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25 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc.green2 sentences2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 . 2022The trial court found in Finding of Fact #3 that the contract recites that the sale of property is “As Is” and that Paragraph 7D of the contract defines “As Is” as “the present condition of the Property with any and all defects and without warranty 29 except for the warranties of title and the warranties in this contract.” MacPherson has not challenged that finding of fact on appeal. “[A] seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigat | 16 | 18 |
Myre v. Meletiogreen2 sentences2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 . 2010The Texas Property Code requires, subject to a few limited exceptions which do not apply here, a number of disclosures, including whether “alterations or repairs [have been] made without necessary permits or not in compliance with building codes in effect at that time.” Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 5.008(a), (b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2010) (this statute has been amended since the transaction in question, but none of the amendments are relevant to this appeal); see Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010, pet. filed). ("In the context of a real estate transaction, a seller is under a d | 5 | 6 |
Marshall v. Kuschgreen2 sentences2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 . 2010Smith v. Nat’l Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.1979); Marshall, 84 S.W.3d at 786 . | 1 | 2 |
HTM Restaurants, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.green1 sentence2026But “[a] seller has no duty to disclose facts he does not know.” Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162 ; see also HTM Rests., Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 797 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding that party cannot be guilty of fraudulently concealing facts of which he is not aware). | 1 | 1 |
Republic Insurance Co. v. Stokergreen1 sentence2018Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995) (providing that when an insurer fails to timely investigate a claim or commits an extreme act that causes an independent injury to the policy holder, an insurer is liable for extra-contractual damages). | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.green1 sentence2018Regarding causation, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the damages found by the jury were caused by State Farm because the jury also made findings— unchallenged on appeal—that State Farm failed to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim when its liability had become reasonably clear or refused to pay the Vegas without conducting a reasonable investigation of the claim. 13 See Republic 13 In Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987), the Texas Supreme Court held that “[b]etween an insurer and the insured, there is a | 1 | 1 |
Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence2018Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tex. 1988). | 1 | 1 |
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Millardgreen1 sentence2014USAA argues that Menchaca’s contract claim was “based on whether the damage to her home was caused by Hurricane Ike and was covered by policy,” whereas her insurance code claim was “based on whether USAA conducted a reasonable investigation of her claim.” It cites United States Insurance Fire Co. v. Millard, a 1993 case in which the First District Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs’ contractual and extra-contractual insurance claims were “separate and distinct” and therefore properly severed from each other. 847 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (sta | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. K-Mart Corp.green1 sentence2011See Pearson v. K-Mart Corp ., 755 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (discussing withdrawn supreme court opinion because both parties had referred to it in their briefs). [4] The Maos’ brief does not mention their fraud claim at all; their brief’s only mention of their DTPA and insurance code claims is the following sentence, “The crux of Plaintiff’s extra-contractual claims (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Insurance Code/DTPA) go to whether or not Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation of the claim.” | 1 | 1 |
Worldwide Asset Purchasing, L.L.C. v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc.green1 sentence2011See Worldwide Asset Purchasing L.L.C. v. Rent-A-Center crux of Plaintiff’s extra-contractual claims (breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Insurance Code/DTPA) go to whether or not Defendant conducted a reasonable investigation of the claim.‖ 15 East, Inc., 290 S.W.3d 554, 569 (Tex. App––Dallas 2009, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Robbins v. Capozzigreen1 sentence2006In Texas, a "seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover." Smith v. Nat'l Resort Communities, Inc. , 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); Pairett v. Gutierrez , 969 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). "'Material' means a reasonable person would attach importance to and would be induced to act on the information in determining his choice of actions in the transaction in question." Robbi | 1 | 1 |
Pairett v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2006In Texas, a "seller of real estate is under a duty of disclosing material facts which would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence on the part of the purchaser, or which a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover." Smith v. Nat'l Resort Communities, Inc. , 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); Pairett v. Gutierrez , 969 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). "'Material' means a reasonable person would attach importance to and would be induced to act on the information in determining his choice of actions in the transaction in question." Robbi | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Wittgreen1 sentence2006See Weaver , 561 S.W.2d at 793 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons
green
2 sentences2011Simmons , 963 S.W.2d at 44 . 2011Simmons, 963 S.W.2d at 44 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Cole v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026Encompassed within this framework, “a seller is under a duty to disclose material facts that would not be discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence by the purchaser, or that a reasonable investigation and inquiry would not uncover.” Myre v. Meletio, 307 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (first citing Smith v. Nat’l Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1979); and then citing Marshall v. Kusch, 84 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied)); Cole, 157 S.W.3d at 860 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2026But “[a] seller has no duty to disclose facts he does not know.” Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162 ; see also HTM Rests., Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 797 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (holding that party cannot be guilty of fraudulently concealing facts of which he is not aware). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Professional Corp.
green
1 sentence2019See Smith, 585 S.W.2d at 658 ; Miller, 142 S.W.3d at 345 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Weintraub v. Krobatsch
green
2 sentences1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). 1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Obde v. Schlemeyer
green
2 sentences1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). 1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Sorrell v. Young
green
2 sentences1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). 1978Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445 , 317 A.2d 68 (1974); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.2d 449 , 353 P.2d 672 (1960); Sorrell v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220 , 491 P.2d 1312 (1971); Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1953). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.