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26 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2014The standard for analyzing a defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 531-32 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which is as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 2014The standard for analyzing a defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 531-32 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which is as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. | 10 | 22 |
State v. Thompsongreen1 sentence1997See also State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d 1161 (La.1981) (Louisiana state courts apply four factor test.) In United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit held that the four factor test was no longer compatible with current Supreme Court precedent and adopted an alternate analysis. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mary Dangerfield Bengivengagreen2 sentences1997See also State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d 1161 (La.1981) (Louisiana state courts apply four factor test.) In United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit held that the four factor test was no longer compatible with current Supreme Court precedent and adopted an alternate analysis. 1997Using language from several Supreme Court decisions, the court in Bengivenga , held that a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. 845 F.2d at 596 . | 1 | 1 |
Garland Wayne Kelly and Allen Eugene Kelly, Sr. v. J. C. Smith and Chicot Land Company, Inc.green1 sentence1992The Court in a footnote discussed the four factor test previously used by the Fifth Circuit and set forth in its case, Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 , 94 S.Ct. 1991 , 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Batiste
green
2 sentences2013State v. Batiste, 05-1571, p. 7 (La.10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245, 1250 . 2010DISCUSSION Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Challenge The standard for analyzing a claim by a defendant that his constitutional right to a speedy trial 10 has been violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 531-32 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which is as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 11 State v. Batiste, 05-1571, p. 7 (La.10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245, 1250 . | 8 | 2006–2013 |
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2013In State v. Scott, 06-1610, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/25/07), 958 So.2d 725, 729 , this court discussed the standard for evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim: The standard for analyzing a defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 531-32 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] (1972), which is as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 2013In State v. Scott, 2006-1610, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/25/07), 958 So.2d 725, 729 , this Court discussed the standard for evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim: The standard for analyzing a defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 531-32 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] (1972), which is as follows: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s 19assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. | 4 | 2010–2013 |
ROBERT HALF OF LA. INC. v. Citizens Consulting, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2007Finally, in compliance with the Supreme Court's mandate, the majority attempts to "reconcile" the holdings in Acme, supra, and Robert Half of Louisiana, Inc. v. Citizens Consulting, Inc., 00-2415 (La.App. 4 Cir.10/3/01), 798 So.2d 1124 , on the basis that Acme arose out of a construction contract, which historically is not considered an open account, while Robert Half involved a contract for professional services, which is specifically provided for under La. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Brown
neutral
1 sentence2006This Court further explained in Brown, XXXX-XXXX at p. 4, 929 So.2d at 185 : It is well settled that the standard for analyzing a defendant's claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated is the four factor test enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 [, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ] *422 (1972); to-wit: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corporation
green
1 sentence1995That inquiry is governed by La.C.E. art 702 as stated as the first factor of the four factor test of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1280 , 117 L.Ed.2d 506 (1992), adopted by this Court in Adams v. Chevron, Inc., supra. [1] As to the issue, Relator summarizes Ms. Montgomery's knowledge, skill, experience, training and education and argues that the trial court erred in not having qualified her as an expert. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Miller v. United States
green
1 sentence1995That inquiry is governed by La.C.E. art 702 as stated as the first factor of the four factor test of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1280 , 117 L.Ed.2d 506 (1992), adopted by this Court in Adams v. Chevron, Inc., supra. [1] As to the issue, Relator summarizes Ms. Montgomery's knowledge, skill, experience, training and education and argues that the trial court erred in not having qualified her as an expert. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.
green
1 sentence1995That inquiry is governed by La.C.E. art 702 as stated as the first factor of the four factor test of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1280 , 117 L.Ed.2d 506 (1992), adopted by this Court in Adams v. Chevron, Inc., supra. [1] As to the issue, Relator summarizes Ms. Montgomery's knowledge, skill, experience, training and education and argues that the trial court erred in not having qualified her as an expert. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Sisson v. Ruby
green
1 sentence1992The factors are "the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and the type of injury; and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law." The Court then added that the "precise state of the law in the Fifth Circuit after Foremost is also unclear." [2] 110 S.Ct. at 2897 , Ftn. 4. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities & Exchange Commission
green
1 sentence1992The Court in a footnote discussed the four factor test previously used by the Fifth Circuit and set forth in its case, Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 , 94 S.Ct. 1991 , 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Chicot Land Co. v. Kelly
green
1 sentence1992The Court in a footnote discussed the four factor test previously used by the Fifth Circuit and set forth in its case, Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 , 94 S.Ct. 1991 , 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Nowell
green
1 sentence1979State v. Nowell, supra; State v. Kemp, 359 So.2d 978 (La.1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Kemp
green
1 sentence1979State v. Nowell, supra; State v. Kemp, 359 So.2d 978 (La.1978). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.