Washington standard in Illinois

2019See Cannon , 46 Ill. 2d at 321 , 263 N.E.2d 45 . ¶ 25 The guilty-plea waiver rule poses an equally formidable obstacle.

2019See Cannon , 46 Ill. 2d at 321 , 263 N.E.2d 45 . ¶ 25 The guilty-plea waiver rule poses an equally formidable obstacle.

2021Substantively, however, a petitioner need not show cause and prejudice (Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330 ) but must support his claim of actual innocence with evidence that is “newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial” (id. at 333 (where a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive postconviction petition, the defendant is excused from showing cause and prejudice and, instead, must meet the Washington standard)).

2021Substantively, however, a petitioner need not show cause and prejudice (Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330 ) but must support his claim of actual innocence with evidence that is “newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial” (id. at 333 (where a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive postconviction petition, the defendant is excused from showing cause and prejudice and, instead, must meet the Washington standard)).

2020Manifest error is “ ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004)). ¶ 52 Although the circuit court lacked the guidance of this opinion regarding the applicable standard, it nevertheless found defendant did not meet the less stringent Washington standard.

2020Manifest error is “ ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004)). ¶ 52 Although the circuit court lacked the guidance of this opinion regarding the applicable standard, it nevertheless found defendant did not meet the less stringent Washington standard.

2016But Rule 401(a) admonishments must be provided when the court learns defendant chooses to waive counsel and proceed pro se “so that defendant can consider the ramifications of such a decision.” People v. Langley, 226 Ill.

2016But Rule 401(a) admonishments must be provided when the court learns defendant chooses to waive counsel and proceed pro se “so that defendant can consider the ramifications of such a decision.” People v. Langley, 226 Ill.

2022Id. ¶ 71. ¶ 33 In his reply brief, however, defendant contends that the supreme court made it clear in People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , that “a petitioner who can state a freestanding claim of actual innocence and a deprivation of a constitutional right during the proceedings that resulted in his conviction is not required to choose which claim to pursue.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, the court stated: “Where a defendant makes a claim of trial error, as well as a claim of actual innocence, in a successive postconviction petition, the former claim must meet the cause-and- prejudice

2022Id. ¶ 71. ¶ 33 In his reply brief, however, defendant contends that the supreme court made it clear in People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , that “a petitioner who can state a freestanding claim of actual innocence and a deprivation of a constitutional right during the proceedings that resulted in his conviction is not required to choose which claim to pursue.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, the court stated: “Where a defendant makes a claim of trial error, as well as a claim of actual innocence, in a successive postconviction petition, the former claim must meet the cause-and- prejudice

2022In Reed, the supreme court recognized that a strict application of the Washington standard is “impractical” in cases where the defendant pled guilty, because, “[w]ithout the developed record produced by a trial, a court cannot determine whether the new evidence sufficiently undermines the evidence presented at trial such that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 45 .

2022In Reed, the supreme court recognized that a strict application of the Washington standard is “impractical” in cases where the defendant pled guilty, because, “[w]ithout the developed record produced by a trial, a court cannot determine whether the new evidence sufficiently undermines the evidence presented at trial such that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 45 .

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

2026See id. (“Without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, the reviewing court must presume the circuit court had a sufficient factual basis for its holding and that its order conforms with the law.”) ¶ 23 The Record Is Insufficient To Find That Judgment In Hoff’s Favor After Trial Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence ¶ 24 This brings us to Washington’s contention that the trial court “did not render a determination on the merits” on its breach of contract claim.

2022People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). ¶ 23 Washington’s claim of actual innocence relies on the affidavits from Marshall Hudson and Michael Robinson, who both attest that Washington’s codefendant Willhite made statements that Washington was not involved in “the crime.” We find the affidavits constitute newly discovered evidence since the ultimate source of the evidence is a codefendant of Washington.

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

2021Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 496 ; see also People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004) (because conviction of an innocent person would violate the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution, we have recognized that postconviction petitioners have the right “to assert a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence”); People v. Quickle, 2020 IL App (3d) 170281, ¶¶ 18, 20 (evidence in support of an actual innocence claim must be newly discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial; for purp

1996See People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 367-68 , 107 Ill.Dec. 677 , 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987); People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill.2d 471, 477-78 , 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).

1996See People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 367-68 (1987); People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 477-78 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 510 , 20 L.

1996See People v. Silagy, 116 Ill.2d 357, 367-68 , 107 Ill.Dec. 677 , 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987); People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill.2d 471, 477-78 , 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).

1996See People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 367-68 (1987); People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 477-78 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 510 , 20 L.