medical treatment exception in Ohio

2023Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d at 410-411, 596 N.E.2d 436 . “[The] exception is premised on the theory that a patient’s statements to her physician are likely to be particularly reliable,” United States v. Tome (C.A.10, 1995), 61 F.3d 1446, 1449 , and “carr[y] special guarantees of credibility,” White v. Illinois (1992), 502 U.S. 346, 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 .

2007The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision and stated that, "regardless of whether a child less than ten years old has been determined to be competent to testify pursuant to Evid.R. 601, the child's statements may be admitted at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4) if they were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Muttart at ¶ 46 , citing Ferrell v. Ferrell (Mar. 14, 1986), Huron App. No. H-84-39. {¶ 31} The Ohio Supreme Court explained that: * * * [A] fundamental assumption underlying the medical-treatment exception is that that p

2023Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d at 410-411, 596 N.E.2d 436 . “[The] exception is premised on the theory that a patient’s statements to her physician are likely to be particularly reliable,” United States v. Tome (C.A.10, 1995), 61 F.3d 1446, 1449 , and “carr[y] special guarantees of credibility,” White v. Illinois (1992), 502 U.S. 346, 356 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 .

2007The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision and stated that, "regardless of whether a child less than ten years old has been determined to be competent to testify pursuant to Evid.R. 601, the child's statements may be admitted at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4) if they were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Muttart at ¶ 46 , citing Ferrell v. Ferrell (Mar. 14, 1986), Huron App. No. H-84-39. {¶ 31} The Ohio Supreme Court explained that: * * * [A] fundamental assumption underlying the medical-treatment exception is that that p

2019Evid.R. 802; State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014–Ohio–1019, 9 N.E.3d 930 (2014), ¶ 129. {¶ 93} Evid.R. 803(4) contains an exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar ADAMS, 18CA1079 37 as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” {¶ 94} The hearsay rules except statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment due to the inherent reliability underlying the nature

2019Evid.R. 802; State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014–Ohio–1019, 9 N.E.3d 930 (2014), ¶ 129. {¶ 93} Evid.R. 803(4) contains an exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar ADAMS, 18CA1079 37 as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” {¶ 94} The hearsay rules except statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment due to the inherent reliability underlying the nature

2017State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5 , 2007- Ohio-5267, ¶ 39. {¶ 42} The record indicates that the interview between K.C. and the social worker was done for purposes of diagnosis or treatment and thus satisfies the medical treatment exception under Evid.R. 803(4).2 The conversation between K.C. and the social worker involved the progression of appellant's conduct, initially tickling K.C.'s feet, and then working his way up to rubbing her vagina for five to ten minutes.

2007Within the medical profession, the analysis of the rule appears to be that facts reliable enough to be relied on in reaching a diagnosis have sufficient trustworthiness to satisfy hearsay concerns.'" * * * Muttart at ¶ 41 , quoting State v. Dever , 64 Ohio St.3d 401 , 411 , 1992-Ohio-41 , quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence (4 th Ed. 1992) 250. {¶ 34} Muttart emphasized that the above reliability factors behind the medical-treatment exception also apply to young children.

2007Within the medical profession, the analysis of the rule appears to be that facts reliable enough to be relied on in reaching a diagnosis have sufficient trustworthiness to satisfy hearsay concerns.'" * * * Muttart at ¶ 41 , quoting State v. Dever , 64 Ohio St.3d 401 , 411 , 1992-Ohio-41 , quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence (4 th Ed. 1992) 250. {¶ 34} Muttart emphasized that the above reliability factors behind the medical-treatment exception also apply to young children.

2007It concluded, however, that Said required that the trial court must first determine that A.M. was competent at the time she made the statements to Jones, Humphries, and Crego-Stahl before those statements could be admitted. 2006-Ohio-2506 , 2006 WL 1381638 , ¶ 50. {¶ 28} Notwithstanding its conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements, the court of appeals concluded that the error was harmless with respect to testimony referring to oral rape.

2003Hearsay which is included within another hearsay statement is also excluded unless, "* * * each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule * * *." Evid.R. 805; State v. Vinson (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 391 , 399 . {¶ 27} In this matter, there are exceptions which might be applicable to both hearsays contained in the hospital report: the business record exception contained in Evid.R. 803(6) and the medical treatment exception found in Evid.R. 803(4).

1993The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to suppress in which it argued (1) the clinical psychologist’s testimony was admissible pursuant to a then-newly announced rule created by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108 , 545 N.E.2d 1220 , which allowed qualified experts in child abuse to testify about a child’s out-of-court statements if there was independent evidence of physical and mental abuse and if there was no apparent motive for the child to fabricate statements; and (2) the statements were admissible pursuant to the medical treatment exce

1993The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to suppress in which it argued (1) the clinical psychologist’s testimony was admissible pursuant to a then-newly announced rule created by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108 , 545 N.E.2d 1220 , which allowed qualified experts in child abuse to testify about a child’s out-of-court statements if there was independent evidence of physical and mental abuse and if there was no apparent motive for the child to fabricate statements; and (2) the statements were admissible pursuant to the medical treatment exce