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26 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. Joplin R-VIII School Districtgreen2 sentences2007Lawrence v. Joplin R-VIII School Dist., 834 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo.App.1992). 2007Lawrence v. Joplin R-VIII School Dist., 834 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo.App.1992). | 3 | 3 |
County Asphalt Paving, Co. v. Mosley Construction, Inc.green2 sentences2015County Asphalt Paving, Co. v. Mosley Constr., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). ‘The principal function of this type of implied contract is the prevention of .unjust enrichment.’ Id, (quoting Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. Rohlfing, 81 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)). 2015County Asphalt Paving, Co. v. Mosley Constr., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). ‘The principal function of this type of implied contract is the prevention of unjust enrichment.’ Id. (quoting Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. Rohlfing, 81 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)). | 2 | 2 |
Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. Rohlfinggreen2 sentences2015County Asphalt Paving, Co. v. Mosley Constr., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). ‘The principal function of this type of implied contract is the prevention of .unjust enrichment.’ Id, (quoting Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. Rohlfing, 81 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)). 2015County Asphalt Paving, Co. v. Mosley Constr., Inc., 239 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). ‘The principal function of this type of implied contract is the prevention of unjust enrichment.’ Id. (quoting Bellon Wrecking & Salvage Co. v. Rohlfing, 81 S.W.3d 703, 711 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)). | 2 | 2 |
Angus v. Second Injury Fundgreen1 sentence2016Angus v. Second Injury Fund, 328 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo.App.W.D.2010). | 1 | 1 |
Coverdell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.green1 sentence2015Coverdell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 874, 884 (Mo.App.S.D.2012). | 1 | 1 |
Redden v. Dan Redden Co.green1 sentence2014Redden v. Dan Redden Co., 859 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Mo.App.1993) (overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d 220 ). | 1 | 1 |
Pasley v. Marshallgreen1 sentence2013Pasley v. Marshall, 305 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo.App.K.C.D.1957)(emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Pavia v. Smitty's Supermarketgreen1 sentence2004Pavia v. Smitty’s Supermarket, 118 S.W.3d 228, 241 (Mo.App.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Sanderson v. Porta-Fab Corp.green1 sentence2002Sanderson v. Portor-Fab Corp., 989 S.W.2d 599, 603 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Ballard v. Leonard Brothers Transport Co., Inc.green1 sentence1989Ballard v. Leonard Brothers Transport Co., Inc., 506 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Mo.1974). | 1 | 1 |
Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.green2 sentences1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). 1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp.green2 sentences1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). 1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc.green2 sentences1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). 1989Davies v. Carter Carburetor, Division ACF Industries, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 738, 749 (Mo.1968); Tate v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 715 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo.App.1986); Tibbs v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 691 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Mo.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Washingtongreen1 sentence1973The essential elements of this instruction on concert of action have been approved in State v. Washington, 364 S.W.2d 572, 575 [8] (Mo.1963), and State v. Price, 362 S.W.2d 608, 611 [4, 7] (Mo.1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811 , 83 S.Ct. 1702 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pricegreen1 sentence1973The essential elements of this instruction on concert of action have been approved in State v. Washington, 364 S.W.2d 572, 575 [8] (Mo.1963), and State v. Price, 362 S.W.2d 608, 611 [4, 7] (Mo.1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811 , 83 S.Ct. 1702 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Midwestern Machinery Co. v. Parsonsgreen2 sentences1967Emery v. Brown Shoe Company, Mo.Sup., 287 S.W.2d 761, 767 [4]; Midwestern Machinery Company v. Parsons, Mo.App., 385 S.W.2d 224, 228 [6-10]. 1967Emery v. Brown Shoe Company, Mo.Sup., 287 S.W.2d 761, 767 [4]; Midwestern Machinery Company v. Parsons, Mo.App., 385 S.W.2d 224, 228 [6-10]. | 1 | 1 |
Emery v. Brown Shoe Companygreen2 sentences1967Emery v. Brown Shoe Company, Mo.Sup., 287 S.W.2d 761, 767 [4]; Midwestern Machinery Company v. Parsons, Mo.App., 385 S.W.2d 224, 228 [6-10]. 1967Emery v. Brown Shoe Company, Mo.Sup., 287 S.W.2d 761, 767 [4]; Midwestern Machinery Company v. Parsons, Mo.App., 385 S.W.2d 224, 228 [6-10]. | 1 | 1 |
Bakelite Company v. Millergreen1 sentence1966The jury, in the first instance, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight and value of their evidence, and may believe or disbelieve the testimony of any one or all of the witnesses, though such evidence be uncontradicted and unim- *530 peached.” 5 Whether plaintiff had carried its burden of proof to establish the essential elements of its claim was for the jury [Bakelite Co. v. Miller, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 867, 871 (1, 2)], and the trial court properly refused to direct a verdict against defendant Verla. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection
green
2 sentences2014Redden v. Dan Redden Co., 859 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Mo.App.1993) (overruled on other grounds by Hampton, 121 S.W.3d 220 ). 2012White, 879 S.W.2d at 577 overruled on other grounds by, Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 221 . | 2 | 2012–2014 |
Dibrill ex rel. Wheeler v. Normandy Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015One of the essential elements of a claim of negligence per se is proof that a defendant “violated a statute or regulation.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012The School District also relies on Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. banc 2008) where our Supreme Court rejected a title company’s assertion of the voluntary payment doctrine as an affirmative defense to a claim for money had and received seeking to recover fees paid for a title company’s unauthorized practice of law. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
White v. Henderson Implement Co.
