mootness doctrine in Oregon

2015Id. at 417 n 2.

2015Id. at 417 n 2.

1998As in Jones v. Thompson, 156 Or.App. 226 , 968 P.2d 380 (decided this date), the majority fails to understand or apply the collateral consequences aspect of the mootness doctrine.

1998As in Jones v. Thompson, 156 Or.App. 226 , 968 P.2d 380 (decided this date), the majority fails to understand or apply the collateral consequences aspect of the mootness doctrine.

2021The court found the statutory exception applied because the 1 In FedEx, the taxpayer argued it was entitled to a fee award under the “catalyst theory” because “its efforts in resisting the department led to the abatement.” 20 OTR at 550 , n3 Under the catalyst theory, “where a defendant voluntarily complies with a plaintiff’s requested relief, thereby rendering the plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, the plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ [for purposes of attorney fees and costs] if [the] suit is a ‘catalyst’ for the defendant’s voluntary compliance.” Clapper v. Oregon State Police, 228 Or App 172, 179 ,

2012The department also relies on other Cite as 20 OTR 547 (2012) 549 Oregon cases in which cases have not survived a mootness challenge on the basis that attorney fee awards might be available.

2005Under Oregon law, a case becomes moot when the interests of the parties cease to be adverse, Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 182 , 895 P2d 765 (1995), or when “a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties!.]” Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 406 , 848 P2d 1194 (1993).

1996Even in Brumnett , the Supreme Court held that the “mere possibility” that the state might seek an order requiring the petitioner to pay for his care “at some future date” was insufficient to savé it from a mootness challenge. 315 Or at 407 . 2 We reject appellant’s contention that the death threat was in any way mitigated by the fact that appellant did not indicate that he would inflict that death.

2001See also Hamel, 330 Or. at 184 , 998 P.2d 661 ("Even if a case otherwise is justiciable, if the court's decision `no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' then the matter will be dismissed as moot." (citation omitted)); Barcik, 321 Or. at 182 , 895 P.2d 765 ("`Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' are moot." (citation omitted)); State v. Macy, 320 Or. 408, 412 , 886 P.2d 1010 (1994) (same); Lavitsky, 158 Or.App. at 663 , 976 P.2d 82 (sam

2001See also Hamel, 330 Or. at 184 , 998 P.2d 661 ("Even if a case otherwise is justiciable, if the court's decision `no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' then the matter will be dismissed as moot." (citation omitted)); Barcik, 321 Or. at 182 , 895 P.2d 765 ("`Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' are moot." (citation omitted)); State v. Macy, 320 Or. 408, 412 , 886 P.2d 1010 (1994) (same); Lavitsky, 158 Or.App. at 663 , 976 P.2d 82 (sam

2001See also Hamel, 330 Or. at 184 , 998 P.2d 661 ("Even if a case otherwise is justiciable, if the court's decision `no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' then the matter will be dismissed as moot." (citation omitted)); Barcik, 321 Or. at 182 , 895 P.2d 765 ("`Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' are moot." (citation omitted)); State v. Macy, 320 Or. 408, 412 , 886 P.2d 1010 (1994) (same); Lavitsky, 158 Or.App. at 663 , 976 P.2d 82 (sam

2001See also Hamel, 330 Or. at 184 , 998 P.2d 661 ("Even if a case otherwise is justiciable, if the court's decision `no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' then the matter will be dismissed as moot." (citation omitted)); Barcik, 321 Or. at 182 , 895 P.2d 765 ("`Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court's decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties,' are moot." (citation omitted)); State v. Macy, 320 Or. 408, 412 , 886 P.2d 1010 (1994) (same); Lavitsky, 158 Or.App. at 663 , 976 P.2d 82 (sam

2021To tackle that question, we must first scrutinize the third unexamined proposition that we accepted in Nguyen—that “a decision of this court regarding the propriety of the way by which [probation] conditions were initially imposed would have no practical effect because, in any event, defendant would continue to be subject to the iden- tical conditions” under the unappealed probation-violation judgment. 298 Or App at 140 .

