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26 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1996–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2026Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A.2d 310, 319 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“In Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1996) our Supreme Court refused to expand the scope of the medical treatment exception beyond its relatively limited nature to include the identity of a perpetrator.”); see also E.W. v. E.N., 327 A.3d 679 , 692 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“It is well-established that a statement identifying the individual who causes the injury that leads the declarant to seek medical treatment may not be admitted under the Rule 803(4) exception.”). 2024Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288, 1293 (Pa. 1996) (concluding that “the trial court abused its discretion in admitting [a] nurse’s testimony which repeated the [victim’s] statement as to the identity of [her] alleged abuser pursuant to the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule”)). | 9 | 16 |
Commonwealth v. Belknapgreen2 sentences2021“The following two requirements must be satisfied in order for a statement to qualify as a medical treatment exception: (1) the statement must be made for the purpose of receiving medical treatment; and (2) the statement must be necessary and proper for diagnosis and treatment.” Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2014). 2019“The medical treatment exception provides that testimony repeating out-of-court statements made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive evidence.” Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Finkgreen2 sentences2019The Fink Court expounded on this reality as follows, The medical treatment exception provides that testimony repeating out-of-court statements made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive evidence. . . . [A] statement comes within this exception when two requirements are met: (1) the declarant must make the statement for the purpose of receiving medical treatment, e.g., statements relating to the cause of the injury, including testimony repeating statements made to nurses for the purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis; and (2) the statement must be ne 2014“The medical treatment exception provides that testimony repeating out-of-court statements made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive evidence.” Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1246 (Pa.Super.2002) (citation omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Vininggreen2 sentences2026Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A.2d 310, 319 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“In Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1996) our Supreme Court refused to expand the scope of the medical treatment exception beyond its relatively limited nature to include the identity of a perpetrator.”); see also E.W. v. E.N., 327 A.3d 679 , 692 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“It is well-established that a statement identifying the individual who causes the injury that leads the declarant to seek medical treatment may not be admitted under the Rule 803(4) exception.”). 2020Pa.R.E. 803(4), Comment; cf. Commonwealth v. Vining, 744 A.2d 310, 319 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) (holding that doctor’s testimony that victim specifically named the defendant as the perpetrator of abuse was not relevant to medical treatment, but that the fact that the perpetrator was a “male adult” may be relevant). - 11 - J-S35037-20 J-S35038-20 such evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Cassidy v. Stategreen2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John Louis Iron Shell, Jr.green2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that "the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse." Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant "would seldom if ever" be related to diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, | 2 | 2 |
Com. v. DJAgreen2 sentences2014This is true “regardless whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965, 975 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 700 , 857 A.2d 677 (2004), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 786 , 959 A.2d 928 (2004). 2005Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965 , 976 (Pa. Commw. 2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 698 , 857 A.2d 677 (2004). | 1 | 2 |
Harris v. Toys\ R\" Us-Penngreen1 sentence2019With respect to the admission by a party opponent exception under Rule 803(25)(D), the proponent of the statement must demonstrate that: “(1) the declarant was an agent or employee of a party opponent; (2) the declarant made the statement while employed by the party opponent; and (3) the statement concerned a matter within the scope of agency or employment.” Harris v. Toys “R” Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Eckertgreen2 sentences2014This is true “regardless whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965, 975 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 700 , 857 A.2d 677 (2004), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 786 , 959 A.2d 928 (2004). 2014Id. at 976 (citation omitted). *12 Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in concluding that Appellant’s aforementioned hearsay claim was devoid of merit. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Matthew Wayne Tomegreen2 sentences1996See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir.1995) (hearsay statement to physician identifying the identity of a sexual abuser who is a family member admissible under Rule 803(4)); United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 955 (8th Cir.1993) (identity of abuser admissible under Rule 803(4) since such information is particularly important as it affects the physician’s treatment and recommendation for counseling); Renville, supra (statements by victim to her treating physician identifying her stepfather as her abuser were admissible under the medical treatment exception). . 1996See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir.1995) (hearsay statement to physician identifying the identity of a sexual abuser who is a family member admissible under Rule 803(4)); United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 955 (8th Cir.1993) (identity of abuser admissible under Rule 803(4) since such information is particularly important as it affects the physician's treatment and recommendation for counseling); Renville, supra (statements by victim to her treating physician identifying her stepfather as her abuser were admissible under the medical treatment exception). [2] The majority, in rever | 1 | 1 |
Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc.green2 sentences1996The second requirement for a statement to come within the medical treatment exception is that the statement be pertinent to medical treatment. 2 Joseph, Evidence in America, Rule 803 at p. 58; see Cody 447 Pa. at 566 , 291 A.2d at 776 . 1996The second requirement for a statement to come within the medical treatment exception is that the statement be pertinent to medical treatment. 2 Joseph, Evidence in America, Rule 803 at p. 58; see Cody 447 Pa. at 566 , 291 A.2d at 776 . | 1 | 1 |
Eakes v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995) (statement to physician as to identity of abuser of child sexual abuse victim admissible under medical treatment hearsay exception); Nelson, supra (child’s statement to psychologist that father assaulted her was admissible under medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Vosika, 83 Or.App. 298 , 731 P.2d 449 (1987) (physician who reasonably relied on child sexual abuse victim’s identification of her abuser as a family member in treating victim may testify under medical treatment exception as to victim’s statement); Goldade, supra, ( 1996See Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995) (statement to physician as to identity of abuser of child sexual abuse victim admissible under medical treatment hearsay exception); Nelson, supra (child's statement to psychologist that father assaulted her was admissible under medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Vosika, 83 Or.App. 298 , 731 P.2d 449 (1987) (physician who reasonably relied on child sexual abuse victim's identification of her abuser as a family member in treating victim may testify under medical treatment exception as to victim's statement); Goldade, supra . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Harvey M. Renville
