Rev. George TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUNGE Corp., Defendant-Appellee, 775 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1985). · Go Syfert
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Rev. George TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUNGE Corp., Defendant-Appellee, 775 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, last quoted 2003 · 3 courts · …put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit. at p. 619 ✓ Topic ↗
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2013–2019 · 2 courts · …a section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort ... and is, therefore, governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by louisiana civil code article 3492. at p. 618 ≈ altered Topic ↗
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, 1989–2019 · 2 courts · …termination of employment either through discharge or resignation is not a 'continuing' violation because the individual ceases to be an employee on the date of his discharge and all of his legal claims mature at the time at p. 619 ✓
82 citation events (52 in the last 25 years) across 16 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Taggatz v. Midland Credit Management, Inc. (txwd, 2020-05-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Taggatz v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.
W.D. Tex. · 2020 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the effect of a voluntary dismissal was to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit. the prescriptive period, therefore, is not tolled by the bringing of an action that is later voluntarily dismissed.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Oirya v. Auburn University (CONSENT)
M.D. Ala. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
termination of employment either through discharge or resignation is not a 'continuing' violation because the individual ceases to be an employee on the date of his discharge and all of his legal claims mature at the time
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Drury v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
5th Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the fifth circuit has clearly stated that the filing of an eeoc charge does not toll, interrupt, or suspend prescription with regard to a plaintiffs state law claims.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whiticar v. Parish Hospital Service District for the Parish of Orleans, District A
E.D. La. · 2025 · confidence medium
See Mitchell v. Crescent River Port Pilots Ass’n, 265 F. App’x 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arana-Allende v. United States Department of Agricultural Development Agency
D.P.R. · 2023 · confidence medium
Nichols Real Estate, 57 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 1995); Robinson v. Willow Glen Acad., 895 F.2d 1168 , 1169 (7th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985); Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer- Chester Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ross v. Loyola University New Orleans
E.D. La. · 2022 · confidence medium
Feb. 7, 2018). 28 Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 398 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985)). limitations for federal civil actions adopted in 1990 applies to causes of action authorized by the 1991 amendment to § 1981 (i.e., claims related to contractual performance).29 Thus, the critical question is whether Ross’s cause of action “arose under” the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or under § 1981 as originally enacted.30 If Ross’s claim was cognizable under § 1981 as originally enacted, then Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive pe…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Belton v. Geo Group Inc
W.D. La. · 2021 · confidence medium
Code Art. 3492.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pittman v. Swan River, LLC
E.D. La. · 2019 · confidence medium
Here, “that would be Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period for tort actions.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Combs v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
M.D. La. · 2019 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Jones v. R.R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. United Assoc of Jour
M.D. La. · 2019 · confidence medium
Under Louisiana law, “[a] section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort ... and is, therefore, governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2183 , 189 L.Ed.2d 62 , reh'g denied., - U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 23 , 189 L.Ed.2d 874 (2014) (noting that statutes of limitations "require plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution of known claims” and “promote justice by preventing surprises through [plaintiffs’] revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) (emphasizing the "policy of finality underlying the statute of limitations”). 155 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Isaac Jordan v. Cleco Corporation
5th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The prescription period here under § 1981 is one year, Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985), and Jordan offered the district court only conclusory statements for an extension to four years under the 1991 Amendments.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Cleco Corp.
W.D. La. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under Louisiana law, “[a] section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort ... and is, therefore, governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willis v. Cleco Corp.
W.D. La. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under Louisiana law, “[a] section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort ... and is, therefore, governed by the one year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Culbert v. Cleco Corp.
W.D. La. · 2013 · confidence medium
Under Louisiana law, “[a] section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort ... and is, therefore, governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by [Louisiana Civil Code article] 3492.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Braswell v. Invacare Corp. (2×)
S.D. Miss. · 2010 · confidence medium
The effect of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which she would have been had she never brought the suit, Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) (citing LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976)), which means that the limitations period is “not tolled by the bringing of an action that is later voluntarily dismissed.” Id. 3 Consequently, in the current posture of the case, plaintiff cannot “add” The Medical Store as a defendant since the statute of limitations has run on her claim. 4 Instead…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carl Peacock v. J.A.M. Distributing, Inc.
5th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
5th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
The district court correctly determined that Taylor’s non-Title VII promotion claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985), La.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nelson v. University of Texas at Dallas
5th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (stating that termination is not a “continuing violation” for limitations purposes in an employment discrimination suit); Prophet v. Armco Steel, Inc., 575 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brinston v. Koppers Industries, Inc.
W.D. Tex. · 2008 · confidence medium
Co., 982 F.Supp. 1253, 1256 (E.D.Tex.1997) (citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Casanova Ortiz v. Reyes
D.P.R. · 2007 · confidence medium
Dist. # 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir.1991); Robinson v. Willow Glen Academy, 895 F.2d 1168 , 1169 (7th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir.1987) (per curiam); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985); Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester Med.
cited Cited as authority (rule) McNealy v. Emerson Electric Co.
M.D. La. · 2004 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985). 15 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Foley v. Univ of Houston Sys
5th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Bd., 928 F.2d 978 , 983 (10th Cir.1991); see also, Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518 (characterizing § 1981 as a tort remedy, such that non-employer defendants may be liable); Cf. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 , 107 S.Ct. 2617 , 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987)(holding that § 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights and approving application of a tort statute of limitations to a § 1981 claim); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985)(holding that § 1981 is best characterized as a tort under Louisiana law). 8 The district court properly applied the same summary …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc.
M.D. La. · 2003 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985)("A section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort under Louisiana law and is, therefore, governed by the one year prescriptive period for delictual actions ... ”). 18 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Laurence v. Atzenhoffer Chevrolet
S.D. Tex. · 2003 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Foley v. University of Houston System
