juvenile sentencing factors in Illinois

2025On appeal, defendant contends that the petition set forth the arguably meritorious claims that he was unconstitutionally arrested pursuant to an investigative alert and that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate when the trial court did not apply the juvenile sentencing factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

2025See People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 379 (2000) (“Defendant cannot obtain post-conviction relief merely by rephrasing a claim which was previously addressed on direct appeal”). ¶ 63 Juvenile Sentencing Claim ¶ 64 Defendant next contends he made a substantial showing that his 60-year sentence violated his constitutional right to a new juvenile sentencing hearing under the principles in Miller, 567 U.S. 460 , and its progeny.

2017Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶ 56 (remanding for resentencing so that trial court could consider the characteristics of defendant’s youth “through the lenses of Miller”); People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 63 (de facto life sentence imposed on juvenile offender was unconstitutional where “although the trial court exercised discretion in imposing the petitioner’s sentence, nothing in the record supports the State’s position that the court’s reasoning comported with the juvenile sentencing factors recited in Roper, Graham, [and] Miller”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S

2017Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶ 56 (remanding for resentencing so that trial court could consider the characteristics of defendant’s youth “through the lenses of Miller”); People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 63 (de facto life sentence imposed on juvenile offender was unconstitutional where “although the trial court exercised discretion in imposing the petitioner’s sentence, nothing in the record supports the State’s position that the court’s reasoning comported with the juvenile sentencing factors recited in Roper, Graham, [and] Miller”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S

2025Cf. People v. Haynie, 2020 IL App (1st) 172511, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding sentencing court’s “focus on deterrence” in sentencing a juvenile improper); People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 89 (finding court gave “improper weight” to deterrence when sentencing a juvenile where it - 16 - stated it had considered “all of those new factors” for juvenile sentencing “but the sentence must deter future criminal conduct”). ¶ 51 Last, defendant compares his case to McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907 , and Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172 , where, following resentencings pursuant to Miller and its pr

2025Cf. People v. Haynie, 2020 IL App (1st) 172511, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding sentencing court’s “focus on - 16 - deterrence” in sentencing a juvenile improper); People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 89 (finding court gave “improper weight” to deterrence when sentencing a juvenile where it stated it had considered “all of those new factors” for juvenile sentencing “but the sentence must deter future criminal conduct”). ¶ 51 Last, defendant compares his case to McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907 , and Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172 , where, following resentencings pursuant to Miller and its pr

2025Cf. People v. Haynie, 2020 IL App (1st) 172511, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding sentencing court’s “focus on deterrence” in sentencing a juvenile improper); People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 89 (finding court gave “improper weight” to deterrence when sentencing a juvenile where it - 16 - stated it had considered “all of those new factors” for juvenile sentencing “but the sentence must deter future criminal conduct”). ¶ 51 Last, defendant compares his case to McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907 , and Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172 , where, following resentencings pursuant to Miller and its pr

2025Cf. People v. Haynie, 2020 IL App (1st) 172511, ¶¶ 34-35 (finding sentencing court’s “focus on deterrence” in sentencing a juvenile improper); People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶ 89 (finding court gave “improper weight” to deterrence when sentencing a juvenile where it - 16 - stated it had considered “all of those new factors” for juvenile sentencing “but the sentence must deter future criminal conduct”). ¶ 51 Last, defendant compares his case to McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907 , and Woodson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221172 , where, following resentencings pursuant to Miller and its pr

2017Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶ 56 (remanding for resentencing so that trial court could consider the characteristics of defendant’s youth “through the lenses of Miller”); People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 63 (de facto life sentence imposed on juvenile offender was unconstitutional where “although the trial court exercised discretion in imposing the petitioner’s sentence, nothing in the record supports the State’s position that the court’s reasoning comported with the juvenile sentencing factors recited in Roper, Graham, [and] Miller”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S

2017Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶ 56 (remanding for resentencing so that trial court could consider the characteristics of defendant’s youth “through the lenses of Miller”); People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 63 (de facto life sentence imposed on juvenile offender was unconstitutional where “although the trial court exercised discretion in imposing the petitioner’s sentence, nothing in the record supports the State’s position that the court’s reasoning comported with the juvenile sentencing factors recited in Roper, Graham, [and] Miller”); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S

2025See People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 379 (2000) (“Defendant cannot obtain post-conviction relief merely by rephrasing a claim which was previously addressed on direct appeal”). ¶ 63 Juvenile Sentencing Claim ¶ 64 Defendant next contends he made a substantial showing that his 60-year sentence violated his constitutional right to a new juvenile sentencing hearing under the principles in Miller, 567 U.S. 460 , and its progeny.

2024People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). ¶ 140 Here, the trial court made extensive and detailed findings regarding the juvenile sentencing factors.

2023See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 41 (finding “a reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the ‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court” and the defendant’s juvenile sentencing claim would be more properly raised in a collateral proceeding (quoting People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 ¶ 19)).

2023See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 41 (finding “a reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied finding of unconstitutionality in the ‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court” and the defendant’s juvenile sentencing claim would be more properly raised in a collateral proceeding (quoting People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563 ¶ 19)).

2022ANALYSIS ¶ 13 The defendant argues the circuit court failed to properly consider the juvenile sentencing factors set forth in section 5-4.5-105 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)) before resentencing him, resulting in an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. ¶ 14 At the outset, we note that “[i]t is well settled that a trial judge’s sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference and will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Jackson, 375 Ill.

2021People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010).