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9 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1904–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harrington v. State Board of Tax Commissionersgreen2 sentences2004This includes the requirement that "assessments be consistent with similar property of the same classification." Harrington v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 525 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ind. Tax Ct.1988) (citing Inp. 2002This includes the requirement that "assessments be consistent with similar property of the same classification." Harrington v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 525 N.E.2d 360, 361 (Ind. Tax Ct.1988) (citing Inp. | 3 | 3 |
Meredith v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity—a rule that requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citing Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009)). “[E]ven under this rule, we avoid construing a statute so narrowly ‘as to exclude cases they fairly cover.’” Id. (quoting Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 872 ). 2026“In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity—a rule that requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citing Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009)). “[E]ven under this rule, we avoid construing a statute so narrowly ‘as to exclude cases they fairly cover.’” Id. (quoting Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 872 ). | 2 | 2 |
GTE North Inc. v. State Board of Tax Commissionersgreen2 sentences2002Constr., Art. 10, § 1); see also GTE North Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 634 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994). "[Wlhen, for any reason, [taxation] becomes discriminative between individuals of the class taxed, and selects some for an exceptional burden, the tax is deprived of the necessary element of legal equality, and becomes inadmissible." Smith, 63 N.E. at 27 (quoting Cooley, Tax'n, 169). 2001Const., Art. 10, § 1); see also GTE North Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 634 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind.Tax Ct.1994). "[When, for any reason, [taxation] becomes discriminative between individuals of the class taxed, and selects some for an exceptional burden, the tax is deprived of the necessary element of legal equality, and becomes inadmissible." Smith, 68 N.E. at 27 (quoting Cooley, Tax'n, 169). | 2 | 2 |
Nicoson v. Stategreen1 sentence2026“Ultimately, we presume the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010)). [16] We conclude Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) is unambiguous. | 1 | 1 |
Cape v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind.2009) (noting that even under the rule of lenity, “statutes ‘are not to be overly narrowed so as to exclude cases they fairly cover’ ” (quoting Cape v. State, 272 Ind. 609, 613 , 400 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1980))). 2016Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind.2009) (noting that even under the rule of lenity, “statutes ‘are not to be overly narrowed so as to exclude cases they fairly cover’ ” (quoting Cape v. State, 272 Ind. 609, 613 , 400 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1980))). | 1 | 1 |
Kubsch v. Stategreen1 sentence2013This includes a requirement that the defendant “be advised of the potential pitfalls surrounding self-representation so that it is clear that he knows what he is doing and [that] his choice is made with eyes open.” Kubsch, 866 N.E.2d at 736 (citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Lewis v. Smithgreen1 sentence2002Constr., Art. 10, § 1); see also GTE North Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 634 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994). "[Wlhen, for any reason, [taxation] becomes discriminative between individuals of the class taxed, and selects some for an exceptional burden, the tax is deprived of the necessary element of legal equality, and becomes inadmissible." Smith, 63 N.E. at 27 (quoting Cooley, Tax'n, 169). | 1 | 1 |
Bassett v. Nickersongreen1 sentence2001Const., Art. 10, § 1); see also GTE North Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 634 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind.Tax Ct.1994). "[When, for any reason, [taxation] becomes discriminative between individuals of the class taxed, and selects some for an exceptional burden, the tax is deprived of the necessary element of legal equality, and becomes inadmissible." Smith, 68 N.E. at 27 (quoting Cooley, Tax'n, 169). | 1 | 1 |
Gonzales v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Gonzales v. State, 642 N.E.2d 216, 217 (Ind.1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Michael Day v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2026“In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity—a rule that requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while resolving any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citing Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009)). “[E]ven under this rule, we avoid construing a statute so narrowly ‘as to exclude cases they fairly cover.’” Id. (quoting Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 872 ). 2019"In criminal *1064 cases, this includes the rule of lenity-interpreting the statute in the defendant's favor as far as the language can reasonably support." Id. [21] Here, Adams' liberty was deprived, by his undisputed account, for between six and eight hours. | 2 | 2019–2026 |
Horner v. Doe
green
1 sentence1904Bank v. Hanna, 12 Ind. App. 240 , it is held that the presumption is that a court of general jurisdiction had jurisdiction of a person who seeks to set aside its decree, whether such decree contained a recital of jurisdictional facts or not, the court saying: “The court will be presumed to have done its duty, and this includes the presumption that all parties affected by said judgment and decree were properly before it, and were duly served with process.” In the early case of Horner v. Doe, 1 Ind. 130 , 48 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Cole v. Allen
neutral
1 sentence1904Dec. 355 , the court said: “That where the record discloses nothing upon the point, jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter will, the contrary not being proved, be presumed, in eases of domestic judgment of courts of general jurisdiction, where they come collaterally in question.” In the ease of Crane v. Kimmer, 77 Ind. 215 , the court said: “In the case of Cole v. Allen, 51 Ind. 122 , the record did not show that any process had been served, and there was no process appearing in the record; for which error the cause was reversed. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Crane v. Kimmer
green
1 sentence1904Dec. 355 , the court said: “That where the record discloses nothing upon the point, jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter will, the contrary not being proved, be presumed, in eases of domestic judgment of courts of general jurisdiction, where they come collaterally in question.” In the ease of Crane v. Kimmer, 77 Ind. 215 , the court said: “In the case of Cole v. Allen, 51 Ind. 122 , the record did not show that any process had been served, and there was no process appearing in the record; for which error the cause was reversed. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
First National Bank v. Hanna
neutral
1 sentence1904Bank v. Hanna, 12 Ind. App. 240 , it is held that the presumption is that a court of general jurisdiction had jurisdiction of a person who seeks to set aside its decree, whether such decree contained a recital of jurisdictional facts or not, the court saying: “The court will be presumed to have done its duty, and this includes the presumption that all parties affected by said judgment and decree were properly before it, and were duly served with process.” In the early case of Horner v. Doe, 1 Ind. 130 , 48 Am. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.