Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phares v. Carrgreen1 sentence2011Under that doctrine “the proprietor of an athletic field or golf course is not liable for damages sustained by participants or spectators by reason of injuries which are reasonably incidental to the particular athletic events.” Id. at 602, 106 N.E.2d 242, 244 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monteith v. Kokomo Wood Enameling Co.
green
2 sentences1910Monteith v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 58 L. 1907Monfeith v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149 , 58 L. | 2 | 1907–1910 |
Davis Coal Co. v. Polland
green
2 sentences1909A. 944; Island Coal Co. v. Swaggerty (1903), 159 Ind. 664 ; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, supra. The doctrine of assumed risk does not apply, as against a statute or an ordinance. 1907Thus, in Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, supra, in discussing the question of whether the common-law doctrine of assumed risk, growing out of a knowledge of defective conditions, should be applied where the right of action grew out of the coal mining statute, it was said: “The manner of constructing and maintaining the working places and appliances so as to measure up to the general standard of the reasonably pru dent person was no longer left to the judgment of the employer. | 2 | 1907–1909 |
Ridgway v. Yenny Ridgway v. Lombardo
green
2 sentences1987Among these was the Court's Final Instruction No. 21, which read: "The doctrine of assumed risk does not apply if a continued exposure to a known risk of injury is due to a lack of reasonable opportunity to escape after the danger is appreciated, or if the continuance of exposure to the danger is a result of influence, circumstances, or surroundings which are a real inducement to continue." This language is essentially quoted from Ridgway v. Yenny; Ridgway v. Lombardo (1944), 223 Ind. 16 , 57 N.E.2d 581 which explains that before one can be held to have legally incurred a risk, the risk must b 1987Among these was the Court's Final Instruction No. 21, which read: "The doctrine of assumed risk does not apply if a continued exposure to a known risk of injury is due to a lack of reasonable opportunity to escape after the danger is appreciated, or if the continuance of exposure to the danger is a result of influence, circumstances, or surroundings which are a real inducement to continue." This language is essentially quoted from Ridgway v. Yenny; Ridgway v. Lombardo (1944), 223 Ind. 16 , 57 N.E.2d 581 which explains that before one can be held to have legally incurred a risk, the risk must b | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lolla v. State
green
2 sentences1973As the court said in Lolla v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 221 , 294 N.E.2d 798 : “. . . it is well settled in Indiana that the refusal or failure to give an instruction is not grounds for reversal if the substance is covered by other instructions.” Appellant also maintains as error the failure to give his tendered instruction 8, which reads: “If continued exposure to a known risk of injury is due to a lack of reasonable opportunity to escape after the danger is appreciated, or if continuance of exposure to the danger is the result of influence, circumstances, or surroundings which are a real induce 1973As the court said in Lolla v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 221 , 294 N.E.2d 798 : “. . . it is well settled in Indiana that the refusal or failure to give an instruction is not grounds for reversal if the substance is covered by other instructions.” Appellant also maintains as error the failure to give his tendered instruction 8, which reads: “If continued exposure to a known risk of injury is due to a lack of reasonable opportunity to escape after the danger is appreciated, or if continuance of exposure to the danger is the result of influence, circumstances, or surroundings which are a real induce | 1 | 1973–1973 |
STALLINGS v. Dick
green
2 sentences1970The doctrines are distinguished on the basis that ‘assumption of risk’ only arises in the context of a contractual relationship, while ‘incurred risk’ requires no contractual undertaking. * *” And in Stallings v. Dick (1965), 139 Ind. App. 118, 128 , 210 N. E. 2d 82 , we noted: “The courts have differentiated between the doctrine of assumed risk and the doctrine of incurred risk only to the extent of holding that the doctrine of assumed risk applies only in those instances where there is a contractual relationship between the parties. * * * ” (It should be noted that the Coleman and Stallings 1970The doctrines are distinguished on the basis that ‘assumption of risk’ only arises in the context of a contractual relationship, while ‘incurred risk’ requires no contractual undertaking. * *” And in Stallings v. Dick (1965), 139 Ind. App. 118, 128 , 210 N. E. 2d 82 , we noted: “The courts have differentiated between the doctrine of assumed risk and the doctrine of incurred risk only to the extent of holding that the doctrine of assumed risk applies only in those instances where there is a contractual relationship between the parties. * * * ” (It should be noted that the Coleman and Stallings | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Pierce v. Clemens
green
1 sentence1965Co. v. Hoffman, (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431 , 107 N. E. 315 ; Pierce v. Clemens (1943), 113 Ind. App. 65 , 46 N. E. (2d) 836. *129 *128 The courts have differentiated between the doctrine of assumed risk and the doctrine of incurred risk only to the *129 extent of holding that the doctrine of assumed risk applies only in those instances where there is a contractual relationship between the parties. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Hoffman
green
2 sentences1965Co. v. Hoffman, (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431 , 107 N. E. 315 ; Pierce v. Clemens (1943), 113 Ind. App. 65 , 46 N. E. (2d) 836. *129 *128 The courts have differentiated between the doctrine of assumed risk and the doctrine of incurred risk only to the *129 extent of holding that the doctrine of assumed risk applies only in those instances where there is a contractual relationship between the parties. 1965Co. v. Hoffman, (1914), 57 Ind. App. 431 , 107 N. E. 315 ; Pierce v. Clemens (1943), 113 Ind. App. 65 , 46 N. E. (2d) 836. *129 *128 The courts have differentiated between the doctrine of assumed risk and the doctrine of incurred risk only to the *129 extent of holding that the doctrine of assumed risk applies only in those instances where there is a contractual relationship between the parties. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Potter
green
2 sentences1916Inland Steel Co. v. Gillispie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 638 , 104 N. E. 76 ; McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Potter (1899), 153 Ind. 107 , 53 N. E. 465 . 1916Inland Steel Co. v. Gillispie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 638 , 104 N. E. 76 ; McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Potter (1899), 153 Ind. 107 , 53 N. E. 465 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Inland Steel Co. v. Gillespie
green
2 sentences1916Inland Steel Co. v. Gillispie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 638 , 104 N. E. 76 ; McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Potter (1899), 153 Ind. 107 , 53 N. E. 465 . 1916Inland Steel Co. v. Gillispie (1914), 181 Ind. 633, 638 , 104 N. E. 76 ; McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Potter (1899), 153 Ind. 107 , 53 N. E. 465 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Island Coal Co. v. Swaggerty
neutral
1 sentence1909A. 944; Island Coal Co. v. Swaggerty (1903), 159 Ind. 664 ; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, supra. The doctrine of assumed risk does not apply, as against a statute or an ordinance. | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.