reasonable investigation inquiry (Texas) · Go Syfert
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reasonable investigation inquiry in Texas

25 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc.green
tex · 1979 · cited in 18 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1982–2026
2 sentences

2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 .

2022The trial court found in Finding of Fact #3 that the contract recites that the sale of property is “As Is” and that Paragraph 7D of the contract defines “As Is” as “the present condition of the Property with any and all defects and without warranty 29 except for the warranties of title and the warranties in this contract.” MacPherson has not challenged that finding of fact on appeal. “[A] seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigat

1618
Myre v. Meletiogreen
texapp · 2010 · cited in 6 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026
2 sentences

2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 .

2010The Texas Property Code requires, subject to a few limited exceptions which do not apply here, a number of disclosures, including whether “alterations or repairs [have been] made without necessary permits or not in compliance with building codes in effect at that time.” Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 5.008(a), (b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2010) (this statute has been amended since the transaction in question, but none of the amendments are relevant to this appeal); see Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, pet. filed). ("In the context of a real estate transaction, a seller is under a d

56
Marshall v. Kuschgreen
texapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026
2 sentences

2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 .

2010Smith v. Nat’l Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.1979); Marshall, 84 S.W.3d at 786 .

12
HTM Restaurants, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.green
texapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026But “[a] seller has no duty to disclose facts he does not know.” Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162 ; see also HTM Rests., Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 797 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding that party cannot be guilty of fraudulently concealing facts of which he is not aware).

11
Republic Insurance Co. v. Stokergreen
tex · 1995 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995) (providing that when an insurer fails to timely investigate a claim or commits an extreme act that causes an independent injury to the policy holder, an insurer is liable for extra-contractual damages).

11
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.green
tex · 1987 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Regarding causation, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the damages found by the jury were caused by State Farm because the jury also made findings— unchallenged on appeal—that State Farm failed to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim when its liability had become reasonably clear or refused to pay the Vegas without conducting a reasonable investigation of the claim. 13 See Republic 13 In Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987), the Texas Supreme Court held that “[b]etween an insurer and the insured, there is a

11
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.green
tex · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tex. 1988).

11
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Millardgreen
texapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014USAA argues that Menchaca’s contract claim was “based on whether the damage to her home was caused by Hurricane Ike and was covered by policy,” whereas her insurance code claim was “based on whether USAA conducted a reasonable investigation of her claim.” It cites United States Insurance Fire Co. v. Millard, a 1993 case in which the First District Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ contractual and extra-contractual insurance claims were “separate and distinct” and therefore properly severed from each other. 847 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (sta

11
Pearson v. K-Mart Corp.green
texapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See Pearson v. K-Mart Corp ., 755 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing withdrawn supreme court opinion because both parties had referred to it in their briefs). [4] The Maos’ brief does not mention their fraud claim at all; their brief’s only mention of their DTPA and insurance code claims is the following sentence, “The crux of Plaintiff’s extra-contractual claims (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Insurance Code/DTPA) go to whether or not Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation of the claim.”

11
Worldwide Asset Purchasing, L.L.C. v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc.green
texapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See Worldwide Asset Purchasing L.L.C. v. Rent-A-Center crux of Plaintiff’s extra-contractual claims (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Insurance Code/DTPA) go to whether or not Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation of the claim.‖ 15 East, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 554, 569 (Tex. App––Dallas 2009, no pet.).

11
Robbins v. Capozzigreen
texapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006In Texas, a "seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover." Smith v. Nat'l Resort Communities, Inc. , 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); Pairett v. Gutierrez , 969 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). "'Material' means a reasonable person would attach importance to and would be induced to act on the information in determining his choice of actions in the transaction in question." Robbi

11
Pairett v. Gutierrezgreen
texapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006In Texas, a "seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover." Smith v. Nat'l Resort Communities, Inc. , 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); Pairett v. Gutierrez , 969 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). "'Material' means a reasonable person would attach importance to and would be induced to act on the information in determining his choice of actions in the transaction in question." Robbi

11
Weaver v. Wittgreen
tex · 1977 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006See Weaver , 561 S.W.2d at 793 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons green
tex · 1998
2 sentences

2011Simmons , 963 S.W.2d at 44 .

2011Simmons, 963 S.W.2d at 44 .

22011–2011
Cole v. Johnson green
texapp · 2005
1 sentence

2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 .

12026–2026
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. green
tex · 1995
1 sentence

2026But “[a] seller has no duty to disclose facts he does not know.” Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162 ; see also HTM Rests., Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 797 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding that party cannot be guilty of fraudulently concealing facts of which he is not aware).

12026–2026
Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Professional Corp. green
texapp · 2004
1 sentence

2019See Smith, 585 S.W.2d at 658 ; Miller, 142 S.W.3d at 345 .

12019–2019
Weintraub v. Krobatsch green
nj · 1974
2 sentences

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

11978–1978
Obde v. Schlemeyer green
wash · 1960
2 sentences

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

11978–1978
Sorrell v. Young green
washctapp · 1971
2 sentences

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953).

11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Prop. Code § 5.008 (7)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 25 (1978–2026) FL 2 (1992–1995) OR 2 (2018–2019) MO 2 (1974–2004)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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