5th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Bd. 928 F.2d 978 , 983 (10th Cir.1991); see also, Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 518 (characterizing § 1981 as a tort remedy, such that non-employer defendants may be liable); Cf. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 , 107 S.Ct. 2617 , 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987)(holding that § 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights and approving application of a tort statute of limitations to a § 1981 claim); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.l985)(holding that § 1981 is best characterized as a tort under Louisiana law). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
W.D. La. · 2001 · confidence medium
The filing and processing of charges with the EEOC under Title VII does not toll the running of the state prescriptive period governing section 1981 claims.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Jones v. Orleans Parish Sch.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Felix Chico-Velez v. Roche Products, Inc.
1st Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Dist. # 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir.1991); Robinson v. Willow Glen Academy, 895 F.2d 1168, 1169 (7th Cir.1990); Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir.1987) (per curiam); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985); CardioMedical Assoc, v. Crozer-Chester Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buerger v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Tex. · 1997 · confidence medium
Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985); see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1056 (1987). “[T]he effect of [a voluntary dismissal is] to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit.” Taylor, 775 F.2d at 619 ; see also Basco, 43 F.3d at 965-66 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Deepwells Estates Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Head of the Harbor
E.D.N.Y · 1997 · confidence medium
See Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 , 109 S.Ct. 2261 , 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989) (continuing violation theory rejected in Title VII case); De *346 laware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 , 101 S.Ct. 498 , 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); Taylor v. Bunge, 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) (“termination of employment ... is not a continuing violation because the individual ceases to be an employee on the date of his discharge and all of his legal claims mature at that time”)- The courts have had difficulty defining what a continuing violation is, resulting in case law that is “inconsist…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc. (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1996 · confidence medium
"A federal statute of limitations is not tolled when the plaintiff files a claim that later is voluntarily dismissed.” (Emphasis in original.) Basco v. American General Insurance Co., 43 F.3d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1994), citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985); 9 C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines (2×)
Ill. App. Ct. · 1996 · confidence medium
"A federal statute of limitations is not tolled when the plaintiff files a claim that later is voluntarily dismissed." (Emphasis in original.) Basco v. American General Insurance Co., 43 F.3d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1994), citing Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Orleans Parish School Board v. United States Gypsum Co.
E.D. La. · 1995 · confidence medium
“The prescriptive period, therefore, is not tolled by the bringing of an action that is later voluntarily dismissed.” Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Long v. Card
E.D.N.Y · 1995 · confidence medium
Dick Co. v. Marr, 197 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 169 , 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952)); Goff v. United States, 659 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1981); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Med.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. First Republicbank Corp., Tgx Corp. v. Gloria Annette Turner Simmons, Cross-Appellees v. Greenwich Insurance Company, Cross-Appellants. Gaylon D. Simmons, Cross-Appellees v. J.C. Templeton, Cross-Appellants
1st Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Nullification 37 The TGX Defendants have found language in our cases in which this court states that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to "put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit." Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. First RepublicBank Corp.
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Nullification The TGX Defendants have found language in our cases in which this court states that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to "put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit." Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TGX Corporation v. Simmons
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
Nullification The TGX Defendants have found language in our cases in which this court states that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to "put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit." Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnston v. Ethyl Corp.
M.D. La. · 1988 · confidence medium
A dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4(j) is intended to leave the plaintiff in the same position as if the action had never been filed. 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure section 1137, p. 399 (1987); Hilbun v. Goldberg, 823 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir.1987); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) HERBERT R GRAFF; CARL W MANGUS; STEVE FEDORKO; ED J PAYNE; LARRY FLOOD; VINCE SCARICH; OTTO NASS v. DONALD L FIELD, JR
unknown court · confidence medium
Co., 43 F.3d 964, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A federal statute of limitations is not tolled when the plaintiff files a claim that later is voluntarily dismissed.”); Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985); see also 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
cited Cited "see" Quinlan v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office
E.D. La. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985); Parrino v. Board of Supervisors of La.
cited Cited "see" Oak Creek Investments, LLC v. Atlas FRM LLC d/b/a Atlas Holdings, LLC, New Wood Resources, LLC, Winston Plywood and Veneer, LLC, WPV Holdco, LLC, Andrew M. Bursky and Kurt Liebich;
Miss. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: accord · confidence high
Inc., 45 So. 3d 280, 283 (¶13) (Miss. 2010); accord Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 1985).
cited Cited "see" Riggs v. D X P Enterprises Inc
W.D. La. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1985); Fussell v. BellSouth Communications, Inc., No. 96-1660, 1998 WL 12229 , *2 (E.D.
cited Cited "see" Riggs v. D X P Enterprises Inc
W.D. La. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1985); Fussell v. BellSouth Communications, Inc., No. 96-1660, 1998 WL 12229 , *2 (E.D.
cited Cited "see" Notariano v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board
E.D. La. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal discrimination claims subject to 1 year prescriptive period); La.
cited Cited "see" John Murchison v. Cleco Corporation
5th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, Inc.
5th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir.1985).
cited Cited "see" Basco v. American General Ins. Co.
5th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corporation, 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985); 9 Chakles A. Wright & Arthur R.
discussed Cited "see" Veronica Davis v. Louisiana State University (2×)
5th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985) ("termination of employment either through discharge or resignation is not a 'continuing' violation because the individual ceases to be an employee on the date of his discharge and all of his legal claims mature at the time").
discussed Cited "see" Joe Nathan Price v. Digital Equipment Corporation (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor, 775 F.2d at 619 .
cited Cited "see" Bernetta Hilbun v. David J. Goldberg
5th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985): Ford v. Sharp, 758 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (5th Cir.1985); Owens v. Weingarten’s, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 497, 498 (W.D.La.1977). 6 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
39 Fair empl.prac.cas. 265, 38 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,754 Rev. George Taylor
v.
Bunge Corporation
85-3321.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Oct 31, 1985.
775 F.2d 617
1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 24531
Robert E. Lee, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant., Monroe & Lemann, Kenneth P. Carter, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.
Rubin, Johnson, Jones.
Cited by 64 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The principal issue is whether the discharge of an employee in alleged viola-, tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII is a continuing violation of those laws with the result that the statute of limitations on a suit for breach of those laws begins to run anew each day. Joining the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, we hold that the statute of limitations commences to run on discharge, the employee’s claims mature at that time, and the violation is not a continuing one. We, therefore, affirm the judgment dismissing the suit for untimely filing.