green
1 sentence2012White, 879 S.W.2d at 577 overruled on other grounds by, Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 221 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cramer v. Smoot
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Roberts v. MO. HIGHWAY AND TRANSP. COM'N
green
1 sentence2009Robeiis, 222 S.W.3d at 331 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Martin v. City of Washington
green
1 sentence2000The Court sets forth the historic listing of the essential elements of a claim for negligence, requiring the plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant failed to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.” Id. at 493 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cook v. Sunnen Products Corp.
green
1 sentence1999In a workers’ compensation proceeding, the “claimant has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim and must establish a causal connection between the accident and the injury.” Cook v. Sunnen Products Corp., 937 S.W.2d at 223 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Stevens v. Continental Can Co.
green
1 sentence1973The essential elements of this instruction on concert of action have been approved in State v. Washington, 364 S.W.2d 572, 575 [8] (Mo.1963), and State v. Price, 362 S.W.2d 608, 611 [4, 7] (Mo.1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811 , 83 S.Ct. 1702 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1963). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Smith v. United States
green
1 sentence1973The essential elements of this instruction on concert of action have been approved in State v. Washington, 364 S.W.2d 572, 575 [8] (Mo.1963), and State v. Price, 362 S.W.2d 608, 611 [4, 7] (Mo.1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811 , 83 S.Ct. 1702 , 10 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1963). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Gibbs v. Mikesell
green
2 sentences1963Definitive statement of the Kansas Last Clear Chance Doctrine appears in a 1958 case as follows; “The essential elements under the doctrine of last clear chance are: (1) The plaintiff by his own negligence placed himself in a position of danger; (2) that the plaintiff’s negligence had ceased; (3) that the defendant seeing the plaintiff in a position of danger, or by the exercise of due care should have seen the plaintiff in such position, by exercising due care on his part had a clear chance to avoid injuring the plaintiff; (4) that the defendant failed to exercise such due care; and (5) as a 1963Definitive statement of the Kansas Last Clear Chance Doctrine appears in a 1958 case as follows; “The essential elements under the doctrine of last clear chance are: (1) The plaintiff by his own negligence placed himself in a position of danger; (2) that the plaintiff’s negligence had ceased; (3) that the defendant seeing the plaintiff in a position of danger, or by the exercise of due care should have seen the plaintiff in such position, by exercising due care on his part had a clear chance to avoid injuring the plaintiff; (4) that the defendant failed to exercise such due care; and (5) as a | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Ferguson v. Stokes green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Jankowski v. Delfert green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Ellis v. Williams
green
1 sentence1959Ellis v. Williams, supra. There is no controversy as to the burden of proof; those who claim a resulting trust have the burden of establishing it and those who claim a gift have the burden of establishing all the essential elements and factors . of a gift (2 Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 458; Ferguson v. Stokes, Mo., 269 S.W.2d 655 ; Jankowski v. Delfert, 356 Mo. 184 , 201 S.W.2d 331 ) although it is indeed doubtful that either need be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2A Bogert, Trusts, Sec. 464, p. 529. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Dunn v. Pickard green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.