition, yet evades review."), and (2) the exception for negative collateral consequences.

2014Tallman, 148 Vt. at 468-69 , 537 A.2d at 424 , applies the exception to the mootness doctrine, allowing claims capable of repetition but evading review, but does not discuss exceptions for issues of great public concern.

2014Tallman, 148 Vt. at 468-69 , 537 A.2d at 424 , applies the exception to the mootness doctrine, allowing claims capable of repetition but evading review, but does not discuss exceptions for issues of great public concern.

2019Further, we have recognized that such an exception “would almost certainly swallow the rule.” In re S.N., 2007 VT 47, ¶ 9 (“We can hardly 2 We do not accept the premise that if we do not adopt a public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine, a challenge to the DOC rules implementing 28 V.S.A. § 808c(c) cannot be fully litigated by an incarcerated offender with standing before the offender reaches the minimum release date.

2019Therefore, although reintegration furlough decisions implicate an important public interest, as before, “we once again reject a catchall public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine.” In re S.N., 2007 VT 47, ¶ 9 .

2015See State v. J.S., 174 Vt. 619, 620 , 817 A.2d 53, 55 (2002) (mem.) (recognizing exception to the mootness doctrine “when negative collateral consequences are likely to result from the action being reviewed,” and stating that in mental health commitment cases negative collateral consequences can apply because “legal disabilities radiating from the label of mentally incompetent are myriad” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 3.

2015See State v. J.S., 174 Vt. 619, 620 , 817 A.2d 53, 55 (2002) (mem.) (recognizing exception to the mootness doctrine “when negative collateral consequences are likely to result from the action being reviewed,” and stating that in mental health commitment cases negative collateral consequences can apply because “legal disabilities radiating from the label of mentally incompetent are myriad” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 3.

2005We will not address a moot case merely because “others will find themselves in a similar position.” See In re Moriarty, 156 Vt. at 164 , 588 A.2d at 1065 (explaining that Vermont had not adopted a “general public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine”).

2005We will not address a moot case merely because “others will find themselves in a similar position.” See In re Moriarty, 156 Vt. at 164 , 588 A.2d at 1065 (explaining that Vermont had not adopted a “general public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine”).

2014Skaskiw argues that we have recognized a mootness exception for cases that are “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ ” In re S.H., 141 Vt. 278, 281 , 448 A.2d 148, 149 (1982) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)), and argues that it should apply here.

1987The Board found further that the issue was not moot in that the question was an exception to the mootness doctrine because it was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973).

2014To invoke this exception, “ ‘(1) the challenged action [must be] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [must be] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.’ ” State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 469 , 537 A.2d 422, 424 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).

1998As we explained in Tallman: *381 The applicability of this exception is dependent on the satisfaction of a two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975): “(1) the challenged action [must be] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [must be] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Id.

2009“Thus, this Court can no longer issue a ruling that would affect [defendant’s] custodial status, and the case is moot unless an exception to the mootness rule applies.” E.S., 2005 VT 33, ¶ 5 ; see also In re M.A.C., 134 Vt. 522, 522-23 , 365 A.2d 254, 255 (1976) (per curiam).

2009“Thus, this Court can no longer issue a ruling that would affect [defendant’s] custodial status, and the case is moot unless an exception to the mootness rule applies.” E.S., 2005 VT 33, ¶ 5 ; see also In re M.A.C., 134 Vt. 522, 522-23 , 365 A.2d 254, 255 (1976) (per curiam).

2020Defendant argues that the appeal meets the requirements for two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “(1) the exception for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review and (2) the 6 exception for negative collateral consequences.” Paige v. State, 2017 VT 54, ¶ 10 , 205 Vt. 287 , 171 A.3d 1011 (citation omitted).

2020Defendant argues that the appeal meets the requirements for two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “(1) the exception for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review and (2) the 6 exception for negative collateral consequences.” Paige v. State, 2017 VT 54, ¶ 10 , 205 Vt. 287 , 171 A.3d 1011 (citation omitted).

2019Thus, it is well established that our “historic reluctance” to adopt a public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine is grounded in an understanding that “issuing an advisory opinion, even based on public-interest considerations” would exceed the constitutional mandate that this Court determine only “actual controversies.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 9 (quotation omitted); see also In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524 , 64 A.2d 169 (1949) (holding that power to render advisory opinions “is in no wise incidental to the constitutional function of the judiciary of this State and no act of the

2019Thus, it is well established that our “historic reluctance” to adopt a public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine is grounded in an understanding that “issuing an advisory opinion, even based on public-interest considerations” would exceed the constitutional mandate that this Court determine only “actual controversies.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 9 (quotation omitted); see also In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524 , 64 A.2d 169 (1949) (holding that power to render advisory opinions “is in no wise incidental to the constitutional function of the judiciary of this State and no act of the

2013The so-called negative collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine “is limited to situations where proceeding to a decision in an otherwise dead case is ‘justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.’ ” In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 16 , 185 Vt. 210 , 969 A.2d 101 (quoting All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 164 Vt. 428, 432 , 670 A.2d 800, 803 (1995)).

