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28 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 2002–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Delgado v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Once evidence has been admitted without a limiting instruction, it is part of the general evidence and may be used for all purposes . . . . [A] limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be requested, and given, in the guilt- stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted. 4 235 S.W.3d at 251 ; see Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 230 (Tex. Crim. 2026Thus, “a limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be requested, and given, in the guilt-stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted.” Id. | 15 | 25 |
Hammock v. Stategreen2 sentences2026App. 2008) (“A failure to request a limiting instruction at the time evidence is presented renders the evidence admissible for all purposes and relieves the trial judge of any obligation to include a limiting instruction in the jury charge.”); Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tex. Crim. 2015“A limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be requested, and given, in the guilt-stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction under Rule of Evidence 105 when the evidence was first admitted.” Id. at 251; see also Hammock v. State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. Crim. | 7 | 7 |
Douglas Lee McGowan v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, the Court concluded that a limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be given in the guilt-stage jury charge “only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted.” Id. 2015Id.; McGowan v. State, 375 S.W.3d 585, 593 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd). 18 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be given in the guilt-stage jury charge “only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted.” Id. | 2 | 4 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Once evidence has been admitted without a limiting instruction, it is part of the general evidence and may be used for all purposes . . . . [A] limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous offense evidence should be requested, and given, in the guilt- stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted. 4 235 S.W.3d at 251 ; see Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 230 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Gunter v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See id. (“[A] limiting instruction concerning the use of extraneous[-]offense evidence should be requested, and given, in the guilt-stage jury charge only if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted.”); Gunter v. State, 327 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (applying Delgado to hold that appellant forfeited his complaint on appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Archie v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 324 n.9 (1985) (“The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”); Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Francis v. Franklingreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 324 n.9 (1985) (“The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”); Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Varelasgreen1 sentence2020See Ex parte Varelas, 45 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)(observing that the trial court should give a limiting instruction, if requested by a defendant, at the time evidence is admitted); see also Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)(observing that a limiting instruction should be given in the jury charge if the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was first admitted). | 1 | 1 |
Rankin v. Stategreen1 sentence2002In Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the defendant requested a limiting instruction at the time the trial court admitted the extraneous offense testimony into evidence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.