green
2 sentences2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . 2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth's argument was "at first blush, inviting[,]" the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, "everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception." Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . | 3 | 1996–2002 |
Goldade v. State
green
2 sentences2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . 2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth's argument was "at first blush, inviting[,]" the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, "everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception." Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . | 3 | 1996–2002 |
Lichtenwallner v. Lanbach
green
2 sentences2019As early as 1884, this Court stated that “nothing is better settled than that statements of a patient to his physician, as to the character and seat of his sensations, made for the purpose of receiving medical advice, are competent evidence. . . .” Lichtenwallner v. Laubach, 105 Pa. 366 (1884). 1996As early as 1884, this Court stated that “[njothing is better settled than that statements of a patient to his physician, as to the character and seat of his sensations, made for the purpose of receiving medical advice, are competent evidence----” Lichtenwallner v. Laubach, 105 Pa. 366 (1884). | 2 | 1996–2019 |
Estate of Swift Ex Rel. Swift v. Northeastern Hospital of Philadelphia
green
2 sentences2015“The medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule provides that testimony repeating out-of-court statements which were made for purposes of receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive evidence.” Estate of Swift, supra at 721 . 2002This rule was set forth in Swift v. Northeastern Hospital of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. Super. 330 , 690 A.2d 719 (1997), alloc. denied, 549 Pa. 716 , 701 A.2d 577 (1997). | 2 | 2002–2015 |
Com. v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2014This is true “regardless whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965, 975 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 700 , 857 A.2d 677 (2004), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 786 , 959 A.2d 928 (2004). 2005Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965 , 976 (Pa. Commw. 2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 698 , 857 A.2d 677 (2004). | 2 | 2005–2014 |
Walker v. State
green
2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Veluzat
green
2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that "the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse." Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant "would seldom if ever" be related to diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Eades v. United States
green
2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that "the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse." Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant "would seldom if ever" be related to diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Goolsby v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that "the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse." Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant "would seldom if ever" be related to diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Owensby v. United States
green
2 sentences2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that “the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse.” Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant “would seldom if ever” be related to diagnosis or treatment), ce rt. denied, 2002The Commonwealth sought to introduce this statement under the medical treatment exception, arguing that "the statement as to identity of the perpetrator of abuse is of significance for psychological and emotional treatment of the victim as well as for the protection of the child from future abuse." Id. at 495 , 681 A.2d at 1292 . ¶ 32 Rejecting this argument, the Smith court first reviewed cases addressing similar issues, including U.S. v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 81-85 (8th Cir.1980) (statements identifying assailant "would seldom if ever" be related to diagnosis or treatment), cert. denied, | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Raymark Industries, Inc. v. Clay
green
2 sentences2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . 2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth's argument was "at first blush, inviting[,]" the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, "everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception." Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Lee v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . 2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth's argument was "at first blush, inviting[,]" the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, "everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception." Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Hastings v. United States
green
2 sentences2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . 2002Contra U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 , 104 S.Ct. 3539 , 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984). ¶ 33 Next, although agreeing that the Commonwealth’s argument was “at first blush, inviting[,]” the Smith court concluded that if it were to accept that argument, “everything said by the patient in the context of being questioned for the purposes of psychological treatment and diagnosis would be admissible under the medical treatment exception.” Id. at 496 , 681 A.2d at 1292-1293 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Brady
green
1 sentence1998Brady , at 128-129, 507 A.2d at 69 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Gary Longie
green
2 sentences1996See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir.1995) (hearsay statement to physician identifying the identity of a sexual abuser who is a family member admissible under Rule 803(4)); United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 955 (8th Cir.1993) (identity of abuser admissible under Rule 803(4) since such information is particularly important as it affects the physician’s treatment and recommendation for counseling); Renville, supra (statements by victim to her treating physician identifying her stepfather as her abuser were admissible under the medical treatment exception). . 1996See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446 (10th Cir.1995) (hearsay statement to physician identifying the identity of a sexual abuser who is a family member admissible under Rule 803(4)); United States v. Longie, 984 F.2d 955 (8th Cir.1993) (identity of abuser admissible under Rule 803(4) since such information is particularly important as it affects the physician's treatment and recommendation for counseling); Renville, supra (statements by victim to her treating physician identifying her stepfather as her abuser were admissible under the medical treatment exception). [2] The majority, in rever | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Vosika
green
2 sentences1996See Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995) (statement to physician as to identity of abuser of child sexual abuse victim admissible under medical treatment hearsay exception); Nelson, supra (child’s statement to psychologist that father assaulted her was admissible under medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Vosika, 83 Or.App. 298 , 731 P.2d 449 (1987) (physician who reasonably relied on child sexual abuse victim’s identification of her abuser as a family member in treating victim may testify under medical treatment exception as to victim’s statement); Goldade, supra, ( 1996See Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995) (statement to physician as to identity of abuser of child sexual abuse victim admissible under medical treatment hearsay exception); Nelson, supra (child’s statement to psychologist that father assaulted her was admissible under medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule); State v. Vosika, 83 Or.App. 298 , 731 P.2d 449 (1987) (physician who reasonably relied on child sexual abuse victim’s identification of her abuser as a family member in treating victim may testify under medical treatment exception as to victim’s statement); Goldade, supra, ( | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.