Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Winkle v. City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2025See Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 431, ¶ 11 (2021) (“The ripeness doctrine prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.”) (quoting Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997)). 2021“The ripeness doctrine prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.” Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997). | 8 | 8 |
cluster 769722green2 sentences2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise. 2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise. | 3 | 3 |
Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc.green2 sentences2016See U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc. v. AZCC, 198 Ariz. 208, 214-15, ¶ 15 (App. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 201 Ariz. 242 (2001); Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 140 Ariz. 438, 444-45 (App. 1984). 2016When reviewing an administrative decision, the ripeness doctrine prevents courts from interfering until the decision “has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Arizona Downs, 140 Ariz. at 445 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). ¶13 Woodward maintains that his action is ripe because the Commission’s delay in reaching a conclusive ruling on APS’s application, caused by the decision to proceed under A.A.C. | 3 | 3 |
Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Countygreen2 sentences2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise. 2019See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 , 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing and, in many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.”); Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241 , 244 ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (stating that “[r]ipeness is analogous to standing”). ¶36 Ripeness is a prudential doctrine that prevents a court from rendering a premature decision on an issue that may never arise. | 1 | 3 |
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardnerred2 sentences2016When reviewing an administrative decision, the ripeness doctrine prevents courts from interfering until the decision “has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Arizona Downs, 140 Ariz. at 445 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). ¶13 Woodward maintains that his action is ripe because the Commission’s delay in reaching a conclusive ruling on APS’s application, caused by the decision to proceed under A.A.C. 1984Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). | 1 | 2 |
Karen Fann v. State of Arizonagreen1 sentence2025See Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425, 431, ¶ 11 (2021) (“The ripeness doctrine prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.”) (quoting Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. Napolitanogreen1 sentence2018Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 525, ¶ 19 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Stine v. Stinegreen1 sentence2018See Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241, 244-45, ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (explaining that the doctrine of ripeness “prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.”) (quoting Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997)). 5 Under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), the family court must consider “the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” 4 VAHIDI v. HOSSEINI Decision of the Court Mar. 1, 2018) (reviewing an award of fees under § 25-324(A) for an abuse of discr | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. Freygreen1 sentence2018See Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 241, 244-45, ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (explaining that the doctrine of ripeness “prevents a court from rendering a premature judgment or opinion on a situation that may never occur.”) (quoting Winkle v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415 (1997)). 5 Under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), the family court must consider “the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” 4 VAHIDI v. HOSSEINI Decision of the Court Mar. 1, 2018) (reviewing an award of fees under § 25-324(A) for an abuse of discr | 1 | 1 |
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commissiongreen1 sentence2016See U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc. v. AZCC, 198 Ariz. 208, 214-15, ¶ 15 (App. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 201 Ariz. 242 (2001); Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 140 Ariz. 438, 444-45 (App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
US West Communications, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commissiongreen1 sentence2016See U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc. v. AZCC, 198 Ariz. 208, 214-15, ¶ 15 (App. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 201 Ariz. 242 (2001); Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 140 Ariz. 438, 444-45 (App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Bolingreen2 sentences2000See Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 140 Ariz. 438, 444 , 682 P.2d 443, 449 (1984). *215 “The court ordinarily will not decide as to future or contingent rights, but will wait until the event giving rise to rights has happened, or, in other words, until rights have become fixed under an existing state of facts.” Moore v. Bolin, 70 Ariz. 354, 357 , 220 P.2d 850, 852 (1950). 2000See Arizona Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 140 Ariz. 438, 444 , 682 P.2d 443, 449 (1984). *215 “The court ordinarily will not decide as to future or contingent rights, but will wait until the event giving rise to rights has happened, or, in other words, until rights have become fixed under an existing state of facts.” Moore v. Bolin, 70 Ariz. 354, 357 , 220 P.2d 850, 852 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. Brownlow
green
1 sentence2021Our courts exercise restraint to ensure they “refrain from issuing advisory opinions, that cases be ripe for decision and not moot, and that issues be fully developed between true adversaries.” Bennett v. Brownlow, 211 Ariz. 193 , 196 ¶ 16 (2005). ¶12 Though federal justiciability jurisprudence is not binding on Arizona courts, we find the factors federal courts use to determine whether a case is justiciable instructive. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
City of Surprise v. acc/lake Pleasant
green
2 sentences2021Whether to apply the ripeness doctrine in Arizona is a matter of “prudential or judicial restraint.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206 , 209 ¶ 8 (2019) (quoting Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, 233 Ariz. 119 , 122 ¶ 9 (2013)). 2021Whether to apply the ripeness doctrine in Arizona is a matter of “prudential or judicial restraint.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206 , 209 ¶ 8 (2019) (quoting Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, 233 Ariz. 119 , 122 ¶ 9 (2013)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Dobson v. State Ex Rel App Court Appointments
green
2 sentences2021Whether to apply the ripeness doctrine in Arizona is a matter of “prudential or judicial restraint.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206 , 209 ¶ 8 (2019) (quoting Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, 233 Ariz. 119 , 122 ¶ 9 (2013)). 2021Whether to apply the ripeness doctrine in Arizona is a matter of “prudential or judicial restraint.” City of Surprise v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 206 , 209 ¶ 8 (2019) (quoting Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm’n on App. Ct. Appointments, 233 Ariz. 119 , 122 ¶ 9 (2013)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
cluster 238985
neutral
2 sentences1984Likewise, the ripeness doctrine is often applied in cases involving attacks on general orders, rules and regulations of an administrative agency, 7 see, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir.1956); Insurance Co. of North America v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Ins. 1984Likewise, the ripeness doctrine is often applied in cases involving attacks on general orders, rules and regulations of an administrative agency, 7 see, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir.1956); Insurance Co. of North America v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Ins. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Insurance Co. of North America v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1984Dept., 327 A.2d 411 , 15 Pa. Cmwlth. 462 (1974). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hinz v. City of Phoenix
green
2 sentences1984T5] The ripeness doctrine has been utilized in many instances to justify non-intervention by the courts when the complained of administrative action has not become final because of failure to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies, see, e.g., Hinz v. City of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 161 , 575 P.2d 360 (App.1978); Stephens v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 92 , 559 P.2d 212 (App.1977). 1984T5] The ripeness doctrine has been utilized in many instances to justify non-intervention by the courts when the complained of administrative action has not become final because of failure to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies, see, e.g., Hinz v. City of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 161 , 575 P.2d 360 (App.1978); Stephens v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 92 , 559 P.2d 212 (App.1977). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stephens v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1984T5] The ripeness doctrine has been utilized in many instances to justify non-intervention by the courts when the complained of administrative action has not become final because of failure to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies, see, e.g., Hinz v. City of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 161 , 575 P.2d 360 (App.1978); Stephens v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 92 , 559 P.2d 212 (App.1977). 1984T5] The ripeness doctrine has been utilized in many instances to justify non-intervention by the courts when the complained of administrative action has not become final because of failure to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies, see, e.g., Hinz v. City of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 161 , 575 P.2d 360 (App.1978); Stephens v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 92 , 559 P.2d 212 (App.1977). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.