medical treatment exception in Texas

2024See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 ); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical tre

2023See Lumsden, 2018 WL 5832112 , at *19; Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (“[C]ourts can infer from the record that [a child complainant] knew it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.”); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (“[T]here is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatment exception to apply.”).

2014Moreover, appellant acknowledged that “[i]n applying the medical treatment exception to cases involving child abuse, courts have allowed the victim’s statements concerning the identity of the attacker to be admitted because treatment of child abuse must begin with removing the child from the abusive setting.” The cases cited by appellant as so holding include Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237 , 4 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d), Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d at 189 , and Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676 , 683–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. refd).

2014The Austin Court of Appeals has explained that: “The medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is based on the assumption that the patient appreciates that the effectiveness of the treatment may depend on the accuracy of the information provided to the physician.” Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 292 (Edward Cleary, ed., 3d ed. 1984)).

2024See Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). “[C]ourts can infer from the record that the victim knew it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.” Franklin, 459 S.W.3d at 677 (citing Prieto v. State, 337 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d).

2021Evid. 803(4) (providing that statements made for or reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment are not excluded by the rule against hearsay); Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d) (“There is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatment exception to apply.”).

2023See Lumsden, 2018 WL 5832112 , at *19; Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (“[C]ourts can infer from the record that [a child complainant] knew it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.”); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (“[T]here is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatment exception to apply.”).

2019See Lumsden, 2018 WL 5832112 , at *19; Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (“[C]ourts can infer from the record that [a child complainant] knew it was important to tell a [SANE] the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.”); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (“[T]here is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatment exception to apply.”).

2022Guzman v. State, 253 S.W.3d 306 , 308–09 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d); Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676 , 683–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d); Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237, 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d) (per curiam); Macias v. State, 776 S.W.2d 255 , 258–59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, pet. ref’d).

2014Moreover, appellant acknowledged that “[i]n applying the medical treatment exception to cases involving child abuse, courts have allowed the victim’s statements concerning the identity of the attacker to be admitted because treatment of child abuse must begin with removing the child from the abusive setting.” The cases cited by appellant as so holding include Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d 237 , 4 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d), Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d at 189 , and Molina v. State, 971 S.W.2d 676 , 683–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. refd).

2024See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 ); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical tre

2022See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 )); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatm

2024See Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). “[C]ourts can infer from the record that the victim knew it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.” Franklin, 459 S.W.3d at 677 (citing Prieto v. State, 337 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d).

2022See Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.— 32 Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d). “[C]ourts can infer from the record that the victim knew it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis.” Franklin, 459 S.W.3d at 677 (citing Prieto, 337 S.W.3d at 921 ).

2024See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 ); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical tre

2022See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 )); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical treatm

2024See Fahrni v. State, 473 S.W.3d 486, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 ); see also Gohring, 967 S.W.2d at 463 (ordinarily it is reasonable to assume that a child will understand that a statement given to a “recognizable health professional, such as a physician, nurse, psychologist, or mental health therapist[]” will be for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); Beheler, 3 S.W.3d at 188 (“there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical tre

2022Notwithstanding its dicta in Iron Shell, the Eighth Circuit held in Renville that “[s]tatements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abused is a member of the victim’s household are reasonably pertinent to treatment.” Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Renville, 779 F.2d at 436).12 When applying the medical treatment exception to cases involving child abuse, Texas appellate courts have also permitted the victim’s statements concerning the identity of the perpetrator to be admitted because treatment of child abuse must begin with removing the child from the abus

2015Id.

2014Munoz v. State, 288 S.W.3d 55, 58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d)).

2015State v. Lasalle, 135 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Tex. App. –Corpus Christi 2003).5 The theory supporting the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is that the effectiveness of the treatment depends upon the accuracy of the information given.

2015Id.

2015Evid. 803(4). 17 see Puderbaugh v. State, 31 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d); Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d). 13 the information provided.18 The proponent of the evidence must show that: 1) the out-of-court declarant was aware that the statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment and that proper diagnosis or treatment depends on the veracity of such statements; and 2) the particular statement proffered is pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.19 The witness need not expressly state that the hearsay decla

2003CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT In issue seven, appellant contends the trial court erred in ruling that the drawing of a sample of appellant’s blood by hospital personnel, 6 without appellant’s consent to accept medical treatment, did not constitute an assault upon appellant, which would require suppression of the blood draw under Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 7 In challenging this finding, appellant relies on Hailey v. State, 50 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex.App.Waco 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 87 S.W.3d 118 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2218 , 155

1992See Interest ofL.S., 748 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tex.App.1988, no writ).