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25 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re CPgreen2 sentences2002In re A.P., 59 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In re C.P., 998 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). 2002In re A.P., 59 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In re C.P., 998 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). | 4 | 4 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2024In reviewing legal sufficiency in sexually violent predator cases, we use the familiar criminal law standard: “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665 , 675 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 2024STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing legal sufficiency in sexually violent predator cases, we use the familiar criminal law standard: “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). | 3 | 3 |
In Re BPHgreen2 sentences2008"The criminal law standard for factual insufficiency is also applicable in juvenile cases." In re B.P.H., 83 S.W.3d at 407 . 2008"The criminal law standard for factual insufficiency is also applicable in juvenile cases." In re B.P.H. , 83 S.W.3d at 407 . | 2 | 4 |
In Re APgreen2 sentences2002In re A.P., 59 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In re C.P., 998 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). 2002In re A.P., 59 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); In re C.P., 998 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
In Re JLHgreen2 sentences2009J.L.H., 58 S.W.3d at 245-46. 2009J.L.H. , 58 S.W.3d at 245–46. | 1 | 3 |
Matter of EPgreen2 sentences2011In re E.P., 963 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no writ); Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(f) (West Supp.2011). 2011In re E.P., 963 S.W.2d 191 , 193 (Tex.App.--Austin 1998, no writ); Tex. Fam. | 1 | 2 |
Lambert v. Californiagreen2 sentences2014FLEMING DISSENT — 8 applied to a person who had no actual knowledge of his duty to register and where no showing was made “of the probability of such knowledge.”36 “Engrained in our concept of due process,” the Court held, “is the requirement of notice.”37 Although notice is an important component of procedural due process in defending against a criminal charge, it is also a consideration in determining whether certain behavior can even be considered a criminal law violation.38 In Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court recognized its holding in Lambert but nevertheless stated that the “Court has n 2014See also Smith, 361 U.S. at 150 (citing Lambert and observing that, while the States had the power to create strict-liability offenses, “there is precedent in this Court that this power is not without limitations”). 37 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . 38 Id. 39 392 U.S. 514 , 535 & n.27 (1968). 40 Id. at 535 n.27. 41 Id. 42 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Californiagreen1 sentence2014See also Smith, 361 U.S. at 150 (citing Lambert and observing that, while the States had the power to create strict-liability offenses, “there is precedent in this Court that this power is not without limitations”). 37 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . 38 Id. 39 392 U.S. 514 , 535 & n.27 (1968). 40 Id. at 535 n.27. 41 Id. 42 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. Texasgreen2 sentences2014See also Smith, 361 U.S. at 150 (citing Lambert and observing that, while the States had the power to create strict-liability offenses, “there is precedent in this Court that this power is not without limitations”). 37 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . 38 Id. 39 392 U.S. 514 , 535 & n.27 (1968). 40 Id. at 535 n.27. 41 Id. 42 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . 2014See also Smith, 361 U.S. at 150 (citing Lambert and observing that, while the States had the power to create strict-liability offenses, “there is precedent in this Court that this power is not without limitations”). 37 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . 38 Id. 39 392 U.S. 514 , 535 & n.27 (1968). 40 Id. at 535 n.27. 41 Id. 42 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 . | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. Tunksgreen1 sentence1997Tunks further points out that the degree of proof necessary to support finding a public officer guilty of the removal complaint’s allegations is the civil law standard, a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the criminal law standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tunks, 360 S.W.2d at 520 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences1991See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 1991See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
Carnley v. Cochrangreen2 sentences1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). 1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Samudio v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weinstein v. Bradford
green
2 sentences2011To begin our review, we examine whether applicant's claim is justiciable under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine of Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 , 96 S.Ct. 347 , 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), given that TDCJ's Parole Division is the same institutional party in all preliminary hearing cases. 2011To begin our review, we examine whether applicant's claim is justiciable under the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine of Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 , 96 S.Ct. 347 , 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), given that TDCJ's Parole Division is the same institutional party in all preliminary hearing cases. | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Llanes v. Corpus Christi Independent School District
green
1 sentence2016Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mullins v. Dallas Independent School District
green
1 sentence2016Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642 ). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2014Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ex Parte Martinez
neutral
1 sentence1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Texas v. Samudio
green
1 sentence1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mission Insurance v. United States
green
1 sentence1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Levine v. Commissioner
green
1 sentence1990Martinez, 775 S.W.2d at 457-58 ; see also Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 , 82 S.Ct. 884, 889 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent record); Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 , 103 S.Ct. 3113 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983); Linder, 783 S.W.2d at 762-63 (Burnett, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.