assumed risk doctrine in Texas

1966This Court in Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (1963), recognized that the assumed risk doctrine is a relatively harsh one, and the Court indicated that it felt required to keep it within justifiable limits. 371 S.W.2d 368 at 380 .

1966This Court in Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (1963), recognized that the assumed risk doctrine is a relatively harsh one, and the Court indicated that it felt required to keep it within justifiable limits. 371 S.W.2d 368 at 380 .

1981Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.1966); Halepska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.1963); Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354 , 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953).

1981Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.1966); Halepska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.1963); Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond, 152 Tex. 354 , 258 S.W.2d 60 (1953).

1975Also see Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.1966), and Cantrell v. Markham & Brown Company & Associates, 452 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

1971When asked “No, but that would mean that there was something wrong with the exhaust system ?” He answered “He could have run over something and broken it loose; yeah, that’s right.” Appellees rely on Rabb v. Coleman, 469 S.W.2d 384 (Supreme Court 1971) in support of their contention that the assumed risk doctrine of volenti non fit in-juria has been established as a matter of law.

1969A. Hoover & Son, 437 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1969), the Court said: “Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto founded on the assumed risk principle.

1968It was the clear holding of this Court in McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517 , 271 S.W.2d 391 * * * as well as in the Halepeska case that the knowledge of the defect is not enough.

1968It was the clear holding of this Court in McKee v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517 , 271 S.W.2d 391 * * * as well as in the Halepeska case that the knowledge of the defect is not enough.

1968Corporation v. Ball, Tex., 414 S.W.2d 143 , and, as we understand our Supreme Court in each of these cases, we think the clearest statement of the majority opinion in each of these cases is found in the Ellis case, Point 1: “This Court in Halepeska v. Callihan interests, Inc., * * * recognized that the assumed risk doctrine is a relatively harsh one, and the Court indicated that it felt required to keep it within justifiable limits. * * *.

1952App., 117 S.W. 2d 876 , writ ref., which doctrines, if distinguishable from the doctrine of assumed risk, are nevertheless closely akin thereto.

1951Co., 96 Vt. 208 , 118 Atl. 874 , the Supreme Court of Vermont says that since the maxim extends beyond contractual relations, the limitations of the doctrine of assumption of risk based thereon must be looked for in the terms of the maxim itself; that any other course would be illogical and the limitations could not escape being purely artificial; that, therefore, the doctrine of assumed risk, in an action between persons not having relations by contract, must be confined to cases where the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger and put himself in the way of it of his own free will and as t

1951Co., 96 Vt. 208 , 118 Atl. 874 , the Supreme Court of Vermont says that since the maxim extends beyond contractual relations, the limitations of the doctrine of assumption of risk based thereon must be looked for in the terms of the maxim itself; that any other course would be illogical and the limitations could not escape being purely artificial; that, therefore, the doctrine of assumed risk, in an action between persons not having relations by contract, must be confined to cases where the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger and put himself in the way of it of his own free will and as t

1947In the application of the law to the agreed factual situation here it is our duty “to give to the terms of the act the utmost liberality of which they are legally capable, to the ■ end that the beneficent purposes of the act may be ’ effectuated.” And “we must remember that the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, as set out in the preamble of the act, was to make more certain the recovery of compensation for injuries to employes in cases where an action would ordinarily exist at common law, to .the exclusion, among other things, of the doctrine of assumed risk.” And “since the common-la

1941Ford Motor Co. v. Maddin, 124 Tex. 131 , 76 S.W.2d 474 , page 476, paragraph 4.

1941Ford Motor Co. v. Maddin, 124 Tex. 131 , 76 S.W.2d 474 , page 476, paragraph 4.

1938Under such circumstances it has been held that “the doctrine of assumed risk does not apply in the absence of the relationship of employer and employee.” El Paso Printing Co. v. Glick, Tex.Civ.App., 246 S.W. 1076, 1079 , affirmed in, Tex.Com.App., 263 S.W. 260 ; 30 Tex.Jur. § 29, p. 678 ; 20 R.C.L. § 95, p. 109.

1938Under such circumstances it has been held that “the doctrine of assumed risk does not apply in the absence of the relationship of employer and employee.” El Paso Printing Co. v. Glick, Tex.Civ.App., 246 S.W. 1076, 1079 , affirmed in, Tex.Com.App., 263 S.W. 260 ; 30 Tex.Jur. § 29, p. 678 ; 20 R.C.L. § 95, p. 109.

1926App.) 204 S. W. 691 : “When lumber is loaded in a car in one state and shipped to another state, an employé unloading the lumber at destination was engaged in interstate commerce.” Appellee and appellant being engaged in interstate commerce at the time in •handling of thei freight through which he claims to have received the injuries for which he seeks to recover, the common-law doctrine of assumed risk applies.

1915In Orange Lumber Co. v. Ellis, 105 Tex. 363 , 150 S. W. 582 , speaking for the Supreme Court of this state, Justice Dribell says: “The general doctrine of assumed risk, as laid down by the text-writers, to the effect that, where a servant undertakes to perform any particular service, he assumes as a part of his customary obligation the ordinary perils which, in the nature of things, are incident to such service is not applicable to the performance of such services with defective machinery, unless such defects are known to the servant and at the same time he knows and realizes, or from the circ

1915In Orange Lumber Co. v. Ellis, 105 Tex. 363 , 150 S. W. 582 , speaking for the Supreme Court of this state, Justice Dribell says: “The general doctrine of assumed risk, as laid down by the text-writers, to the effect that, where a servant undertakes to perform any particular service, he assumes as a part of his customary obligation the ordinary perils which, in the nature of things, are incident to such service is not applicable to the performance of such services with defective machinery, unless such defects are known to the servant and at the same time he knows and realizes, or from the circ