Unless the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run, or has been tolled, the claims asserted by the plaintiff in this suit are patently untimely. The plaintiff was last employed by the defendant in August, 1982. This suit was filed in September, 1984. The plaintiff was required to bring suit on his claims under Title VII within ninety days of his receipt of the Right-to-Sue letter issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). [1] The EEOC mailed that letter on December 29, .1982.

Similarly, the plaintiff’s claim of racial discrimination in employment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is time barred. A section 1981 claim is best characterized as a tort under Louisiana law and is, therefore, governed by the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions dictated by La.Civ. Code art. 3492. [2] The filing and processing[*619] of charges with the EEOC under Title VII does not toll the running of the state prescriptive period governing section 1981 claims. [3]

The plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his earlier suit without prejudice did not toll the statute. As we held in LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., [4] the effect of such a dismissal was to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit. The prescriptive period, therefore, is not tolled by the bringing of an action that is later voluntarily dismissed. [5] This principle extends to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) and Title VII. [6]

The plaintiffs characterization of his claim as one for a continuing violation is incorrect. The plaintiff concedes that his employment with the defendant terminated in August, 1982. He argues, however, that, because his claim is for back pay from the date of discharge to date, it is for a “continuing violation.” While the continuing-discrimination theory may be available to present employees, [7] even though on layoff, [8] the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that termination of employment either through discharge or resignation is not a “continuing” violation because the individual ceases to be an employee on the date of his discharge and all of his legal claims mature at that time. [9] Under the plaintiffs suggested application of the continuing-violation doctrine, his claims would never prescribe; this would destroy the policy of finality underlying the statute of limitations.

As to the plaintiff’s pendent state law claims, the Supreme Court has stated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 10 “[e]er-tainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state [law] claims should be dismissed as well.”

For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

1

. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982); Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1973).

2

. Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir.1982), withdrawn in part on rehearing, 688 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951, 103 S.Ct. 2420, 77 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1983) (applying former La.Civ.Code art. 3536, the predecessor of art. 3492); Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 351-52 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978).

3

. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465-66, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1722-23, 44 L.Ed.2d 295, 304-05 (1975).

4

. 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir.1976).

5

. Willard v. Wood, 164 U.S. 502, 523, 17 S.Ct. 176, 181, 41 L.Ed. 531, 540 (1896); Goff v. United States, 659 F.2d 560, 562 (5th Cir.1981).

6

. Cleveland v. Douglass Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir.1975); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525, 528-29 (6th Cir.1973), aff'd, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 730, 732-33 (E.D.Pa.1979); Owens v. Weingarten’s, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 497 (W.D.La.1977). See generally 5 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[2] (2d ed. 1975), 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2367, at 186— 87 (1971).

7

. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-53, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971).

8

. Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.1969).

9

. West v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 683 F.2d 845, 846 (4th Cir.1982); Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir.1975) (en banc); Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290 (7th Cir.1969). See also United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977).

10

. 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1137, 16 L.Ed.2d 218, 228 (1966). See 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1588, at 814-15 (1971).