includes instruction in Texas

2011City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 51 S.W.3d 231, 262 (Tex. 2000) (citing Richardson v. City of 9 Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1974)).5 This includes the requirement that litigants receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2011City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 51 S.W.3d 231, 262 (Tex. 2000) (citing Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1974)).[5] This includes the requirement that litigants receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2011City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 51 S.W.3d 231, 262 (Tex. 2000) (citing Richardson v. City of 9 Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1974)).5 This includes the requirement that litigants receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2011City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 51 S.W.3d 231, 262 (Tex. 2000) (citing Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 513 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1974)).[5] This includes the requirement that litigants receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

2022See id.

2016See id.

2024This includes a requirement for the State to “disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document, item, or information in the possession, custody, or control of the state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the punishment for the offense charged.” Id. art. 39.14(h); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that violation of constitutional due process rights occurs when state suppresses, willfully or inadvertently, evidence favorable to defendant); Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265 , 277 (Tex. Crim.

2019See City of Galveston, 217 S.W.3d at 469 .

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2015While Stafford refers us to some ’80s-era court of appeals cases that seem to have adopted a less exacting approach, the Texas Supreme Court, as appellants emphasize, has forcefully reiterated in recent years that proof of “reasonable and necessary” repair damages requires evidence 18 See, e.g., Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (absent preserved meritorious complaint of charge error, challenges to sufficiency of evidence supporting jury findings are evaluated in light of charge as submitted).

2015Mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional.132 Here, the jury charge included the presumption that “knowledge that the assaulted person was a public servant is presumed if the person was wearing a distinctive 128 Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 157 ; Ramos v. State, 991 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). 129 R.R.III:145. 130 Alexander v. State, 757 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3109 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)); Jimenez v. State, 419 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref

2014App. 1998), it is also true that when a trial court includes an instruction on a defensive issue in its charge, that instruction must be correct, Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim.

2013See id.

2013Cf. Web-ber v. State, 29 S.W.3d 226, 231, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. refd) (when the charge includes a mandatory presumption — which occurs when the trial court includes a presumption in the charge and fails to also instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, find an element of the offense proven because of the presumption — general instructions about the elements of the offense and proof beyond a reasonable doubt do not remedy or lessen the harm suffered).

2009See id.

2007Castanon v. Monsevais , 703 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).

2001Lalande, 676 S.W.2d at 118 n. 5; Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.) (modified on other grounds by Pierce, 32 S.W.3d at 251-52 ).

2000Ladd v. State , 3 S.W.3d 547, 564 (Tex. Crim.

1997DeGarmo, 691 S.W.2d at 661 ; Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1997, pet. refused).