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13 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Larson v. Multnomah Countygreen2 sentences1993Petitioners quote, with apparent disapproval, the statement in our opinion that the ripeness requirement necessitates that “at least one application must be made after the initial denial.” Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123 , 854 P2d 476 (1993). 1993Petitioners quote, with apparent disapproval, the statement in our opinion that the ripeness requirement necessitates that “at least one application must be made after the initial denial.” Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123 , 854 P2d 476 (1993). | 1 | 3 |
Beck v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2019In U.S. West Communications v. City of Eugene , 336 Or. 181 , 81 P.3d 702 (2003), the court concluded that ORS 28.020 -which allows a person to seek a declaratory judgment if the person's rights "are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise"-codifies a ripeness requirement for justiciability of a declaratory relief action. 336 Or. at 191 , 81 P.3d 702 ; see also Beck , 202 Or. 2019App. at 366 , 122 P.3d 131 (describing U.S. West Communications as "appl[ying] the test for ripeness set out in [two prior cases] in which the court explicitly identified ripeness as a jurisdictional issue"). "[T]he legislature's use of the present tense phrase 'are affected' implies [that] the controversy must involve a dispute based on present facts rather than on contingent or hypothetical events." U.S. West Communications , 336 Or. at 191 , 81 P.3d 702 . | 1 | 1 |
Boise Cascade Corp. v. State Board of Forestrygreen2 sentences2007Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114, 116-18 , 991 P2d 563 *342 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001) (Boise IV). 2007Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114, 116-18 , 991 P2d 563 *342 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001) (Boise IV). | 1 | 1 |
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agencygreen2 sentences2005Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123-24 , 854 P2d 476 , adh’d to on recons, 123 Or App 300 , 859 P2d 574 (1993); accord Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 339 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002) (Fifth Amendment imposes “strict ripeness requirement” that protects the public interest in informed decision-making by requiring landowners to take reasonable and necessary steps to give regulatory agencies the opportunity to exercise full discretion to determine what uses are allowable before a landowner may bring a takings claim). 2005Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123-24 , 854 P2d 476 , adh’d to on recons, 123 Or App 300 , 859 P2d 574 (1993); accord Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 339 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002) (Fifth Amendment imposes “strict ripeness requirement” that protects the public interest in informed decision-making by requiring landowners to take reasonable and necessary steps to give regulatory agencies the opportunity to exercise full discretion to determine what uses are allowable before a landowner may bring a takings claim). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. City of Lake Oswegogreen2 sentences1997Relying on Nelson v. *786 City of Lake Oswego, 126 Or App 416, 420 , 869 P2d 350 (1994), plaintiffs argue that the ripeness doctrine does not apply to their claim. 4 In Nelson , the plaintiffs applied for a permit to build a house and, as a condition for approval of the permit, the city manager required the plaintiffs to convey a 55-foot drainage easement to the city. 1997Relying on Nelson v. *786 City of Lake Oswego, 126 Or App 416, 420 , 869 P2d 350 (1994), plaintiffs argue that the ripeness doctrine does not apply to their claim. 4 In Nelson , the plaintiffs applied for a permit to build a house and, as a condition for approval of the permit, the city manager required the plaintiffs to convey a 55-foot drainage easement to the city. | 1 | 1 |
Yee v. City of Escondidogreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 US_,_, 112 S Ct 1522 , 118 L Ed 2d 153, 169 (1992); MacDonald, Sommer & Frateso. 1993See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 US_,_, 112 S Ct 1522 , 118 L Ed 2d 153, 169 (1992); MacDonald, Sommer & Frateso. | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Benton Countygreen2 sentences1993See Nelson v. Benton County, 115 Or App 453, 458 , 839 P2d 233 (1992); see also note 1, supra, and note 4, infra. Therefore, even given petitioners’ distinction, the ripeness requirement applies here. 2 The petition for review presents a number of arguments, the principal one being that LUBA misconstrued Fifth Avenue as making the “irreversible damage” test applicable only in the context of decisions contemplating eventual takings for public use, while making that test inapplicable to taking claims arising from regulatory denials of land uses. 1993See Nelson v. Benton County, 115 Or App 453, 458 , 839 P2d 233 (1992); see also note 1, supra, and note 4, infra. Therefore, even given petitioners’ distinction, the ripeness requirement applies here. 2 The petition for review presents a number of arguments, the principal one being that LUBA misconstrued Fifth Avenue as making the “irreversible damage” test applicable only in the context of decisions contemplating eventual takings for public use, while making that test inapplicable to taking claims arising from regulatory denials of land uses. | 1 | 1 |
Cope v. City of Cannon Beachgreen2 sentences1993See Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or 339 , 855 P2d 1083 (1993); see also, note 4, infra. We do not imply an answer to whether the two differ in substance. 2 In Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, supra n 1, the court held that, at least for purposes of a Fifth Amendment regulatory taking claim, the same ripeness requirement does not obtain when the challenge to the regulation is a facial one. 1993See Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or 339 , 855 P2d 1083 (1993); see also, note 4, infra. We do not imply an answer to whether the two differ in substance. 2 In Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, supra n 1, the court held that, at least for purposes of a Fifth Amendment regulatory taking claim, the same ripeness requirement does not obtain when the challenge to the regulation is a facial one. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State Ex Rel. Oregon State Board of Forestry
green
