ripeness doctrine in Florida

2013“Any analysis in an as-applied regulatory taking claim must start with the threshold question of ripeness.... ” Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.2d 1174, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (noting that “Florida courts have ... adopted the ripeness requirement”).

2002As the Palazzolo court noted, a "futility exception" exists to the ripeness requirement that we have similarly acknowledged in City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.2d 1174, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

2013See Tinnerman, 641 So.2d at 525 (“[T]he ripeness requirement of a final decision requires more than procedural finality because it includes an opportunity for government to change its mind.”).

1998See Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So.2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

2013See Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 726 (11th Cir.1990) (on pet. for reh’g) (describing the “futility exception” to the “final decision” requirement); Shillingburg, 659 So.2d at 1181 ; McCole v. Marathon, 36 So.3d 750, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

1995The Reahard court reaffirmed the ripeness requirement set forth in Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720-21 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 , 111 S.Ct. 1073 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1179 (1991), noting that the "impact and interference [with investment-backed expectations] cannot be ascertained until the local authority has determined the nature and extent of the development that will be permitted." Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1135 n. 7.

2002See Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030, 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

1998See Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So.2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

2008The ripeness requirement applies only to as-applied takings and does not apply to facial takings because in a facial taking "the mere enactment of the regulation constitutes the taking of all economic value to the land." Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Taylor, 659 So.2d at 1172 n. 3 (explaining that "based on Supreme Court precedent[,] the ripeness doctrine *716 has generally not been applied to facial challenges").

2008The ripeness requirement applies only to as-applied takings and does not apply to facial takings because in a facial taking "the mere enactment of the regulation constitutes the taking of all economic value to the land." Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Taylor, 659 So.2d at 1172 n. 3 (explaining that "based on Supreme Court precedent[,] the ripeness doctrine *716 has generally not been applied to facial challenges").

2002See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 352-53 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 ; Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 187-88 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 .

2002See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 352-53 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 ; Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 187-88 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 .

2017Under certain circumstances, “where the governmental agency effectively concedes that any other development would be impermissible, this can negate the requirement of pursuing further administrative remedies and the governmental action is effectively treated as a final decision.” Taylor v. City of Riviera Beach, 801 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingburg, 659 So.2d 1174, 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).

2002For example, in Taylor v. Riviera Beach we held the landowner's taking claim was ripe where it would have been futile to seek an amendment to a comprehensive plan after the same had already been considered and rejected. 801 So.2d at 263 .

2002Id. at 1181 (citation omitted); accord Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ("Ripeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake.").

2002Id. at 1181 (citation omitted); accord Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 622 , 121 S.Ct. 2448 ("Ripeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake.").

2013See Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 726 (11th Cir.1990) (on pet. for reh’g) (describing the “futility exception” to the “final decision” requirement); Shillingburg, 659 So.2d at 1181 ; McCole v. Marathon, 36 So.3d 750, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

2008The ripeness requirement applies only to as-applied takings and does not apply to facial takings because in a facial taking "the mere enactment of the regulation constitutes the taking of all economic value to the land." Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Taylor, 659 So.2d at 1172 n. 3 (explaining that "based on Supreme Court precedent[,] the ripeness doctrine *716 has generally not been applied to facial challenges").

2008The ripeness requirement applies only to as-applied takings and does not apply to facial takings because in a facial taking "the mere enactment of the regulation constitutes the taking of all economic value to the land." Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach, 838 So.2d 561, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also Taylor, 659 So.2d at 1172 n. 3 (explaining that "based on Supreme Court precedent[,] the ripeness doctrine *716 has generally not been applied to facial challenges").

1995See Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), review dismissed, 652 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1995). [4] It should be noted that recent legislation, effective October 1, 1995, has altered the ripeness requirement for cases involving governmental regulation of private land use.

1995See Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), review dismissed, 652 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1995). [4] It should be noted that recent legislation, effective October 1, 1995, has altered the ripeness requirement for cases involving governmental regulation of private land use.

1995Department of Transp. v. Jirik, 471 So.2d 549, 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), decision approved, 498 So.2d 1253 (Fla. 1986). [3] We did not consider ripeness as an absolute bar to consideration of landowner's facial challenge because, based on Supreme Court precedent the ripeness doctrine has generally not been applied to facial challenges.

1995See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).

1995See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 , 107 S.Ct. 1232 , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 , 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141 , 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).