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The court found the statutory exception applied because the 1 In FedEx, the taxpayer argued it was entitled to a fee award under the “catalyst theory” because “its efforts in resisting the department led to the abatement.” 20 OTR at 550 , n3 Under the catalyst theory, “where a defendant voluntarily complies with a plaintiff’s requested relief, thereby rendering the plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, the plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ [for purposes of attorney fees and costs] if [the] suit is a ‘catalyst’ for the defendant’s voluntary compliance.” Clapper v. Oregon State Police, 228 Or App 172, 179 ,

2021The court found the statutory exception applied because the 1 In FedEx, the taxpayer argued it was entitled to a fee award under the “catalyst theory” because “its efforts in resisting the department led to the abatement.” 20 OTR at 550 , n3 Under the catalyst theory, “where a defendant voluntarily complies with a plaintiff’s requested relief, thereby rendering the plaintiff’s lawsuit moot, the plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ [for purposes of attorney fees and costs] if [the] suit is a ‘catalyst’ for the defendant’s voluntary compliance.” Clapper v. Oregon State Police, 228 Or App 172, 179 ,

2021The court applied a discretionary exception to the mootness doctrine found in ORS 14.175, under which a party alleging that an act, policy, or practice of a public body “is unconstitutional or is otherwise contrary to law * * * may continue to prosecute the action and the court may issue a judgment on the validity of the challenged act, policy or practice even though the specific act, policy or practice giving rise to the action no longer has a practical effect on the party if the court determines that: (1) The party had standing to commence the action; (2) The act challenged by the party is c

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2021The premise underlying the per se exception is that the mobility of vehicles creates a risk that they will become inaccessible in the time it takes to get a warrant, and the court expected that advances in 4 E.g., State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or 464, 492-93 , 479 P3d 254 (2021) (overrul- ing prior decision that was internally inconsistent and had created confusion in the law); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 36-40 , 307 P3d 429 (2013) (overruling prior decisions that imported federal constitutional analysis without adequately explaining why it was appropriate to do so to resolve a state constitutio

2016We described that exception in Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Or App 502, 510 , 971 P2d 435 (1998): “The voluntary cessation of a practice that is challenged in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does not, in itself, render an action moot; if the law were otherwise, wrongdoers could cease their wrongdoing as soon as complaints are filed and resume the wrongdoing as soon as the complaints are dismissed for being moot.” Accord Safeway, Inc. v. OPEU, 152 Or App 349, 355 , 954 P2d 196 (1998).

2016We described that exception in Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Or App 502, 510 , 971 P2d 435 (1998): “The voluntary cessation of a practice that is challenged in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does not, in itself, render an action moot; if the law were otherwise, wrongdoers could cease their wrongdoing as soon as complaints are filed and resume the wrongdoing as soon as the complaints are dismissed for being moot.” Accord Safeway, Inc. v. OPEU, 152 Or App 349, 355 , 954 P2d 196 (1998).

2016We described that exception in Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Or App 502, 510 , 971 P2d 435 (1998): “The voluntary cessation of a practice that is challenged in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does not, in itself, render an action moot; if the law were otherwise, wrongdoers could cease their wrongdoing as soon as complaints are filed and resume the wrongdoing as soon as the complaints are dismissed for being moot.” Accord Safeway, Inc. v. OPEU, 152 Or App 349, 355 , 954 P2d 196 (1998).

2016We described that exception in Tanner v. OHSU, 157 Or App 502, 510 , 971 P2d 435 (1998): “The voluntary cessation of a practice that is challenged in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief does not, in itself, render an action moot; if the law were otherwise, wrongdoers could cease their wrongdoing as soon as complaints are filed and resume the wrongdoing as soon as the complaints are dismissed for being moot.” Accord Safeway, Inc. v. OPEU, 152 Or App 349, 355 , 954 P2d 196 (1998).