ripeness doctrine in Washington

2015The community custody condition is ripe for review To determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we must find that '"the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final."' State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 6 As part of the ripeness analysis we also consider '"the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' !d. (internal qu

2015The community custody condition is ripe for review ¶15 To determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we must find that “ ‘the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’ ” State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 8 As part of the ripeness analysis, we also consider “ ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Id. (in

2015The community custody condition is ripe for review To determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we must find that '"the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final."' State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 6 As part of the ripeness analysis we also consider '"the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."' !d. (internal qu

2015The community custody condition is ripe for review ¶15 To determine whether a preenforcement challenge to a community custody condition is ripe for review, we must find that “ ‘the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.’ ” State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786 , 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 751 , 193 P.3d 678 (2008)). 8 As part of the ripeness analysis, we also consider “ ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Id. (in

2002Furthermore the declaratory judgment statute provides an independent basis for review because the act "`allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensated damages are sustained.'" Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 , 118 S.Ct. 2131 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 71 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)).

2002Furthermore the declaratory judgment statute provides an independent basis for review because the act “ ‘allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensated damages are sustained.’ ” Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1999This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wn.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S. Ct. 1097 , 113 L.

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

2026Second, “[f]urther factual development is needed when the challenger’s argument is based on the potential for ‘[s]ome future misapplication of the community custody condition,’ which necessarily depends ‘on the particular circumstances of the attempted enforcement.’” Nelson, 4 Wn.3d at 494 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cates, 183 Wn.2d at 535 ).

2018The ripeness doctrine provides that claims are ripe for judicial review when “the issues raised are primarily legal, and do not require further factual development.” Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wn.2d 520, 525 , 303 P.3d 1042 (2013).

2018The ripeness doctrine provides that claims are ripe for judicial review when “the issues raised are primarily legal, and do not require further factual development.” Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wn.2d 520, 525 , 303 P.3d 1042 (2013).

2011Citing State v. Baldwin, she contends that the ripeness test does not apply to her challenge to the trial court’s factual findings and that we should review this challenge under the clearly erroneous standard. 13 See Reply Br. of Appellant at 4-5 (citing State v. Baldwin, 63 Wn.

2011App. 303, 312 , 818 P.2d 1116 , 837 P.2d 646 (1991)).

2008See State v. Ziegenfuss, 118 Wash.App. 110, 113-15 , 74 P.3d 1205 (2003) (defendant argued her due process rights were violated by imposition of a financial obligation at sentencing because the law governing violation hearings lacked adequate safeguards; argument held not ripe since the defendant was not harmed by the alleged unconstitutionality; the defendant had not yet failed to pay and had not been incarcerated or sanctioned for failure to pay; any imposition of sanctions without inquiry into ability to pay would be unconstitutional); State v. Massey, 81 Wash.App. 198, 200-01 , 913 P.2d 42

2008See State v. Ziegenfuss, 118 Wash.App. 110, 113-15 , 74 P.3d 1205 (2003) (defendant argued her due process rights were violated by imposition of a financial obligation at sentencing because the law governing violation hearings lacked adequate safeguards; argument held not ripe since the defendant was not harmed by the alleged unconstitutionality; the defendant had not yet failed to pay and had not been incarcerated or sanctioned for failure to pay; any imposition of sanctions without inquiry into ability to pay would be unconstitutional); State v. Massey, 81 Wash.App. 198, 200-01 , 913 P.2d 42

2008See State v. Ziegenfuss, 118 Wash.App. 110, 113-15 , 74 P.3d 1205 (2003) (defendant argued her due process rights were violated by imposition of a financial obligation at sentencing because the law governing violation hearings lacked adequate safeguards; argument held not ripe since the defendant was not harmed by the alleged unconstitutionality; the defendant had not yet failed to pay and had not been incarcerated or sanctioned for failure to pay; any imposition of sanctions without inquiry into ability to pay would be unconstitutional); State v. Massey, 81 Wash.App. 198, 200-01 , 913 P.2d 42

2008See State v. Ziegenfuss, 118 Wash.App. 110, 113-15 , 74 P.3d 1205 (2003) (defendant argued her due process rights were violated by imposition of a financial obligation at sentencing because the law governing violation hearings lacked adequate safeguards; argument held not ripe since the defendant was not harmed by the alleged unconstitutionality; the defendant had not yet failed to pay and had not been incarcerated or sanctioned for failure to pay; any imposition of sanctions without inquiry into ability to pay would be unconstitutional); State v. Massey, 81 Wash.App. 198, 200-01 , 913 P.2d 42

2002Furthermore the declaratory judgment statute provides an independent basis for review because the act "`allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensated damages are sustained.'" Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 , 118 S.Ct. 2131 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 71 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)).

2002Furthermore the declaratory judgment statute provides an independent basis for review because the act "`allows individuals threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental action before potentially uncompensated damages are sustained.'" Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521 , 118 S.Ct. 2131 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 , 71 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2620 , 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)).

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1999Although personal restraint petitions must normally be brought within a year of discovery of pertinent facts, there is an exception for constitutional challenges. [20] This is the ripeness test set forth in First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392, 400 , 787 P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated on other grounds, 499 U.S. 901 , 111 S.Ct. 1097 , 113 L.Ed.2d 208 (1991). [21] State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 757 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996).

1992Thus, in McMillan v. Goleta Water District [ 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987)], the Ninth Circuit relied on the ripeness requirement applied by the Supreme Court in taking claims to conclude that the § 1983 taking claim did not accrue either when the Water District imposed a moratorium on new water connections (and thus interrupted the property owners' water service) or when it became clear that the interruption was not temporary.

1992Thus, in McMillan v. Goleta Water District [ 792 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987)], the Ninth Circuit relied on the ripeness requirement applied by the Supreme Court in taking claims to conclude that the § 1983 taking claim did not accrue either when the Water District imposed a moratorium on new water connections (and thus interrupted the property owners' water service) or when it became clear that the interruption was not temporary.

1990See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 , 18 L.Ed.2d 697 , 87 S.Ct. 1520 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 , 18 L.Ed.2d 704 , 87 S.Ct. 1526 (1967). [4] The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...". [5] Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious ... wors

1990See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 , 18 L.Ed.2d 697 , 87 S.Ct. 1520 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 , 18 L.Ed.2d 704 , 87 S.Ct. 1526 (1967). [4] The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...". [5] Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious ... wors

1990See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 , 18 L.Ed.2d 697 , 87 S.Ct. 1520 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 , 18 L.Ed.2d 704 , 87 S.Ct. 1526 (1967). [4] The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...". [5] Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious ... wors

1990See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 , 18 L.Ed.2d 697 , 87 S.Ct. 1520 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 , 18 L.Ed.2d 704 , 87 S.Ct. 1526 (1967). [4] The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...". [5] Article 1, section 11 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious ... wors

1990Co. v. Schaible, 874 F.2d 624 , 627 (9th Cir.1989).