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11 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1986–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York Blue Line Council, Inc. v. Adirondak Park Agencygreen2 sentences2025Notably, "the mere fact that petitioner[ ] may have to endure [respondents'] review process is not sufficient, without more, to constitute injury" for purposes of a ripeness inquiry ( Matter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc. v Adirondack Park Agency , 86 AD3d at 761 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). 2025Notably, "the mere fact that petitioner[ ] may have to endure [respondents'] review process is not sufficient, without more, to constitute injury" for purposes of a ripeness inquiry ( Matter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc. v Adirondack Park Agency , 86 AD3d at 761 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Clair v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2022The Department of Buildings letter to petitioner, which indicated that it intended to revoke certain approvals, permits and signoffs unless petitioner demonstrated that they should not be revoked, did not constitute a final and binding agency determination which inflicted actual, concrete injury on petitioner ( see Matter of Clair v City of New York , 144 AD3d 98, 108 [1st Dept 2016]; Cubas v Martinez , 33 AD3d 96, 103 [1st Dept 2006]). 2022The Department of Buildings letter to petitioner, which indicated that it intended to revoke certain approvals, permits and signoffs unless petitioner demonstrated that they should not be revoked, did not constitute a final and binding agency determination which inflicted actual, concrete injury on petitioner ( see Matter of Clair v City of New York , 144 AD3d 98, 108 [1st Dept 2016]; Cubas v Martinez , 33 AD3d 96, 103 [1st Dept 2006]). | 2 | 2 |
Cubas v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2022The Department of Buildings letter to petitioner, which indicated that it intended to revoke certain approvals, permits and signoffs unless petitioner demonstrated that they should not be revoked, did not constitute a final and binding agency determination which inflicted actual, concrete injury on petitioner ( see Matter of Clair v City of New York , 144 AD3d 98, 108 [1st Dept 2016]; Cubas v Martinez , 33 AD3d 96, 103 [1st Dept 2006]). 2022The Department of Buildings letter to petitioner, which indicated that it intended to revoke certain approvals, permits and signoffs unless petitioner demonstrated that they should not be revoked, did not constitute a final and binding agency determination which inflicted actual, concrete injury on petitioner ( see Matter of Clair v City of New York , 144 AD3d 98, 108 [1st Dept 2016]; Cubas v Martinez , 33 AD3d 96, 103 [1st Dept 2006]). | 2 | 2 |
Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Patakigreen1 sentence2016Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 240 [1984]; accord Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 275 AD2d 145, 158 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Nys Law Enforcement Employees v. Cuomogreen1 sentence2016Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233, 240 [1984]; accord Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce v Pataki, 275 AD2d 145, 158 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
Mangold v. ANSER CORP.green1 sentence2005Ordinarily, Eighth Amendment challenges arise in an as- applied context, thus requiring, as a predicate for judicial review, “the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” (Cheffer v Reno, 55 F3d 1517, 1523 [11th Cir 1995]; see also Kraebel v Michetti, 1994 WL 455468 , *11, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1196, *31 [SD NY 1994] [“Merely being potentially subject to fines, without an actual finding of liability, is not enough to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation”].) The ripeness doctrine “asks whether there is sufficient injury to meet [the] requirem | 1 | 1 |
Cheffer v. Renogreen2 sentences2005Ordinarily, Eighth Amendment challenges arise in an as- applied context, thus requiring, as a predicate for judicial review, “the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” (Cheffer v Reno, 55 F3d 1517, 1523 [11th Cir 1995]; see also Kraebel v Michetti, 1994 WL 455468 , *11, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1196, *31 [SD NY 1994] [“Merely being potentially subject to fines, without an actual finding of liability, is not enough to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation”].) The ripeness doctrine “asks whether there is sufficient injury to meet [the] requirem 2005Ordinarily, Eighth Amendment challenges arise in an as- applied context, thus requiring, as a predicate for judicial review, “the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” (Cheffer v Reno, 55 F3d 1517, 1523 [11th Cir 1995]; see also Kraebel v Michetti, 1994 WL 455468 , *11, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1196, *31 [SD NY 1994] [“Merely being potentially subject to fines, without an actual finding of liability, is not enough to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation”].) The ripeness doctrine “asks whether there is sufficient injury to meet [the] requirem | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bajakajiangreen1 sentence2005Ordinarily, Eighth Amendment challenges arise in an as- applied context, thus requiring, as a predicate for judicial review, “the imposition, or immediately impending imposition, of a challenged punishment or fine.” (Cheffer v Reno, 55 F3d 1517, 1523 [11th Cir 1995]; see also Kraebel v Michetti, 1994 WL 455468 , *11, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 1196, *31 [SD NY 1994] [“Merely being potentially subject to fines, without an actual finding of liability, is not enough to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation”].) The ripeness doctrine “asks whether there is sufficient injury to meet [the] requirem | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Essex County v. Zagata
green
2 sentences2016As the Court has recognized, the ripeness doctrine is closely related to the finality requirement, and in order for an administrative determination to be final, and thus justiciable, it must be ripe for judicial review (Matter of Essex County, 91 NY2d at 453-454 , 454 n). 2003The considerations applied to the finality analysis in Essex County also apply to a ripeness analysis (see Essex County, 91 NY2d at 454 n). . | 2 | 2003–2016 |
Petosa v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1992Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66 , supra; Petosa v City of New York, 135 AD2d 800 , lv denied 71 NY2d 807 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Honore de St. Aubin v. Flacke
green
1 sentence1992Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66 , supra; Petosa v City of New York, 135 AD2d 800 , lv denied 71 NY2d 807 ). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick
green
1 sentence1987Andrew v Barwick ( 67 NY2d 510, 521 , cert denied — US —, 107 S Ct 574 ), in the following manner: "The ripeness requirement that a plaintiff must make use of available administrative means to forestall the alleged harm should not be confused with the requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before an action may be judicially reviewed (see, Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US, at p[p 192-193] * * * supra). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. BarWick
green
1 sentence1987Andrew v Barwick ( 67 NY2d 510, 521 , cert denied — US —, 107 S Ct 574 ), in the following manner: "The ripeness requirement that a plaintiff must make use of available administrative means to forestall the alleged harm should not be confused with the requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before an action may be judicially reviewed (see, Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US, at p[p 192-193] * * * supra). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City
red
2 sentences1986The focus of the "exhaustion” requirement, on the other hand, is not on the challenged action itself, but on whether administrative procedures are available to review that action and whether those procedures have been exhausted (see, Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US, at p —, 105 S Ct, at p 3120 , supra). 1986The ripeness requirement that a plaintiff must make use of available administrative means to forestall the alleged harm should not be confused with the requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted before an action may be judicially reviewed (see, Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v Hamilton Bank, 473 US, at p —, 105 S Ct, at p 3120 , supra). 5 Ripeness pertains to the administrative action which produces the alleged harm to plaintiff; the focus of the inquiry is on the finality and effect of the challenged action and whether harm from it might be prevented or cured by ad | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.