2 sentences2005The third reason that we reach that conclusion is that it is consistent with the ripeness doctrine that we articulated in Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 192 Or App 126, 129 , 83 P3d 966 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 339 Or 136 , 117 P3d 990 (2005). 2005The third reason that we reach that conclusion is that it is consistent with the ripeness doctrine that we articulated in Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 192 Or App 126, 129 , 83 P3d 966 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 339 Or 136 , 117 P3d 990 (2005). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State Ex Rel. Oregon State Board of Forestry
green
2 sentences2005The third reason that we reach that conclusion is that it is consistent with the ripeness doctrine that we articulated in Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 192 Or App 126, 129 , 83 P3d 966 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 339 Or 136 , 117 P3d 990 (2005). 2005The third reason that we reach that conclusion is that it is consistent with the ripeness doctrine that we articulated in Coast Range Conifers v. Board of Forestry, 192 Or App 126, 129 , 83 P3d 966 (2004), rev’d on other grounds, 339 Or 136 , 117 P3d 990 (2005). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
US West Communications, Inc. v. City of Eugene
green
2 sentences2019In U.S. West Communications v. City of Eugene , 336 Or. 181 , 81 P.3d 702 (2003), the court concluded that ORS 28.020 -which allows a person to seek a declaratory judgment if the person's rights "are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise"-codifies a ripeness requirement for justiciability of a declaratory relief action. 336 Or. at 191 , 81 P.3d 702 ; see also Beck , 202 Or. 2019In U.S. West Communications v. City of Eugene , 336 Or. 181 , 81 P.3d 702 (2003), the court concluded that ORS 28.020 -which allows a person to seek a declaratory judgment if the person's rights "are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise"-codifies a ripeness requirement for justiciability of a declaratory relief action. 336 Or. at 191 , 81 P.3d 702 ; see also Beck , 202 Or. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dixon v. Regents of the University of New Mexico
green
1 sentence2007Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 164 Or App 114, 116-18 , 991 P2d 563 *342 (1999), rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000), cert den, 532 US 923 (2001) (Boise IV). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brown v. Oregon State Bar
green
1 sentence2007Brown, 293 Or at 449 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 304 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Larson v. Multnomah County
green
2 sentences2005Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123-24 , 854 P2d 476 , adh’d to on recons, 123 Or App 300 , 859 P2d 574 (1993); accord Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 339 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002) (Fifth Amendment imposes “strict ripeness requirement” that protects the public interest in informed decision-making by requiring landowners to take reasonable and necessary steps to give regulatory agencies the opportunity to exercise full discretion to determine what uses are allowable before a landowner may bring a takings claim). 2005Larson v. Multnomah County, 121 Or App 119, 123-24 , 854 P2d 476 , adh’d to on recons, 123 Or App 300 , 859 P2d 574 (1993); accord Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 339 , 122 S Ct 1465 , 152 L Ed 2d 517 (2002) (Fifth Amendment imposes “strict ripeness requirement” that protects the public interest in informed decision-making by requiring landowners to take reasonable and necessary steps to give regulatory agencies the opportunity to exercise full discretion to determine what uses are allowable before a landowner may bring a takings claim). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City
red
1 sentence2003Thus, in Williamson Planning Commission, there was no “futility” exception to the ripeness requirement because it appeared to the Court that “variances could have been granted” that would have allowed the development to occur. 473 US at 188 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton
green
2 sentences1994As the Oregon Supreme Court said in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254 , 656 P.2d 306 (1982), in either case, "the landowner may not simply rest on the apparent preclusive effect of the [challenged] plan or other regulation when administrative procedures exist by which [the landowner] might obtain at least temporary or partial relief, including administrative procedures for amending the plan. 1994As the Oregon Supreme Court said in Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254 , 656 P.2d 306 (1982), in either case, "the landowner may not simply rest on the apparent preclusive effect of the [challenged] plan or other regulation when administrative procedures exist by which [the landowner] might obtain at least temporary or partial relief, including administrative procedures for amending the plan. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Fifth Avenue Corp. v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, ETC.
green
2 sentences1994In Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., supra , for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a landowner's challenge to the constitutionality of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, because the landowner had failed to request amendments to either the plan or the zoning ordinance. 282 Or. at 615-22 , 581 P.2d 50 . 1994In Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., supra , for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a landowner's challenge to the constitutionality of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, because the landowner had failed to request amendments to either the plan or the zoning ordinance. 282 Or. at 615-22 , 581 P.2d 50 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Dority v. Clackamas County
neutral
1 sentence1993(Footnote omitted.) 1 Similarly, in Dority v. Clackamas County, 115 Or App 449 , 839 P2d 1103 (1992), rev den 315 Or 311 (1993), we held that, under Article I, section 18, of the state constitution, a landowner could not satisfy the ripeness requirement simply by pointing to the unavailability of a particular procedure for obtaining permission to conduct a use that had been initially denied, as long as at least one other local application procedure for the same or another economically viable use remained available and none had been pursued. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.