2013The so-called negative collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine “is limited to situations where proceeding to a decision in an otherwise dead case is ‘justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.’ ” In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 16 , 185 Vt. 210 , 969 A.2d 101 (quoting All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 164 Vt. 428, 432 , 670 A.2d 800, 803 (1995)).

2009Id.

2008In re *440 Green Mountain Power Corp., 148 Vt. 333, 335 , 532 A.2d 582, 583 (1987).

2012We caution, however, as we did in State v. Schaefer, 157 Vt. 339, 345 , 599 A.2d 337, 341 (1991), that general questions of law as are present here meet the exception, but once such questions are answered, the issues in future cases become more fact specific and are less likely to fit within the exception. ¶ 11.

2012We caution, however, as we did in State v. Schaefer, 157 Vt. 339, 345 , 599 A.2d 337, 341 (1991), that general questions of law as are present here meet the exception, but once such questions are answered, the issues in future cases become more fact specific and are less likely to fit within the exception. ¶ 11.

2002College, 156 Vt. 114, 118 (1991).

1998See id.

2019See, e.g., 3 V.S.A. § 807 (authorizing declaratory judgment action “if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff”); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1975) (holding in class action that mootness as to individual class representative does not moot litigation if controversy may still exist between defendant and member of the class represented by named plaintiff). 5 imagine a state action that is not of substantial public significance and would not, therefore,

1996Plaintiffs contend, and the trial court concluded, that this case falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine because it is “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 400-01 (1975) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 333 n.2 (1972)); see State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 469 , 537 A.2d 422, 424 (1987).

2013First, plaintiff argues that the situation where an unqualified person runs for the Office of the President “is capable of repetition, yet evades review.” State v. Condrick, 144 Vt. 362, 363 , 477 A.2d 632, 633 (1984) (citing State v. O’Connell, 136 Vt. 43, 45 , 383 A.2d 624, 626 (1978)).

2013First, plaintiff argues that the situation where an unqualified person runs for the Office of the President “is capable of repetition, yet evades review.” State v. Condrick, 144 Vt. 362, 363 , 477 A.2d 632, 633 (1984) (citing State v. O’Connell, 136 Vt. 43, 45 , 383 A.2d 624, 626 (1978)).

2025See Holton v. Dep’t of Emp. & Training (Town of Vernon), 2005 VT 42, ¶ 14 , 178 Vt. 147, 153 (2005) (“The mootness doctrine derives its force from the Vermont Constitution, which, like its federal counterpart, limits the authority of the courts to the determination of actual, live controversies between adverse litigants.”).

2025See Holton v. Dep’t of Emp. & Training (Town of Vernon), 2005 VT 42, ¶ 14 , 178 Vt. 147, 153 (2005) (“The mootness doctrine derives its force from the Vermont Constitution, which, like its federal counterpart, limits the authority of the courts to the determination of actual, live controversies between adverse litigants.”).

2023This case does not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases “capable of repetition yet evading review.” State v. Rooney, 2008 VT 102, ¶ 11 , 184 Vt. 620 , 965 A.2d 481 (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2023This case does not fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases “capable of repetition yet evading review.” State v. Rooney, 2008 VT 102, ¶ 11 , 184 Vt. 620 , 965 A.2d 481 (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2015The negative collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine “ ‘is limited to situations where proceeding to a decision in an otherwise dead case is justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.’ ” Paige, 2013 VT 105, ¶ 12 (quoting In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 16 , 185 Vt. 210 , 969 A.2d 101 ).

2015The negative collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine “ ‘is limited to situations where proceeding to a decision in an otherwise dead case is justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.’ ” Paige, 2013 VT 105, ¶ 12 (quoting In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 16 , 185 Vt. 210 , 969 A.2d 101 ).

2011The second exception to the mootness doctrine occurs when “the underlying situation is capable of repetition, yet evades review.” E.S. v. State, 2005 VT 33, ¶ 6 , 178 Vt. 519 , 872 A.2d 356 (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2011The second exception to the mootness doctrine occurs when “the underlying situation is capable of repetition, yet evades review.” E.S. v. State, 2005 VT 33, ¶ 6 , 178 Vt. 519 , 872 A.2d 356 (mem.) (quotation omitted).

2015This is also not a case where “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” In re Unnamed Defendant, 2011 VT 25, ¶ 4 , 189 Vt. 585 , 15 A.3d 1039 (mem.) (quotation omitted; emphasis added).

2011See In re Unnamed Defendant, 2011 VT 25 (explaining that the mootness doctrine “limits the authority of the courts to the determination of actual, live controversies between adverse litigants”) (citation omitted).

2024Applied appropriately to this Court, the mootness doctrine requires “[a]n actual controversy [to] be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp. 147 Vt. 236, 239 , 151 A.2d 371 , 373 (1986) (quotation omitted).

1991Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp., 147 Vt. 236, 239 , 515 A.2d 371, 373 (1986).